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ABSTRACT 
Volume I of this report is concerned with the architecture of a 
fault tolerant digital computer for an advanced commercial aircraft. All 
of the computations of the aircraft, including those presently carried out 
by analogue techniques, are to be carried out in this digital computer. 
Among the important qualities of the computer are the following: (1) the 
capacity is to be matched to the aircraft environment, (2) the reliability 
is to be selectively matched to the criticality and deadline requirements 
of each of the computations, (3) the system is to be readily expandable and 
contractible and (4) the design is to appropriate to post 1975 technology. 
Three candidate architectures are discussed and assessed 'in terms of the 
above qualities. Of the three •candidates, a.newly conceived architecture, 
Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT), provides the best match to the 
above qualities. In addition SIFT is particularly simple and believable. 
The other candidates, Bus Checker System (BUCS), also newly conceived in 
this project, and the Hopkins multiprocessor arepotentially more efficient 
than SIFT in the use of redundancy, but otherwise are not as attractive. 
Volume II of the report is concerned with a detailed description and catego-
rization of the computations and with a discussion of the technology available 
for realizing the-computer-system. 
PRECEDING PAGE BLAN LI)T F'D 
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PREFACE 
This report, issued in two volumes, summarizes the work of Stanford 
Research Institute on Contract NAS1-10920. The goal of the contract was 
to specify the design of a computer, destined for use as the central com-
puter in an advanced, high-performance commerical aircraft. Because of 
the critical nature of many of the computations, fault tolerance was the 
primary design goal of the computer. Other important design goals of 
the computer relate to 
• The matching of the architecture to the aircraft computations 
• The capability for expansion or contraction to meet the 
requirements of various missions 
• The suitability to post 1975 technology. 
Volume I is concerned with the architecture of fault tolerant com-
puters, that are matched to the, aircraft 'environment. We selected and 
studied three candidate architectures as part of Task I of the contract. 
Two of these architectures,, Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT) 
and Bus Checker System (BUCS) are new and as such are described In detail. 
The third candidate architecture is a multiprocessor '
 concept that is due 
to Al Hopkins of MIT-Draper Laboratories. We are aware of the extensive 
work that has been devoted to fault tolerant techniques and architectures 
over the past decade. However, a survey of this work has pointed out 
significant deficiencies In each architecture, for our particular constraints. 
For the most well-known of these previously studied architectures we document 
the deficiencies. 
Volume II of the report is organized as two parts. Part 1 Is concerned 
with the computational requirements of an aircraft, wherein it is assumed 
that all of the computations scattered among special purpose analogue and 
mechanical computers would be carried out by a centralized digital computer. 
In addition to the usual computations associated with a commercial aircraft, 
e.g. navigation, stability augmentation, decrab, we also assume advanced 
cockpit displays and fly-by-wire. These various computations are categorized 
according to criticality, and for each computation we derive such parameters 
xiii 
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as memory requirements, processor requirements, iteration rates, the 
tolerable down time and the amount of data that must be saved in the 
event of failure. These results are concisely tabulated. 
Part 2 of Volume II is concerned with the technology for realizing 
the central computer. It is assumed that production would commence in 
the late 1970's. The two aspects of the realization that we consider are 
concerned with logic and memory and with module interconnections. With 
regard to logic and memory we assess the various technologies, MOS,.CMOS, 
BIPOLAR, etc., as a function of requirements of speed, reliability, cost, 
number of units. In addition we discuss such realizations as customized 
large scale integrated (LSI), medium scale integrated (MSI), programmable 
logic in the light of the above requirements. With regard to inter-
connection technology the primary goal .-is to prevent the propagation of 
faults beyond some predetermined module boundaries. Various approaches 
toward achieving this fault confinement .are assessed in terms of speed, 
cost, reliability. 
We would like to acknowledge the support of Nick Murray and his 
colleagues at NASA-Langley--Sal Bavuso, Larry Spencer, Bill Dove, and 
Brian Lupton. They interacted with us on all phases of .the project and 
provided valuable guidance. On the computation aspects many aircraft 
and avionic specialists provided us with detailed descriptions of algorithms 
as well as experience on the conversion of analogue algorithms to adigital 
representation. With regard to architecture, we have had stimulating dis-
cussions with Al Hopkins, Al Avizienis, Bill Carter, Bill Martin,. 
Barry Borgerson and Jim Miller. Many of their ideas are reflected in 
our candidate architectures. 	 . .	 . . 
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I	 INTRODUCTION 
A.	 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to aid NASA in specifying the design of 
a computer, destined for use as the central computer in an advanced, high-
performance commercial aircraft. This computer, or more realistically, 
computer complex, is to 
(1) be responsible for all of the aircraft computations 
currently being carried out by analogue, mechanical or 
dedicated, special purpose digital computers, 
(2) be capable of carrying out computations associated with 
an advanced aircraft of the type similar to the proposed 
Advanced Technology Transport (ATr), 
(3) exhibit sufficiently high reliability such that the 
probability of a computer failure adversely effecting 
the fligh.t is negligible as compared with other system 
failures. In particular, the design goal is 10 -8 
failures/hour for the flight critical function. For 
computations that are not flight critical higher 
failure rates can be tolerated. 
(4) be readily expandable and contractible so as to meet 
the needs of various missions, 
(5) be matched to the post 1975 component technology. 
The present study is composed of three tasks, as follows: 
Computational Requirements: .
 The purpose of this task is to 
survey all of the computations being carried out in contem-
porary commercial aircraft .
 (e.g. navigation, autopilot, auto-
land, control of cabin pressure) and in the projected ATT 
(e.g. advanced stability augmentation, collision avoidance). 
The survey is to reveal aspects of these computations that 
influence the architecture of the computer including, word 
size, memory requirements, reliability, recovery time from 
a failure. Volume II of this report describes, in detail, 
the algorithms for 3ach computation and extracts from these 
1
algorithms some of the crucial parameters for the individual. 
computations. Chapter III of this volume summarizes the 
information and presents a global view of the implications 
of the computations on the computer aircraft. 
Technology: The purpose of this task is to survey the technology 
associated with the various system blocks of the computer. If 
this computer is to be produced in large quantities, production 
will commence in the late 1970's. Volume II of this report 
discusses in detail the prognoses for the following technologies: 
logiá, main read-write memory, read-only memory, buffer-type 
memory, back-up memory, and interconnections. For each of these 
technologies the report discusses speed, reliability and cost. 
Architecture: The purpose of this task is to specify the 
architecture of three candidate computers, each of which can 
match the computational and reliability requirements, and the 
technology constraints revealed in the other two tasks. The 
hardware and software systems of the candidates are to be 
specified to a level such that the overall reliability can be 
assessed. In essence then, each candidate is to be specified 
in terms of a concept, wherein detailed design and analysis is 
to be avoided unless required for the reliability assessment. 
For example, a detailed description is needed of the process of 
recovering from a suspected transient fault, but a detailed 
description of the arithmetic unit is not needed unless it em-
bodies some particular fault tolerance scheme. This volume 
summarizes our work on the architecture task. 
B.	 Organization of the.-Report 
Chapter II briefly reviews the reliability enhancement techniques 
that have been proposed and analyzed during the past 15 years. Our 
review is purposely terse since most of these techniques are, by now, 
well-known. The intent is to delineate, a set of concepts that are 
used in the three architectures.
Chapter III is concerned with the implications of the computational 
requirements task. Here we summarize the results of the computation sur-
vey and convert the results into computer parameters: e.g., word size, 
I/O bandwidth, fault recovery time, multiprogramming characteristics. 
Chapter IV discusses constraints on the architecture as revealed by 
the technology task. For example, we discuss the impact of LSI technology 
on approaches toward applying redundancy and on the desirability of using 
slow memories to aid in system recovery. A primary feature of the tech-
nology task is a review of interconnection technology, at all system levels 
(chip-chip, card-card, subsystem-subsystem), and the impact of various 
approaches to interconnection on. the problem of fault isolation. 
Chapter V is a "checklist" for the design of a fault-tolerant com-
puter, for the particular aircraft environment that we are confronted 
with. We summarize here, for example, the fault types that must be 
accounted for, the various alternative approaches.to system design, the 
components of the reliability analysis, and in general the details to look 
for in the design and analysis of the computer. 
Perhaps the simplest architectural concept that can meet the relia-
bility requirements involves the use of three or more complete computers 
operating in a locked-step manner. We call such an approach the multi-
channel concept (MCC). The basic reliability technique is trivial here--
a simple voting or adaptive voting suffices. However, there are still 
important design decisions required for the multi-channel concept, in 
particular relating to the operating system procedures for transient 
fault recovery, and to communication among the computer units. However, 
we decided not to pursue this concept, for the following reasons 
• NASA Langley is in the process of establishing a detailed 
design and implementation effort based on the MCC. 
• Comparable reliability performance can be achieved with 
a system that consumes less hardware redundancy. Such a 
cheaper system takes advantage of the possibilities for 
allocating sub-tasks to independent processor units, and 
the possibilities for using less costly coding techniques 
in memory.
3
• All of the interesting software problems attendant to the 
MCC are confronted in practically all types of fault 
tolerant architectures. 
In the second half of Chapter V we survey existing architectures 
that have been suggested for various fault tolerant applications. It is 
clear that NASA-Langley should pursue an existing concept provided it is 
matched to the . aircraft requirements. The systems that we surveyed are 
the following: 
0 Self-Testing and Repairing Computer, (STAR) of JPL. 
• All Application Digital Computer (AADC) of the Naval Air 
Systems Command. 
• Experimental Aerospace Multiprocessor (EXAM) of NASA-Electronics 
Research Center. 
• Automatically Reconfigurable Modular Multiprocessor 
System (ARMMS) of NASA-Marshall Space , Flight Center and 
of Hughes. 
• Modular Architecture for Reliable Computer Systems (MARCS) 
of IBM-Yorktown. 
.• A Fault-Tolerant Information Processing System for. Advanced 
Control Guidance and Navigation (Hopkins' Multiprocessor)' 
'of MIT Draper Laboratory. 
This chapter will present detailed information on each of these systems, 
but for purposes of summary we feel that only the Hopkins' Multiprocessor 
should be considered as a candidate architecture, although extensive 
design and analysis must be carried out to ensure that the concept is 
suitable to our environment. To-be fair to the architects of some. of 
the other systems we should state that their concepts have not yet con-
fronted all of the reliability questions. Hence most of the concepts 
can be adapted to achieve fault tolerance although this design process 
would probably entail 'as much work as dcieloping a new system from 
start, and may not produce a better machine than one designed explicitly 
for the environment-we have in mind..'	 . 
4
Chapter VI presents a discussion of the Software Implemented Fault 
Tolerance ConcepL (SIFT), one of two candidate architectures that we de-
signed anew. We recommend that SIFT be selected for pursual in further 
design phases since it meets all of our reliability, computational, and 
cost objectives, and, moreover, it is likely to be the least costly in 
the construction of a prototype. This attractiveness in cost is due to 
the following factors: 
(I) The fault detection and recovery processes are carried 
out by software (although firmware or special hardware 
would also suffice). 
(2) All units could be simple "off-the--shelf" computers, or 
be realized from existing designs. 
(3) Very little ancillary hardware, (the only exception being 
a bus structure) is required to implement the concept. 
(4) The architecture is well-suited to varying reliability 
requirements among the computations. 
Hence, the SIFT concept could be experimentally evaluated by programming 
special executive routines on 3 or 4 minicomputers. 
Chapter VII presents a discussion of another, newly conceived can-
didate architecture, denoted as the Bus Checker System (BUCS). BUCS 
was inspired by the architectures covered in our survey. 
As in SIFT, processing units that are nearly conventional suffice 
as the primary computing elements. However, the memories utilize coding 
techniques to enhance reliability at a relatively low cost, and a "smart" 
.bus acts in concert with a software executive to detect faults and recon-
figure the system.	 . 
Chapter VIII summarizes the characteristics of the three candidate 
architectures and presents our conclusions and recommendations. 
Appendix A describes the detailed design of an algorithm for SIFT 
that allocates computational tasks to processors. Appendix B presents 
a detailed comparison of the SIFT architecture with the multi-channel 
concept, in terms of reliability and redundancy. 
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II REVIEW OF RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES 
A.	 Introduction 
In this chapter we review the various redundancy techniques for im-
proving digital system reliability that have been proposed during the 
past 15 years. Our review is intentionally brief since 
(1) There have been no fundamental breakthroughs since our 
last survey  of the field six years 'ago. 
(2) Most of the redundancy techniques that . are theoretically 
interesting are only applicable at the component level. 
The constraints imposed by the emerging LSI technology 
(see Chapter IV) are such that redundancy should be 
applied over chip, not within the components of chips. 
Hence relatively few redundancy techniques remain relevant, 
and moreover system architecture considerations are now of 
primary interest. 
(3) The underlying concepts are relatively simple. 
We have concluded that architectural considerations are of primary 
importance in the design of 
.
a reliable digital computer, as compared 
with so-called low-level redundancy techniques. For example, workable 
strategies for. recovering from transient faults, or the protection of 
programs and data in the event of a fault are less understood than 
abstract redundancy techniques. However, some of these redundancy 
techniques, originally intended for low-level application, form the 
basis for enhancing system reliability even when applied at a high 
level. 
The attainment of high reliability in a system requires that 
* 
(1) Faults be detected subsequent to their occurrence. 
(2) Errors produced by these faults be masked or the faulty 
unit should be disconnected and be replaced by an 
operational one. 
The following terminology has become more or less standard in the re-
liability field. A fault is the actual malfunctioning of an element. 
An error is the appearance of incorrect data, on some data line, as 
a result of a fault.
 NOT 
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Two techniques have been seriously proposed to accomplish fault 
detection, namely: 
(1) The data lines of the system are encoded so that under 
fault-free conditions the signals on the data lines 
form a code word in an error detecting/correcting code. 
The occurrence of any fault, within a detectable class, 
is to introduce an error such that a non-code word 
appears on the data lines. (Duplication is an instance 
of a trivial error-detecting code.) 
(2) All system blocks are subject to periodic diagnosis in 
order to determine if a fault has occurred since the 
last attempt at diagnosis. There are important system 
questions concerned with such high-level diagnosis, in 
particular how to account for faulty diagnosing units.2'3 
A third possible technique involves the use of a checking program 
that can carry out consistency checks on another program. This tech-
nique is not studied here because it is clearly dependent on the 
particular application programs. 
For our application the use of periodic diagnosis is not recommended 
as the primary fault detection process since 
(a) transient faults are not detected nor prevented from 
causing data loss by periodic diagnosis, 
(b) the effectiveness of diagnostic routines remains sus-
pect, given the present state of the art, 
(c) the real-time nature of most of the computations pre-
cludes the possibility of buffering computed results 
pending the results of a diagnostic test, 
(ci) diagnostic test schedules derived by contemporary 
systematic approaches usually guarantee detection of 
only single or double gate type failures. However, 
in LSI chips more complicated fault behavior seems to 
be possible including multiple gate faults, and shorts 
in interconnections.
8
The diagnostic approach to fault detection does have a role in certain 
system functions. As we, demonstrate later a memory system can be effec-
tively diagnosed provided other auxiliary.error-detection techniques 
are used'. Moreover a form, of diagnosis is essential in initializing the 
computer system., and in effecting a recovery from a "massive transient" 
fault. 
One notes that technique (1) incorporates only spatial redundancy 
while technique (2) incorporates primarily temporal redundancy. That is 
in the diagnosis approach certain time periods that otherwise would be 
devoted to useful computation are set aside for purposes of detecting 
faults. It 'might be fruitful to explore approaches that combine the 
attractive features of the spatial and temporal approaches. 
Once a fault has been detected, and pinpointed, it remains to apply 
some form of corrective action. When error correcting codes'are used, 
the decoder can produce at its output the intended code word, thus cor-
'recting the effects of the fault. Another approach is to utilize the 
error detecting possibilities of the code to point to a faulty unit, in 
which case the' faulty unit is replaced , by an operational unit. For the 
diagnosis approach the implication is that the corrective action is 
unit replacement. One recognizes that there are important questions 
concerned with uhit replacement, e.g., data recovery, and 'establishing 
the proper state in the newly connected unit. The solution of these 
problems is a dominant theme of 'the later sections of this report. In 
this chapter we concentrate on fault detection and fault correction 
using coding approaches, 
In Section B below we outline the, aspects of coding theory perti-
nent to this discussion. Section C briefly discusses the use of the 
trivial duplication and triplication codes in fault detection and 
masking. Section D discusses the disadvantage (apparent) of utilizing 
more complicated codes in the processor portion of the computer. Section 
E demonstrates the use of coding techniques in the memory sections, in 
particular involving techniques wherein a symbol in .a higher order 
alphabet (greater than two) is associated' with an LSI memory chip. 
Section F presents some comparisons ' among the techniques for memory systems, 
and summarizes our views on redundancy techniques for this application. 
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B.	 Coding Techniques 
The following is a very brief background of the pertinent aspects of 
coding theory. An (n, k;q) code contains q code words of length n, 
wherein each of the symbols is taken from the field GF(q). The number of 
redundant digits is r 	 n - k. The Hamming distance of the code, d, is the 
number of places in which a pair Of code words contain differing symbols, 
minimized over all pairs of code words. For a code of distance d, any com-
bination of t or fewer errors can be corrected, t < d/2, and any combination 
of 6 or fewer errors beyond t can be detected when 6 = d - (2t-1). In a 
linear code the q  code words form a linear subspace. 
For a systematic code, the encoding processes may:be thought of as 
being applied to an n-digit codeword (X, Y) that consists of a k-digit 
information portion X and an r-digit check portion Y. The task of the 
encoder is, of course, the calculation of the Y vector from the X vector, 
assumed given. For an r X n parity check matrix H in echelon canonical 
form, namely
H 
= 9r x k. r X r1 
the computation of Y may be expressed as Y ='QX. 
•	 The decoding process, when error correction is desired, involves con-. 
vertirig .a "received" vector (X*, y*) which may differ from the "transmitted" 
vectorbecause of errors, into the code word which is closest in }tamming 
distance to the received word. The decoding process might only Involve error 
detection in which case the decoding process merely indicates that a received 
word is not equal to a code word. The decoding process might Involve a com-
bination of error correction and detection, in which case, for example, if. 
the received word is within distance two of a code word that code word 
emerges from the decoder, otherwise an error - indication emerges. 
The distance properties-of the code bear a simple relationship to the 
columns of the H-matrix. The code has distance d iff (if and only if) all 
combinations of d - 1 or fewer columns of the H-matrix are linearly inde-
pendent, and there exists a set of d columns that are linearly.dependent. 
For low distance codes, say d < 4, the decodig process is easily carried 
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*	 * 
out by reference to the H-matrix. The product QX is formed from X, and 
*	 * 
then the reference to the H-matrix.. The product QX is formed from X 
and then the received digits are added to form the error syndrome 
	
.*	 * 
Z = QX -Y, 
where it is understood that all of the operations are carried out according 
to the rules of the field GF(q). An error has occurred if and only if Z is 
non-zero. For single-error correction, the digit position in error is iden-
tified by the corresponding column in H being a nonzero multiple (in GF(q)) 
of Z. For double error correction, the correspondence is between a linear 
combination of a pair of columns In H and Z. 
C.	 The Trivial Duplication and Triplication Codes 
Perhaps the simplest error detection scheme that can be visualized Is 
to use two independent systems, each computing ostensibly the same result 
and to compare the results for disagreement. If each system has a single 
binary output line then the code being utilized is a (2, 1; 2) code, with 
H-matrix H = [1 i]. If the systems contain more than one output line then 
the entire system is duplicated, and the corresponding lines in each 
replicate form the positions of distinct duplication codes. The underlying 
assumption is that a single fault only introduces an error On an output 
line(s) in one system. Hence, with knowledge of the probability of a fault 
the effectiveness of the duplication approach can be 'assessed when incor-
porated in a system configuration. There are several possible system con-
figurations that use duplication as the basic. error detection mechanism. 
These include	 . 
(1) an, ensemble of processor pairs wherein one pair is 
active In computation at a given Instant. The detection 
of an error In this active pair, by virtue of a disagreement, 
precipitates the replacement of this pair by another pair. 
It is possible that no effort Is expended to diagnose the 
faulty pair to pinpoint the possible single faulty system--
a concept proposed in the' Hopkins candidate architecture .

	
discussed in Chapter V.
	 .	 .	 .
(2) The same concept as above except that a diagnosis is carried 
out to pinpoint the possibly fault-free unit in a failed pair, 
and return it to service. 
Section F discusses the reliability performance of a coded memory system. 
The simplest error correction scheme involving coding is to use 
three independent systems to carry out a calculation, and to take a 
majority vote of the results. As in the duplication case above, If each 
system contains more than one output line, the vote is taken independently 
• for each output line trio. The code being utilized is a (3, 1;2) code 
with H-matrix
1' 1 0 
H- 1101 
There are several extensions and system implications of this simple 
triplication code as follows. 
(1) An (n, 1;2) code can be utilized wherein any combination of 
L(n-l)/2J or fewer* failures are masked and one extra failure 
Is detected if n Iseven. The decoder Is a threshold network 
with n Inputs and a threshold of In/21 
(2) A.(3, 1; 2) code is utilized to both correct a single error 
and to distinguish the systemblock In error. Thus upon 
the occurrence of an error-some control external to the 
blocks in question switches out the-dissenting block, If 
it is other thana combinational network, the Inserted 
block must be initialized to the state of the other blocks. 
Note that in the candidate architectures to be described the 
switchover Is accomplished by an executive operating in part 
with software and in part with hardware. 
* The notation LxJ and rxl signifies the largest Integer less than or 
equal to x, and the largest integer greater than or equal to x, 
respectively.
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(3) An (n, 1;2) code is utilized whereiji n is varied as faults 
occur and are corrected. This adaptive scheme, proposed by 
Pierce, 4 Goldberg., 5 and undoubtedly others, operates as 
follows. As in technique (1) above the decoder is initially 
set at a threshold .of [n/21 , and thus the system can correct 
any combination of [(n-l)/2J or fewer faults (permanent or 
transient). When the first failure occurs, the malfunctioning 
blOck is logically disconnected, whence the code is transferred 
to a(n.', 1; 2) code, where n' = n - 1. The next failure 
results in an additional decrementing to n II = n / - 1, and so 
on until the code length is reduced to three or possibly two. 
Obviously, this approach (3) exhibits more fault tolerance than 
technique (1), and is comparable in fault tolerance to.-tech-
nique (2) is generally to be preferred because it is compatible 
with graceful degradation. Technique (3) is to be preferred 
only for those applications that cannot endure the switchover 
time associated with (2), or for those applications that cannot 
attain multiple transient fault tolerance with technique (2). 
D.. Use of Less Trivial Codes for Enhancing Processor Reliability 
Ever since the coding theorists have demonstrated the effectiveness 
of error correcting codes in increasing the reliability of information 
transmission, .a search has been underway to uncover a similar concept for 
computation. There have 'been numerous noble attempts, but, in our opinion 
there seems to be no coding technique for the processor portion of the 
computer that is more effective than the trivial techniques of the previous 
section. This is especially, the case for the processors that are suitable 
for our environment, since they are relatively small, being only about 2,000 
gates or several LSI Chips. 
We divide this discussion into sections concerned with arbitrary 
logic and arithmetic.
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I .	 Arbitrary Logic 
By arbitrary logic we refer to the irregularly structured corn-
binational and sequential circuits in a processor responsible for timing, 
control, condition sensing, register transferring, logic operations, etc. 
For such circuits no preferred or canonical methods of realizationhave 
emerged, and hence in attempting to apply redundancy techniques to such 
circuits it must be assumed that arbitrarylogic is utilized in the 
* 
realization. 
The goal of using coding techniques in association with arbitrary 
logic is to detect the occurrence of failures in a replaceable module, 
without incurring the excessive redundancy attendant to the use of repli-
cation codes. In communicationsystems, wherein the main design consider-
ation is transmission rate, the redundancy associated with theuse of coding 
is - simply nfl, the ratio of redundant bits tocode length. The situation 
Is significantly more insidious in the case of coding techniques as applied 
to arbitrary logic. 
To illustrate this point consider the circuit depicted in Figure 
11-1, where it is assumed that g 1 is an arbitrary function of f1, 
and is generated in an indivisible module. A-similar assumption applies 
to g2, 931941 h 1 , h2 , h3 . The indivisibility property of the various 
modules means that a module failure will cause an error in the Output. 
Winograd and Cowan 6 (WC) have suggested a coding scheme to-providefault 
tolerance in a circuit of the type depicted in Figure 11-1. The WC method 
for this circuit is depicted in Figure 11-2. The intention here is to	 - 
provide a mechanism so that an error due to failure at any level is cor-
rected before it propagates to the next level. To-aChieve -thisthree extra 
* Microprogramming techniques for the realization of control functions 
can eliminate much of the arbitrary logic associated with conventional 
combinational and sequential realizations. Moreover, the microprogram 
memory can be made fault tolerant by the relatively inexpensive coding 
techniques described in Section Ebelow. For-the aircraft environment 
we have in mind the processor(s)constitutea relatively 'small proportion 
of the total system and hence, unless a significantly larger computation 
load is envisaged, the trivial replication coding techniques *ill suffice. 
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g-modules are included such that in the absence of failures the signals 
on the lines g1 ,
	
g correspond to a Hamming single error-correcting 
(7, 4;2) code. (The; number of information lines at a level, in this case 
k = 4, is determined by the number of modules in the nonredundant circuit 
at that level.) At the next level, namely the h-level, the modules pro-
duce signals corresponding to a single error-correcting (6, 3; 2) code. 
(The H-matrices for these two codes are depicted in Table 11-1.) The 
particular way in which this is to be carried out is to provide a set of 
modules each of which exhibits three roles
	 (1) decodes the signals 
appearing on the previous level, to produce estimated error-free versions 
of the signals needed by the corresponding irredundant modules, (2) 
computes' the irredundant signal, (3) encodes the signal so as to produce 
the corresponding signal in the code at the next level. 
This three stage process is illustrated in Figure 11-2 for the 
computation of signals h and h. With regard to h 1
 the signals 
91 , g,...,g, are passed through a decoder to generate estimates, g, g, 
of the signals g1 , 922 93 . (If no failures or only a single failure occurred 
in the, ensemble of g modules, then the estimates are indeed the desired 
signals.)' The signals g 1 , 92 , 93 are then combined to form the signal h. 
The encoding process for h is simply the identity operation since. h 1 cor-
responds to an information digit. On the other ,
 hand h corresponds to a 
check .
 digit, which by reference to Table 11-1 Is specified by h
	 h + h. 
This exclusive OR operation is carried out in the encode portion of the 114 
module.
As we previously mentioned, the'cod'ed version, as shown, imple-
menting single error-correcting codes, can mask failures, provided no more 
than one module in a given level is afflicted'. If one measures the redundancy 
as the number of modules in the coded version, then the cost seems quite 
favorable as compared with the use of the trivial replication codes. In the 
case illustrated single fault masking is achieved with less than twice the 
number of modules. However, one immediately notes that the modules utilized 
are significantly more complex than those appearing in the original version. 
This added' complexity is both in the number of inputs to the modules and in 
the functions realized in the-modules.
	 .	 .	 . 
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11010.0	 . 
1:1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
L.. i 0 1 1 0 0 1 
(7, 4; 2) 
h h h h h.h 123456 
[110100 
.	
. Ii. 0	 1 • 0	 1 . O• 
1 1 0 0 1. 
(6,3;2) 
Table 11-1

H-Matrices for (7, 4; 2) and (6, 3; 2) Codes 
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In general it is not easy to measure the complexity of the 
redundant, as compared with the nonredundant case but a few general 
observations can be made. 
(1) Typically, the realization of modules as [SI chips 
results in a pin limited design, rather than one 
which is logic complexity limited. Hence the-WC 
cost measure that relates to the number of modules 
is not tenable. 
(2) In view of (1) the increase in complexity due to 
the use of close packed codes, e.g., Hamming codes, 
is greater than the threefold increase in complexity 
due to the use of the trivial (3, 1; 2) code. 
(3) The use of low-density codes7 Is likely to decrease 
the module complexity, but at the cost of more modules. 
Briefly, low density codes ar ? codes wherein the H 
matrix has a small proportion of l's relative to 0's 
and hence the decoder portion of the module is likely 
to require fewer inputs. 
Several modifications of the WC approach are possible to reduce 
the complexity, and possibly lead to more attractive coding implementations. 
Instead of supplying an encoder and decoder at each level in a multi-level 
circuit, it is possible to achieve fault tolerance with a single encoder 
at the overall circuit Input and a decoder at the output. In this case the 
errors are clearly not corrected at each level in the circuit, but at each 
level sufficient redundant modules are provided to preserve the code. As 
an example consider the situation depicted in Figure 11-3 wherein, In the 
nonredundant case, Figure 11-3(a), the circuit is a row of AND gates. The 
code in question is the (n, n-l; 2) code that corresponds to a single parity 
check. As illustrated in Figure 11-3 the input lines to the circuit level 
include the single parity check P. The parity check P' at the output is to 
be such that If parity is not satisfied at the input, due to a failure at 
some previous level, then parity Is to be satisfied at 'the P' levels. Also 
If a failure occurs in the set Cl, and en , the parity is also set to be 
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satisfied at P'. Thus the equation for P' becomes 
P'=ifa +b +a +b +... +	 +	 + Plthen 
—1	 .1	 2	 2	 n	 n 
C 1 + c 2 + 1 else c 1 + c2 
It takes little observation of this function to realize that the module 
computing P' is at least as complicated as the initial row of AND gates. 
Hence we. conclude that, for this type of coding scheme simple duplication 
is no less attractive for single error detection than more complex coding 
schemes. A similar conclusion has been reached by Pierce.8 
-	 For the processors we have in mind It appears that for the de-
tection and correction of errors the simple. duplication and triplication 
codes are the most attractive. We stress that this conclusion is-based 
upon the present art of processor design and of applying codes.to
 arbitrary 
logic. As we show later, coding techniques as applied to memory are-quite 
attractive and feasible. It is also possible that codes will be useful for 
portions of the bus systems. Since the application of codes to the system 
is dependent on the particular architecture, we defer discussion of this 
question to those sections concerned with architecture.
	 - 
2.	 Arithmetic 
The case with regard to codes to detect and correct errors due 
to failures in the arithmetic unit is somewhat more promising, although 
for our case the duplication and triplication schemes seem optimal. 
9,10 
Historically,	 arithmetic codes were suggested to detect and/or correct 
errors of a particular type in an adder. A parallel adder is envisioned. 
comprising n-stages, but not including any logic for fast carry propagation. 
A single failure is assumed to affect only a single output in a single stage. 
Thus in a given stage either the sum or carry outputs could be in error. 
The effect of such a failure in the i-th stage of an adder is to produce an 
error in the sum. as follows: 
-f 2	 if the error Is in the sum output 
+ 2 1+1 ifthe error Is in the carry output 
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For the purposes. of detecting the occurrence of such.errors 
'	 s r
,
,iiz' 
all numbers to be added can be multiplied by three; the code in question 
is then an AN code with A­ 3. Any single failure of the type described 
above introduces an error of the form + 2 and hence, the occurrence of 
an error is ascertained by the sum not being a multiple of three. In 
this code two redundant bits are required. 
For the purposes of detecting. a larger class of errors the use 
of a larger value of A, notably 15, has. been suggested by Avizienis
11
 as 
an approach toward detecting a. larger class of errors. This expanded. set 
of errors includes (a) simultaneous errors in the sum and carry outputs of 
a single stage (b) errors occurring in the multiple usage of the adder as 
in multiplication, (c) errorsoccurring dueto failures in a fast' carry 
propagation circuit. 
Avizienis has also noted some advantages in encoding and decoding 
attendant to the use of A's of the form 2 - 1. For such A's if b is the 
number to be encoded'then a check number c is computed as C A - (I b i mod A). 
If the binary digits are appended to the most significant -portion of b, then 
:	 the resultant' word is indeed Ab. The decoding process, which involves de-
termining if the sum is a multiple of 15, is accomplished by casting out A's. 
.Avizienis. accomplishes this, with low cost,.using a 4 bit-adder ('for A =15), 
and requires; one cycle In this decoder for each-4-bit byte in the. sum. The 
total equipment required for anarithmetic unit, including encoder, decoder 
and extra bits in the adder itself, for Avizienis scheme is about.li times 
an fr-redundant unit, -Irrespective of any spares. This redundancy. is less 
than the. greater than 100 percent associated with duplication. 
-Despite the apparent attractiveness of the Avizienis scheme we 
do not recommend the .use. of arithmetic codes for the computer for the following 
reasons:
(a) For an arithmetic unit realized with. LSI technology it 
seems unlikely that a failure will be confined to a 
single: stage of the adder; hence.. a significant proport.ion 
of the failures will lead to undetected errors. (Note that 
the detection of a failure is likely to be dependent on the 
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input data to the adder; hence, the inability of the 
code to detect the failure during a particular cycle 
of the adder might be rectified during the next cycle 
whendifferentinputs appear.) 
(b) In the STAR computer the information to/from the 
arithmetic unit is transferred byte serial. Thus 
there is no-appreciable delay introduced by the byte-
oriented encoder and decoder. For a system wherein 
the transfer is to be accomplished in parallel, the 
encoding/decoding delay would be significant. More-
over, it is not clear that a duplicated byte serial 
adder would be less preferable then a coded parallel 
adder for abyte-oriented machine. 
(c) The arithmetic unit is a relatively small part of a 
processor, comprising about 20 percent of the total 
number of gates. Hence, without comparable coding 
techniques for the remainder of the processor it appears 
that little is to be gained by the use of coding in the 
arithmetic unit. 
Recent work by Rao 1.2 and Neumann 
13 has shown that logic operations 
can be performed within an arithmetic unit provided the carry lines 
are available as outputs. More significantly, the same error detecting 
codes used for arithmetic can also serve to detect failures when a 
logic operation is being carried out provided n cycles . through the adder 
are allowed for, say, the logical ORing of two n-bit vectors. 
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E.	 Use of Codes for Memor 
1.	 Memory System Organization 
The situation with regard to codes for main memory-is far more 
promising than for logic or arithmetic. Intuitively the primary reasons 
for this optimism' are based, upon the organization to be described 
'A memory can be very easily designed such that any failure within 
an independent unit results in only an -error within a byte. What we have 
in. mind is a semiconductor memory organized as in Figure 11-4. The memory 
- consists of f O p- chips organized in p-blocks and f-frames. Each chip con-
tains its own- decoder, read amplifiers, and read/write control circuitry, 
- besides the storage flip-flops. There is considerable latitude in or-
ganizing. the-;. separate memory chips, but several typical choices for a 
4096 bit chip are the-, following: 
I (bit wid-e) X 4096 (words), 2 X 2048_4 X 1024, .8 X 512. 
By redu-tidantly .
 including the decoders in each chip, a single fault within 
a chip affects only the byte associated- with that chip. (We will-assume-
that a chip failure can be catastrophic to the chip in question, to the 
point wherein all bits in-the chip-byte are suspect.) Hence an error-
correcting code can be' effectively utilized. here, provided th'e code can - 
correct, all errors within a frame (byte) width, corresponding to the 
width of thechip. Thus with this organization there is no need to 
consider distinct protection strategies for the memory decoders, 'sense 
amplifielTs;, read/write' control circuitry, and so forth. 
Coding schemes fo-r,
 arithmetic and 'arbitrary logic- suffer in 
that the encoder/decoder are just about as complex as the logic- perform-in-g 
the real computation. Fortunately, such is not the case- for memof'y coding 
schemes. As.we will shortly demonstrate, a relatively small memory of-4K 
29 bit words (including redundant bits for coding) consumes-about 30-chips 
while an encoder/decoder can be implemented with one or two chips. 
There are several generalizations and embellishments of the 
simple scheme ofFigure-II-4, mostly related-'to the use of such amemory. 
within a complete system. Among these aspects are the foIloin'g: 
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(a) Providing spare frames in each block for purposes of 
additional fault tolerance. Such spares, presumably 
"addresable" by the encoder/decoder, would be used to 
replace a failed chip as revealed by the correction 
process. 
(b) Providing for fault tolerance in the encoder/decoder 
and MAR (Memory Address Register). This coding scheme 
as utilized in the Bus Checker architecture embodies the 
use of a pair of encoder/decoders and MAR's as part of 
a dual or triplex processor system. Thus the processor 
is protected by the trivial codes while the inherently 
coStlier memory system is protected by more efficient 
codes. It is also. possible to distribute portions of 
the endoder/decodcr among the various memory chips 
anissue that should be explored in later studies. 
Hence processors which are primarily constituted of memory blocks, can 
be effectively protected almost in toto with coding techniques. In such 
processors, control, e.g., instruction processing, could be achieved 
with microprogramming, and logic operations, e.g., vector AND's and 
OR's-by combicnations of logic in memory, table-lookup, and associative 
memories. The memories associated with these functions could be pro-
tected by coding. There will be residual arbitrary logic, but for 
such a memory-oriented processor this logic will be minimal and protected 
by the replication codes. Since the arbitrary logic is minimal only a 
•	 small incremental increase in system cost is incurred. . 
.Accordingly, in the sections below we discuss bounds on the 
redundancy of the memory codes, properties of -the Hamming and other codes 
that achieve or almost achieve the bounds, implementation of the encoder/ 
decoder as -aprogrãmmable cellular array ona single chip, and performance 
of these codes within a system. 	 .	 •.	 .	 . . - 
2.	 BOunds on Code Redundancy 
As inferred in the above section We -are. interested in cod-..s 
that can correct all single byte (or equivalently single-frame) errors 
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That is, for a 32-bit word, all a 2 ,..., a32 , assuming a 4-bit frame size, 
the following errors (among many others, of course,) should be correctable 
by the code:
e1; e 1 e 2 ; e 1 
e 
3 e 4 ; e
1 e 2e3 e4 ; e19,e20 
The following errors need not be correctable: 
e1 è3 e 5
	
(error pattern spans two bytes) 
e 1 e24	 (double byte errors).. 
The situation of interest to us is depicted in Figure 11-5 
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FIGURE 11-5. FRAMES OF A.BLOCK-CODE WORD 
From observation of this illustration, one notes that a code of length 
n = fg over GF(2) is desired or possibly a code of length f over 
To describe a completely general situation we will seek bounds wherein 
the burst tobe corrected by the code is b, where b> g. It is emphasized 
that the case of most interest is b = g. 
A burst of length (t most) b is a pattern of errors (not 
necessarily solid) confined to b consecutive digit positions; for example, 
the patterns 1, 11, 101, Ill are bursts of length three, 1, 11, 101, lii, 
1001, 1011, 1101, liii of length four. There are clearly 
2b1 bursts of 
length b, beginning in a given position. A cyclic burst is one which 
assumes the last digit and the first digit of a code word are contiguous. 
The length is similarly, defined. A framed burst is a burst error that 
occurs solely within one frame. Its length b is therefore at most g. 
Analysis of codes for correcting a single burst of various 
types is made based on the number of syndromes required. The base-two 
logarithm of this number is a lower bound on the number of redundant digits 
required. A cyclic-burst-correcting binary code which corrects any single 
burst of length b must have (at least) 
S(n,b) = n2 b-1 + I 	 '	 (1) 
27
distinct syndromes, one for each of the 2b1 bursts beginning in each of 
the n digit positions (plus, one. for the case of no errors). 
Now consider the situation wherei-n the code is to correct only 
noncyci.ic bursts, i.e., the last digit of the word is not considered to 
contiguous with the first. 
Let N(b) be' the number. of bursts of length .b which are omitted 
from a	 in -gotng to a noncyclic-burst-cor.recting 
code, i.e.,	 . 
S_(n,b)	 N(b) + 
The number N(b) is easily obtainable as 
b-i 
N(b) ' =	 21_i = (b )2bl + 
which leads immediately to the bound, for b > 29 
SN(n,b) = (n-b+2)2 1 ..	 .	 .	 (2 
Finally, consider the situation of a code which only corrects 
single framed bursts of length b within a frame of length . g. Thenumber 
of such .bursts within a frame of length g is	 . 
g2 b-1 - N(b) = (g_b+2)2bl - 1, b < g
 
Consequently, using. (3) for each of the f frames, pius one for thç error-. 
free syndrome yields the: desired.number of syndromes 
SF(n,b) = f(gb+2)2b1_ f + I t b > •g.	 (4) 
Not.e that-,-..for g = b the above bound reduces. to 
S(n,b) = f29	 f + 1	 , (5) 
Equation(5) is identical to the Hamming.bound for a code of length f 
over 2 9 that corrects	 errors, wh-ichis equivalent to any, 
• . of the 2g_1 possible error-,patterns within a frame. 
•
	
	
Hong and Patei 8 'have, shown how to construct minimum redundancy 
framed burst codes.. These codes come very close to achiev.ingthe redundanc.y' 
implied by (5), namely log  S. 
It is desirable to examine the-saving that can be. obtained, by 
using framed bursts. This isdonefirst by examining the ratio of the 
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numbers of syndromes, then by examining the number of redundant digits 
which can be saved. 
Consider the saving of framed bursts over arbitrary cyclic 
bursts of length b. The ratio of (1) to (4) gives the factor by which 
the number of syndromes may be potentially reduced: 
n21 +l	 g 
SCF = f(g_))+2)2b	
-f + 1	 g - b +2 for g > b > 2, 
=	 for b = 2,	 (6) 
= 1 for b	 1. 
This ratio is independentof n. For a given b (or for a given g), (6) is 
maximized when b= g, in which case the number of syndromes required is

	
reduced by a factor of about b/2 for h> 2. 	 (Note that theratio (6) drops 
off sharply as g-b increases.) This maximum for b = g corresponds to a 
potential saving on the order of log 2 b - I check digits for codes cor-
recting only framed bursts instead of cyclic bursts. Note however that 
for small b there is comparatively little saving in going from (1) to (4) 
(or even to (2)). 
Incidentally, any code correcting cyclic burst errors of some 
length b is capable of correcting noncyclic bursts of the same length, 
while a code correcting noncyclic bursts of that length is capable of 
correcting framed errors of the same length. Thusone could always resort 
to a code correcting cyclic bursts, especially if encoding and decoding 
for framed bursts are inordinately complicated. 
Table 11-2 presnts the lower bounds for the number of redundant 
digits r, required for the cases b = g = 1, b = g = 2, b = g = 4. The 
Hamming codes for b = I and the Hong-Patel codes for b = 2 and 4 achieve 
the redundancy implied by SF in all cases shown. 
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# check digits r 
•	 k b 	 =1
S 
•b'=g=2 
S,
b=g=4 
S	 SF 
4 .	 3 .	 5 4 7 6 
8 4 .5 5 7 6 
..12 5 6 5 8 7 
16 5 6 6 8 7 
24 5 6 6 9 7 
.28 . 6 7 6 9 8 
56 6 7 7 10 8 
6 '.8 7 10 8 
64' 7 8 7 10 '	 9 
.128 8 9 8 11 '10 
'256 9	 . '10 9 12 10 
512 10 11 10
, 
13 11 
1024' .	 .11 12 11 14 12 
TABLE 11-2
	 T REDUNDANCY FOR" CORRECTING 'CYCLIC AND 
FRAMED ,BURSTS
3..	 Specific codes •for Correcting'Framed 13u'rst 
From the standpoint of' minimum redundancy theopt,ima1codes, 
for the special case of b =.g, rare the',gene'ralizedHamming dode 4 over 
:"..For rF Eedundant frames, i.e., gr	 redundant ,bits, the rF X f
H-matrix is given as.foliows. ;The colurnns'of the H-matrix consist-of 
distinct r-tup1es, 'with components 	 the additionalpro-
visionthat 'no pairs-of-columns' are multiples of each other. Thusfor a 
given value of'r the-maximum-number of-columns in the H-matrix: is,given 
gr	 F 
by '(2	 1)/(2g_1), 'Table II-3depicts 'the H-matrix for the caseg =,.,2, 
f = 15, r 
F7 
3,-corresponding to a code to handle 24 information bits,2 
bits per frame; 6 check bits. We have also 'included, in Table' 11-3(b) 
the multiplication table for'GF(4). It is recognized tha'tbits-of a 
'frame are suitably'interpreted as'elements of the field	 Inorder 
to augment. this code to provide for single frame-error correction, 
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double frame-error detection, an additional row and column are added to 
the ' H-matrix as shown in Table 11-4. 
Besides the generalized Hamming code, the Abramson code 14 is 
also a possibility for g = b = 2. For the Abramson code the number of 
redundant digits is typically one more than for the Hamming single error-
correcting code over GF(2). This code although, of course, offering no 
redundancy advantages as compared with Hamming codes does offer slight 
advantages in decoding, particularly if portions of the decoding can be 
done in parallel. 
For the case b = g- = 4 Table 11-5 gives the smallest known 
value of •r for the case of single frame-error correction. The best 
codes for-correcting cyclic bursts are based on Reference 15; most are 
truncations of cyclic codes (and therefore not cyclic). For our-applica-
tion cyclic ity is not crucial since the decoding will most likely be ac-
complished in parallel; it may however imply greater structure to enhance 
parallel implementation. A cyclic code (-21, 12) exists, as does (trivially) 
a cyclic áode (12, 4) the latter being effectively triple-modular redundancy. 
The latter code can also be achieved by interlacing two Abramson codes ' 
(6,2-), in addition to interlacing four Hamming codes (3,1). Best codes. 
with r = 8-which correct framed bursts (b = 4) with k from 12 to 60 are - 
obtainable as base 16 Hamming codes. The-code (68,60) is perfect. Best 
codes for k = 4, 8 and 12 for these framed bursts of length 4 can be de-
rived from the cyclic Gilbert code (20,12) (which has the advantage that 
At is systematic)--seé Reference 16. Although this-code corrects cyclic -. 
bursts with 'b = 2, it corrects framed bursts with length 4. Decoding for 
the Gilbert codes is very simple in -the given framework, although these 
codes become noncompetitive in terms of r as k increases.	 - 
4.	 Implementation of Framed Burst Co:rection Codes 
In order not to incur any time delay in the encoding and de-
coding of the codes, it will probably be necessary to carry out a parallel 
implementation. Moreover, the decoding can in part be accomplished in 
parallel with computation. That-is the results of the computation are- 	 - 
held in abeyance until the syndrome calculation determines if an error 
is present in the word. Although such an implementation requires 	 -	 - 
-	 -	
-	 31	 -	 -	 -	 --- -.	 -
H = IQ I Ir LF x F rf x f 
.023111111100100 
H = .111023111101010 
11.1111023110001 
(a) 
pl 2 3. 
0 0 0 0 .0 
.1.0' 1 2 3 
20 2 3 1 
303 1.2 . 
(b) 
Table 11-3 H-Matrix for	 (15,12; 4) Code 
0023111111 1:0 100 
011102311110010 H =
.011111102311001 
• 1 , 11 111 111111111
Table 11-4 H-Matrix for (16, 12; 4 ) Code 
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K
	 S S 
c	 F 
4 
H 
12 
16 
24 
28 
56 
60 
64 
128 
256 
512 
1024 
8 8 
9 8 
9 8 
10 8 
10 8
* 
10 . 	 : 8 
* * 
10 8 
* * 
10 8 
11 9 
12 12 
* 
12 12 
* 
13 12 
* * 
14 12
TABLE 11-5 REDUNDANCY FOR BEST KNOWN CODES FOR SINGLE-FRAME 
CORRECTION, b .= g z 4 
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significantly more gates than a serial implementation for, say, a cyclic 
Hamming code or Abramson code, the cost will still not be excessive. In 
fact, for the implementations to be described a single LSI chip realiza-
tion is possible for a combined encoder/decoder. 
a.	 Cellular array for single error correcting binary code 
In-Reference 17 we presented several approaches to the 
parallel realization of encodersand decoders, with the stress placed on 
cellular array realizations that are well-suited to the LSI technology. 
The following discussion, abstracted from Reference 17, indicates the 
method by which .a single cellular array can serve both. as an encoder 
and decoder for a- single error correcting code over GF(2). 
As a simple illustration of how-encoding and decoding 
arrays might be efficiently realized in cellular form, firs.t consider. 
the encoding and decoding for a single-error-correcting plus multiple-
error-detecting linear binary code.
	 - 
This array is shown in Figure 11-6, along with the logical 
circuitry of a typical cell of the array. The cells (stages) of the 
input register X and the output register Z are also depicted in Figure II-
6.	 Each array cell is seen to consist of. a single flip-flop with binary 
contents q, plus-a small amount of cascade logic (a total-of about .13 
elementary NOR gate, as illustrated in Figure 11-7. 
Fora-systematic code, the encoding and decoding processes 
may be thought of as being-applied to an n-digit codeword (X, Y)-that con-
sists of a k-digit information portion X.andan (r = n - k)-digit check 
portion Y The task of the encoder is, of course, the calculation of 
the Y vector from the X vector, assumed given. For a parity check matrix 
H in echelon canonical-form, namely 
= 1	 ' rXk	 rXr' 
the computation of Y may be expressed as - 
Y = QX 
where all vectors are treated as column vectors. 
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For encoding, then, the array and its two associated 
registers operate as follows. For a given code, each digit q. j
 of the 
Q portion of the matrix H is placed in the flip-flop in row i, column 
j of the cellular array (by a setup process to be described subsequently). 
The block of k information digits of a particular codeword is placed in 
the k digit register X, and the r check digits are computed combinationally 
by the array and inserted in the r-digit check register Z in a single 
clock time. This computation proceeds through the chain of exclusive OR 
•	 gates along each row, independently of the other rows, on the basis of 
the x digits that are bussed vertically down each column. Each x digit 
•	 x. contributes to the sum in a particular row i if and only if the corre-
sponding digit q. j
 of the Q matrix equals I. Thus, after the clock has 
been applied to the Z register, this register contains the block of check, 
digits that are to be associated with the given block of information 
digits.
In general, decoding of a received, possibly erroneous 
* 	 * 	 S 
codeword (X , Y ) may be carried out .byfirst recomputing the check digits 
*	 •* 
QX from X and adding. them to the received check digits Y , to obtain the 
error syndrome 
S	 * 	 * 	 S 
Z=Y®QX. 
An error has occurred if and only if Z is nonzero. For single-error cor-
rection, the digit position in error is identified by the corresponding 
column j H that is identical to Z; that is, by the corresponding column 
of Q (stage of the X resister) if the error is in the information portion 
of the codeword, and the corresponding column of I (stage of the Z register.) 
if the error is in the check portion. As soon as the digit in .error is
-
identified, it may be corrected by complementing it.
* 
For decoding, then, let the data portion X and the check 
*	 - 
portion V. of the received codeword be entered intothe X and.Z reisters,. 
respectively. When clock c 1
 is applied, exactly the same operation is 
•	
* 
carried out as In encoding, except that the calculated check d
.
1gitsj QX. 
* 
are added (digitwise) to the received check digits V , thereby- leaving 
-.	 -	
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S
the syndrome Z in the Z register. The digits of this syndrome are now 
passed back along the rows of the array on the z busses, for digitwise 
comparison with the flip-flop contents (columns of the Q matrix) in each 
column of the array. When clock c2
 is applied, any column in which exact 
coincidence is found causes a 1-signal to be applied to the corresponding 
column of the X register, thereby complementing it. If no such column 
generates such a- coincidence signal, then either there was no error, or 
* 
the error occurred in the check portion Y of the received codeword and 
not In the data portion X. 
It is trivially noted that error detection may be provided 
by attaching a simple OR gate gating r inputs onto the Z register, as 
indicated in Figure 11-6. A 1-output from this gate following the 
application of clock c 1
 during decoding then Indicates the-presence of 
one or more errors. 
For loading the flip-flops of the main array, assume first 
that the flip--flops are all reset initially. To load a 1 Into the flip-
flop in row 1 and column j, inject l's into registers Z and X in this row 
and column, and apply clock C 3) (i =1,2, ...,n - k,j = 1,2,...,k). The 
contents of.these flip-flops are not changed during the encoding and 
decoding operations. 
b.	 Cellular array for codes with frame width, .g > 1. 
The cellular array as discussed above can be easily modi-
fied to handle frame widths-of any arbitrary size. For the g = 1 case 
above the syndrome is formed on the z-lines and passed left-wise through 
the array until a match is found with a q-cólumn vector stored in the 
main array. In the case of a frame size of g
	 2 the. decoding situat4on 
is easily illustrated with an example. 
Assume that the code in question is the (5,3;4) code with 
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H-matrix
2X3	 '2X2 
=	 {? H	 ] 
wherein the components are in GF(4). As in the GF(2) case above the .Q 
portion is stored in flip-flops in the main array. Here 2 fiip-flops'are 
required per cell to store a GF(4) component.. The encoding'. process is to 
form the pro'ductQX. This process requires the inclusion theachcellof 
•	 a GF(4) multiplier and adder, each of .'which are simple four varia1e 
functions. Thus, for example, if 'the information on vector .X is (l 1 1) 
then the check vector is, computed .as ('1 1) + (1 2) + (1 3) =. (1 ,
 0). 
The decoding' process is to first form the syndrome Z = QX* - 	 This 
syndrome is then reflected back through the array, but, 'instead of- searching 
for a stored' q-co.lumn that identically matches •the syndrome, the search ,is 
for a q-column that is a GF(4) multiple of the syndrome.' For example, as 
indicated above (1 1 1 1 0) is a code word in the code in question. 
(Note thát .10 binary digits are involved in- representing this code word in. 
main memory.. Thus the word as stored in main inenor .y could be (0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 0 0 0)	 Assume that theGF(4) version of the word presented tó 
the decoder is (2 1 1 1 0) corresponding to the first 'frame being .10 
instead of 01. The syndrome is thus (3 3), which is noted to be 3 times 
column 1. . The , error is thus identified .as in the first frame and the 
magnitude at the error is the ratio of the syndrome to the' "matched" 
column, which in this case is 3. The data bit In error is corrected by 
computing X ' - error' pattern 
We have not carried out a complete locigal design 'of this 
modified decoder, .but for the case .of'g = 2 the cell complexity is about 
twice that of the-single encoder/decoder for GF(2) case. In-a similar 
manner. the encoder/decoder for g = 4 incurs •a cell complexity about 16. 
tims :that for the g = 1 case. 
Table 11.6 .summar-izes ,the memory configurations and decoder 
complexities for a memory ,word. size .of 24 bits, and 4,096words.of•memory.. 
We assume a'memor.y chip .-size of 4096 bits, which can be configured in-any 
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of the following modes: a (1 bit widex 4096), (2 x 2048), (4 x 1024), 
(8 x 512). In each case we assume a Hamming single error correcting code. 
The table indicates a strong preference to g = 2 with regard to decoding 
complexity. Note that the total number of memory chips for the g = 4 case 
can be reduced by 1 as follows. Seven check bits are sufficient to imple-
ment the code, so one of . the check frames can be 3 bits wide, instead of 4, 
providing for 1 check frames. Assuming 4 blocks the total number of 
check chips is 4 x 1	 7.	 A similar reduction is possible for the 
case g = 8.	 . 
Memory 
chip 
Configuration
# of 
"check" 
frames
# of 
frames 
(total)
# of 
chips 
total
# of 
decoder 
gates 
1	 x 4096	 •. . 5. 29 29 .	 1560 
•	 .	 2 x 2048	 • .	 3	 .. 15 30 936 
-	
4 x 1624 2	 •	 . 8	 • 32	 • 2496 
8 x 512 2 5	 • .	 40	 • 19968
Table 11-6 
Summary of Decoder Complexities for 
Cellular Decoding of Generalized 
Hamming Codes 
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F. Summary of System Aspects of Redundancy 
For the attainment of fault tolerance in the cpu we recommend the 
use of the duplication or triplication codes. In general the duplication 
approach with spares will be used when 
• an ultra-reliable mechanism is available for the analysis of 
disagreement indicators and for the insertion of an operative 
processor pair 
• sufficient time is available for the various processes 
associated with duplication. 
Otherwise the triplication approach will be required. In one of the can- 
didaté architectures, SIFT, the basis for selecting duplication or trip-
lication is the criticality of the application program. The executive 
that accomplishes error control will always be run in a triplicated mode. 
In another candidate, BUCS, the mechanism for processor switchover is 
sufficiently fast to permit the use of duplication for processors. However, 
the approach requires a modest size hardware executive that must be trip-
heated. 
•	 In the case of memory the use of coding techniques is recommended. 
The main reason for this is the economy in redundancy as compared with the 
duplication and triplication approaches. In particular, we recommend the 
• use of the framed burst codes described in Section E. As a minimum, the 
•	 codes should be capable at correcting all single-frame errors, and in 
applications' where back-up Is possible, the codes should be augmented to 
provide double-frame error detection. On the basis of encoding/decoding 
cost the 'optimum frame width, g, is 2. 
Another organizational factor that relates to the choice of frame 
width is the' following. Assume a memory organization as depicted in 
Figure 11.4 with spare blocks included to handle the function of failed 
blocks. We assume that a single-frame error correcting code is utilized 
throughout, and that subsequent to the detection of an error the offensive 
block is discarded in favor of a spare block. On one hand the number of 
redundant chips per block is directly related to frame width, g. However, 
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the smaller the value of g, the larger the block of memory that is dis-
carded subsequent to an error. A problem of concern then is, for a given 
number of memory words required, W, and a given probability of not having 
W words available at time t,' what is the frame width that leads to a min-
imum number of spare chips.- A partial analysis of this problem has been 
carried out elsewhere, 19 wherein the results indicate that g = 4 is optimal. 
However, the optimal point is not sharp enough to override the decoding 
advantage of the g = 2 case.
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III IMPLICATIONS OF COMPUTATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Our purpose in this chapter is to abstract from Volume II the 
aspects of the aircraft computations that strongly influence the design 
of the computer. It should be emphasized that the loading requirements 
are quite tentative, and are possibly inexact by as much as 50 percent. 
However, they do provide a well considered estimate of the computer com-
plexity required, and together with the results. of the tasks on architec-
ture and technology indicate that a computer can be specified to meet the 
computational and reliability requirements. 
Table 111.1 summarizes the computing requirements. The most critical 
phase of the flight from a computational standpoint is during an instrument 
landing. Those applications that are involved in that phase are indicated 
with an "*"• Small tasks that are not required during that phase do not 
influence the design of the computer system and therefore have not been 
estimated to the same accuracy as the more important tasks. 
The column headings of Table 111.1 are defined as follows: 
Task----------------The name given to the application program. 
Criticality Class--- 1. Immediate safety of flight impact. 
2. Eventual safety of flight impact. 
3. Significant change-of-mission impact. 
4. Operation impact. 
5. EconOmic impact. 
Iteration Rate/Sec-- The number of times per second that the calcu-
lation must be carried out. When two figures 
are quoted they represent two calculations within 
the same functional task. 
Equivalent MIPS-----The millions of instructions per second to carry 
out the calculations. 
Memory Required-----The number of words of memory required for instruc-
tions and data. 
Missed Iteration"---.The maximum number of consecutive iterations that 
can be missed before the application is jeopardized. 
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Table 111.1	 Computing Requirements, Applications 
Criticality 
Class 
.'r1r	 Iteration Rate/Sec
Equivalent
'Missed 
MIPS Memory Required	 "Iteration 
APPLICATIONS 
Attitude Control	 1 5,20 .023
Inst. 
1845
Data 
230 2-3 Al 
A2 Flutter Control	 1 250 .069 70 22 2-3 
A3 Load Control	 3,5 *	 '240 .014 '45 15 '2-3 
A4 Autoland, Horiz. *	 20 
A5 Autoland, Vert. 	 1 *	 'l60 .055 750 275 2-3 
A6 Autoland, Throttle *	 .33 
A7 Autopilot	 4 5 150 '100 4-5 
A8 Elec. Att. Control 	 1 *	 30 .077 790 520 ? 
Bl Supervisor	 4 ? ? 75 15 
B2 Inertial	 2 *	 125 .034 2100 .150 0-4 
B3 VOR/DME	 4 5 .004 250 :50 4-5 
B4 DME, OMEGA	 4 5 ? 400 105 ' 4-5 
B5 Air 'Data	 . 4 ? 110 -25 4-5 
B6 Kalman Filter	 4 1/5 .001 250 65 
B7 Flight Data	 4 5 .028 450 100 2-3 
B8 Airspeed, Altitude	 4 *	 8,16 '.009 360 '70 2-3 
B9 Graphic Display	 4 *	 1,8 .032 .890 5360 '2-3 
B10 Text-Displ2y 
--------------------
0 ---019 640 8700
, -----45 
Cl Collision Avoidance 4 *	 1/3,670 .021 550 •650	 , 1-2 
C2 Data Comm, A/C	 ' *	 various .006 210 '	 400	 . ? 
C3_
.
.
,------22L .. ------ 
Dl AIDS '	 '	 5 . *	 .	 .	 1/4	 to 4 002 ._650 650, 4-5 
D2 Inst. Monit.	 . 4 *	 5 '.014 '800 '100	 ' 2-3 
D3 Syst. Monit.	 1-4 *	 1/2 .001 900 .•50 .2-3 
D4 Life'Suort	 1-4 *	 <1/2	 , 001 '900 50 3-4 
p L g c22 ----------*	 --'33 ---.119 ----200	 ----
*
Tasks-to be''run during most criticalphase.. 
?It'idicates'that 'taskexerts a' negligible load for the.parameter in question. 
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For purposes of interpreting the table and discussing its implica-
tions on the computer architecture we briefly discuss the following 
aspects: reliability, roll-back delay, main memory requirements, processor 
speed, processing variations within a mission, and data rates. 
Reliability--We have assumed that the probability of not successfully carrying 
out the most critical computation should be less than 10 -8
 per mission. These 
computations, corresponding to criticality classes 1 and 2, could cause an 
aircraft crash if not carried out, or if carried out with gross errors. With 
this assumed computation reliability, for a fleet of 1000 aircraft flying 4 
daily missions, each of 5 hours without repair between flights within a day, 
about one crash due to a computer failure would occur in 100 years. For the 
other criticality classes the assumed reliability is not as stringent--typical 
failure probabilities are 10 4
--since the failure to carry out these computa-
tions only results in a mission change or an economic loss. In an, actual sys-
tem design it would be beneficial to' allocate redundancy such that each task 
is carried out:with the indicated reliability. For our purposes in specifying 
an architecture we will assume that all of the computations are to be carried 
out with the more stringent-reliability--an assumption that is reasonable 
since those computations in criticality classes 1 and 2 constitute a majority. 
of . the memory and processor requirements. 
Roll-back--An important parameter of a fault-tolerant computer is the maximum 
time interval that the computer can be in a rollback/reconfiguration mode in 
responding to a failure.. During this interval certainly some processing of 
certain computations ceases, and newly appearing data might be lost. The 
missed iterations column of Table 111.1 indicates the number of iterations 
that can be ignored in a given computation without adversely affecting the 
aircraft. In the worst case (collision avoidance) the system must be 
"down" for no more than 1.5 msec. Several other critical computations--
flutter control,, load control, autoland--require reconfiguration times nearly 
as low. For these computations, depending upon the architecture it might 
be necessary to reload programs, which indicates that the computer might be 
required to be totally engaged in reconfiguration following a failure. 
Fortunately, the computations with large amounts of data, e.g., display, can 
tolerate a down time of approximately-0.5 sec., thus allowing ample' time 
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for the possible reloading of data interleaved with the more critical 
computations. 
Memory Requirements--The aplication programs for the critical phase re-
quire 19247K words.. This figure is undoubtedly low for the following 
reasons: 
• the difficulty of estimating accurately 
• the need for memory space for the executive routines. 
Hence we assume a memory requirement of 24K words. Note that this is a 
nonredundant requirement; the demand for fault tolerance will increase this 
figure. For architectures relying totally on the triplication codes this 
storage requirement must be tripled to 72K. For architectures utilizing 
only single-frame correction in memory (plus possibly a few extra frames 
for double frame detection and sparing) the figure is about one-third in 
excess of 24K or about 32K. 
Processor Speed--For the critical phase the application tasks require 
.386 MIPS (millions of instructions per second). Once again we must regard 
this figure as being low in part due to inaccuracies, but mostly due to 
"wasted" cpu power in multiprogrammingand the processing of executive 
.routines. For these reasons we assume a processor load of 0.5 MIPS. An 
important attribute of the computations is their relative independence. 
That is, the sharing of functions and data among the computations does not 
substantially reduce the overall memory or processor requirements. Each 
computationrequires access to the state of the aircraft, but all other 
data can be considered to be loca1 Hence it is quite simple to impose a 
multiprocessor discipline on the computations, with almost an arbitrary 
number of processors. 
Under certain allocation of tasks to processors it is not necessary 
to do any task interruption within a processor. That is, a task can be 
allowed to run through completion before initiating another task. Five 
processors each of 0.1 MIPS would enable such an allocation. However, 
near the end of the useful life of the computer, say if just one or two 
unfailed processors remain, it is possible that a high rate task (flutter 
control) might be allocated to the same processor as a low rate but long 
task (graphic display). If such a joint allocation is unavoidable, then 
interruption of the longer task will be essential. 
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Processing Variations Within a Mission--All applications denoted with an 
are required during an instrument landing. This represents about 60 
percent of the total Cpu requirement and about 50 percent of the memory 
requirement. Hence some graceful degradation is possible as during the 
mission, tasks will be naturally deallocated as they are no longer needed 
as part of the flight. Hence, when a task is no longer needed, its memory 
area can be allocated to another task, or conversely, a failure in a memory 
module is automatically handled by a reduced memory.requirement. However, 
we note that the degradation with respect to memory is not uniform, assuming 
that all programs and constants are retained in main memory.t For example, 
in mid-flight, although not all tasks are being processed, all programs 
must be stored reliably in main memory. Hence the graceful degradation with 
regard to main memory is not exploitable until the last minutes of the 
flight, and hence is of questionable utility to the architecture. 
Data Rates--An important measure of computer power required is the load 
on the bus structure for transfer of instructions and data. With .a computing 
load of 0.5 MIPS we assume that an instruction will, on average, require 24 
bits.4 Different instructioTis require varying amounts of data including 
the fo1loing cases: 
0 bits for register to register operations 
8 bits for byte operations, e.g. text display 
• 16 bits for integer operations 
32 bits for floating point operations. 
Making an estimate that the average data required is 16 bits, the 
t 6tal flow between memory and CPU is 20 M bits/sec. In some architectures 
(e.g.., STAR) the bus would have to be capable of maintaining this rate. 
(Hence the expansion of the STAR system to accommodate a larger computa-
tion burden will require a significant modification in bus design.) In 
the case of theHopkins scheme or BUCS, a significant reduction would be 
tThe issue of back-up memory in an aircraft environment is yet to be com-
pletely resolved. • Rugged discs can be obtaired but their cost/bit is not 
significantly less than that for LSI main memories. 
*In a 16 bit computer this implies equal number of single and double length 
instructions.	 •	 •
49	 -
achieved by the use of the local CACHE on the processors. An additional 
reduction is achieved by providing a multi-bus structure or allowing multi-
parts into rmain memory. In the SIFT system most of the bus lOad would be 
in individual modules, with-only an estimated one percent between modules. 
All ofthese issues are discussed in Chapters V, VI, and VII.
IV IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY 
Task 3 of this study (reported in Volume II of this report reviewed 
the likely technologies that would be appropriate for a fault-tolerant 
computer inthe period 1975-1980. This section of the report examines 
the implications of that task on the architecture of the computer. 
The most important advance in technology will be the continued ad-
vance of LSI. The cost of LSI circuits will continue to drop-throughout 
the 1970's, and will result in processor and memory costs that are low 
enough so that extensive redundancy of units is practical' from a cost 
viewpoint. This redundancy can be either by replication or by coding, 
the latter being more applicable to memories. It is expected that the 
cost of a computer system to carry out all computation within an aircraft 
will be comparable with the present cost of existing single function 
avionic units (e.g., inertial navigation). 
A second advantage in the use of LSI is the small size of such units, 
making it possible to achieve far more efficient shielding from both elec-
tric and magnetic fields, thereby reducing the probability of noise and 
crosstalk. It is expected that fault modes of this type, which are mani-
fested as data-dependent transient faults will be insignificant wi-thin the 
central units. However such faults may still exist in connections to ex-
ternal sensors and actuators. 
With the use of LSI most of the connections at the device and gate 
level take place within a chip, rather than on a board or through a 
connector as in the use of discrete circuits. The reduction in soldered 
and wrapped joints is estimated to be at least an order of magnitude 
lower than that associated with, say, integrated circuits, with a 
consequent reduction of faults in the connection system. 
LSI circuits, ,
 though relatively cheap in high. volume production, 
have a high development cost. This implies that an efficient design' 
would contain as small a number of different chip types as possible. 
This affects architectural decisions at two levels. 'At the unit level 
(memory, bus, arithmetic unit, control, etc.), there will be strong ad-
vantage in using replication of identical units rather than units
	 - 
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designed specifically for particular functions. At the logic level, the 
high development cost of customized units makes it more attractive to 
transfer arbitrary logic to a form of memory as in the use of micro-
programming. 
Replacement and maintenance strategies in a reconfigurable computer 
are also influenced by LSI. The large number of gates per chip, together 
with the tendency for a chip fault to 'affect many gates, imply that small 
units such as registers should not be replaced, but rather that groups of 
registers, all on the same chip should be. 
The choice of LSI technologies is between the lower speed, lower cost 
MOS and the higher speed and cost bipolar technologies. The total computing 
power required among the elements of the several candidate architectures 
is such that MOS will be suffiôien'tly fast for memories, busses and arith-
metic units. In addition, the use of a multiprocessor organization permits 
the attainment of high computation capacity with slower processors. The 
higher speed of bipolar circuits may still be necessary in the control 
sections where the microprogram cycle time will typically be an order of 
magnitude faster than the instruction cycle time. Recent advances in 
technology have tended to bring the two types closer in both speed and 
cost.
We note, that the choice between different LSI technologies, discussed 
above, was on the basis of speed and cost. The lower cost alternative of 
MOS is possible because of the higher density within the chip,, thereby 
enabling the use of fewer chips. This will have the desirable effect of 
increasing the inherent reliability due to the reduction in number of 
chips. LSI memory systems appear to be potentially more reliable.than 
core or plated wire because of the reduced numbers of discrete semi-
conductor devices and interconnections. The use of batteries is deemed 
to be a fully adequate assurance of non-volatility. 
The MI'BF for LSI circuits is estimated to be between 10 and lOw, 
hours. The lower number is factored into the reliability estimates for 
the architectures considered. The requirement 'to achieve a MTBF of 108 
hours for the whole system can be shown - to be achievzble by several 
architectures.
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The use of optical coupling between units can provide great pro-
tection against damage propagation through several units. The architec-
ture must therefore be more concerned with fault propagation through 
erroneous data, than by damaging electrical phenomena. The added cost 
for such protection is substantial, though not prohibitive, so careful 
evaluation of reliability value will be needed. 
The availability of mass memory (disk, drum, etc.) of a sufficiently 
high reliability is not crucial to the application, as the total data 
required to be stored is such that only a small cost penalty will be in-
volved by using LSI techniques for all memory. Advanced bulk-memory 
schemes will be useful in later systems, but are deemed not ready (as 
well as not essential) for the time period of interest. 
To achieve an estimate of total computing system cost we assume that 
the cost of memory dominates that for processors, busses, etc. The un-
replicated memory requirement of 24K words of 16 bits ( 400K bits) 
yields a total OEM chip cost of $2K. If we assume threefold replication 
with some sparing, this figure becomes approximately $8K. Allowing an 
additional 25 percent. for the other (non-memory) units a chip cost of $10K 
is reached. We use, as a)rough rule, a factor of 3 to account for .wiring, 
boards, frames, power supplies, installation, etc. The gross estimate of 
the computer cost is therefore $30K. This figure should not be regarded 
as firm, owing to the significant design choices still to be made in 
further. study.
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V	 A CHECKLIST . AND A SURVEY OF FAULT TOLERANT ARCHITECTURES 
A.	 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to survey some of the existing computer 
systems that have fault tolerance as one of the design goals. The systems 
that are surveyed here are the STAR computer of JPL, the EXAM computer of 
NASA-ERC, the ARMMS computer jointly of NASA-Marshall and Hughes, the MARCS 
concept of IBM-Yorktown, the AADC of Naval Air Systems Command, and the 
Hopkins Scheme (HS) of MIT-Draper Labs. The STAR exists as an advanced 
breadboard and the HS as a preliminary breadboard. Under present plans the 
LSI chips for the AADC should exist within a few years. The future of the 
other three systems is undetermined.  
For reasons which should later be apparent, of the above systems only 
the HS is a candidate architecture for our application. However, even in 
the case of HS some key details of error detection, executive operation, 
and hardware design are currently unspecified, e.g., multiprogramming for 
the diverse avionic computations. Some additional design work is thus 
required before we can be assured of the suitability of HS. We should 
also emphasize , that the other five mentioned systems could be modified to 
better match our environment. However, in modifying these systems we are 
likely to produce a variant of the three candidates--HS, SIFT, BUCS--with 
the addition of some techniques found useful for the environment of parti-
cular-systems. Among such techniques are the special associative memory 
used for scheduling in EXAM or the arithmetic codes of STAR. Thus it 
seemed appropriate to us to design the candidates from scratch, borrowing 
particular concepts of existing systems. 
It should also be mentioned that numerous other architectures that 
embody fault tolerance have been proposed. Anong these are the MECRA1, 
the PRIME 2 system of University of California, Berkeley, the Three-Fault 
4 
Tolerant System 3 of North American, ESS of Bell Telephone Laboratories, 
the Burroughs Multiprocessor5 and systems currently being pursued by 
Raytheon and Ultra-Systems. We do not survey these systems here for one' 
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or more of the following reasons: (1) insufficient documentation is cur-
rently available, (2) fault tolerance is an incidental design goal, or 
achieved in only limited degree, (3) the probability of further design 
work being done by the architect is low, (4) the design goals are quite 
different from ours. In another SRI report  these and other systems are 
surveyed and classified. 
Before embarking on a detailed description of the six architectures 
to be surveyed, we present a checklist for the design of a fault-tolerant 
architecture. In essence, this checklist Is a summary . of the constraints 
Imposed by our environment, as measured by the computational requirements 
and technology. 
B.	 Checklist 
Most of the Items below pertain to the qualities that are expected 
from a fault tolerant computer system for commercial aircraft. We have 
also included some items that enable the reader to evaluate the surveyed 
architectures and the candidate architectures. 
Computational Environment -- As abstracted from Chapter III the air-
craft computations as presently envisioned have the following 
characteristics: 
• Independence -- the 26 computations are essentially independent 
• with respect to shared data, shared programs and shared effectors. 
Almost all of the computations need access to the state of the 
aIrcraft which. is a relatively small amount of data 
• Total processor load -- 0.5 MIPS 
Total memory load -- 24K, exclusive of executive 
Maximum processor load per computation -- .12 MIPS 
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• Maximum memory load per computation -- 9K words, although this can 
probably be reduced to 4K words needed for any iteration. Most 
computations require less than 2K words of memory. 
• System down-time -- no more than 10 msec for certain critical 
computations. Fortunately, the memory requirements for these com-
putations are relatively small. Other computations have less 
stringent down-time requirements. 
Technology -- It is expected that LSI chips will be employed throughout 
the system. One would expect,that at least several hundred airplanes would 
be equipped with the computer and if each computer incorporates at least 
five chips of each type -- a figure easily satisfied for each candidate --
then sufficient chips would be utilized to warrant the per-chip set-up 
costs. As indicated in Chapter V, universal acceptance of LSI memory 
should appear around 1975 despite the volatility aspect. In addition, main 
memory will be used exclusively for all programsand data except possibly 
for the storing of alternative runway information. The failure rate of an 
ISI chip is taken as10 6/hr. with the major failure mechanism being inter-
connections. However, to a first approximation it Is assumed that any chip 
failure causes all chip outputs to be suspect. In designing the system for 
an LSI implementation it is desirable to utilize as few chip types as pos-
sible, and it isnecessary to minimize the number of pins/chips -- 40 is 
an absOlute maximum, 
Faults -- the following faults are expected 
Permanent -- An LSI chip can fail according to the 'rate mentioned 
above. Failures are assumed to be independent among the chips. 
Failure prpaatloti -- Failures are assumed not to propagate from 
chip to chip, i.e., a chip A' in failing will not cause a contiguous 
chip 3 to fail. (0 0
 course if an output of A ts an input to B then 
an output of B can certainly be in error.) As discussed in Chapter 
IV the prevention of failure propagatioi for certain failure modes 
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(e.g. supply voltage applied to a signal line) may require *that 
the chips be isolated by using light coupling or special driver-
receiver combinations as the interface mechanism,* 
Transient -- We are assuming here that at some moment a chip 
produces an erroneous output, but when-the chip is presented with 
the same data a short time later it will produce the correct result. 
A transient fault can be caused by a local electrical disturbance, or 
a design error coupled with a unique data dependency. It is expec-
ted that .a transient would dissipate itself in 10 msec, or when 
the timing of the signals is changed slightly. The system,'however, 
should embody some policy tohañdle larger duration transieñts0** 
Massive transient	 We are assuming here a transient failure that 
causes every modifiable element in the system to be suspect. Such 
an effect could be •caused by lightning, by a static discharge when 
the aircraft passes through a cloud, or even by an accidental power 
outage. At present there Is scant information on the probability 
of massive-transients or their duration or scope. As we note later 
a key difficulty in responding to a massive transient is that the 
tables of operative and failed resources are subject to corruption 
along with all other modifiable information. A tape cassette or 
*There may be contiguous chips wherein the mutual propagation-of faults can 
be tolerated. For such chip pairs, of which several schemes, -- and SIFT 
to a high degree -- have many, the careful isolation is not required. 
**As mentioned previously certain critical-computations cannot-be unserviced 
for more than 10 insec. Hence in responding to a transient fault the system 
cannot -perform retries for 
.
a. longer period than 10 mse-c, but must (at least 
temporarily) assume that the fault is permanent and connect a spare 
resource to service the critical function. SIFT, BUCS, HS, and -S'FARhave 
good transient-response characteristics. SIFT is, perhaps, the-best-of 
these, since it always :.'forms-avoting of 3 results and thus-can-continue 
in operation despite a long-duration, local transient,
	 - - 
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other slow, reliable back-up memory can be used to restart the 
system. It seems clear that a system night not recover in less 
than 10 msec from a massive transient of much longer duration. 
One policy is to have the critical computations be capable of 
being executed in practically all processors with little inter-
vention on the part of the failure-prone executive. SIFT 
permits such a policy in that some of the critical programs, e.g. 
flutter control, tend to be small and hence can be permanently 
resident in all processors so that unless all processors are 
disabled by the massive transient there is a possibility that the 
function can be serviced. Some careful design of the effectors 
might permit a longer MISS time than we are'assuining. 
Reliability -- For the critical computations the probability of 
delivering a wrong answer should not exceed 10 -8. For less critical 
computations the reliability requirements are not as stringent -- 
typically being •around 10T4
. Actually, these reliability figures 
should be weighted according to the inaccuracy of the result, but 
throughout this study we are,, pessimistically, assuming' that a chip 
failure disables all of the chip outputs.* 
*Of course this. does not preclude a single chip failure causing only (for 
exainpie)the least significant digit of a computation to be in errors 
However, we expect that the entire arithmetic unit will be realized on 
one or two chips and hence a chip failure here could indeed corrupt the 
entire computation.
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Availability -- At any time during a mission sufficient resources must 
beàvajlable to handle the critical computations. Once again the probability 
of the system being unavailable for the critical computations must not 
exceed 108. There are two aspects to availability. Firstly, after the 
detection of a failure the system should be unavailable for no more than 
aMISS time that is dependent on the computation. For the critical compu-
tations the MISS time is about 10 msec. Secondly, at the end of the 
mission only about half of the resources are required to effect a landing, 
so that a gracefully degraded system can achieve the availability require-
ments, In Chapter III, however, we showed that graceful degradation is 
not as exploitable as one would hope for. 
Primary Fault-Tolerance Mechanism
.
--
 It seems clear that multiprocessing 
should be utilized as the primary fault-tolerance mechanism. The computa-
tions, being relatively independent and individually requiring low processor 
and memory loads, are easily implemented with a multiprocessor. The multi-
processor concept can be exploited to provide relatively .cheap fault 
tolerance -- the fault tolerance grows linearly with the number of processors 
-- and to accommodate to the limited graceful degradation possibilities, 
- Secondary Fault-Tolerance Mechanisms -- Here the issue is not quite as 
clear. The system comes close to being memory dominated; 24K words of main. 
memory fora 0.5 MIP processor load is somewhat high by contemporary 
stanards. Hence the use of error correcting codes for memory tends to be 
cost effective as compared with triplication. Similarly, for a memory 
dominated system the use of expensive duplication or triplication techniques 
for arithmetic-logic processors does not imply an excessive system cost. 
We emphasize, .however, that the issue is not completely clear, and we do 
not rule out an architecture because it utilizes arithmetic codes 
Redundancy Estimation --.The particular measure. that we are 'looking- for 
here is the ratio of equipment in the redundant system to equipment in a 
non-redundant version.' The comparison is compounded since there is no 
canonical realization of the non-redundant version, but we might assume that 
60
a minimum system contains 24K words of memory and 0,5 MIPS processing power. 
Hence in computing the cost of the redundant system the following cost 
factors must all be included: spare processors and memory blocks, check 
bits for codes, main memory words required to store error control pro-
cedures, spare busses, extra equipment required to effect a multiprocessing 
discipline, extra power supplies, and extra I/O controllers. 
Reliability/Availability Modeling -- The problem here is to verify 
that the probability of a wrong answer and the probability of equipment 
being unavailable do not exceed the desired figure of merit -- as a function 
of the computation. For a purely static system, e.g., one that employs 
only voting, the reliability calculation is trivial. For dynamic systems 
like the candidate architectures the situation is more insidious. Among 
the factors that must be included are: the occurrence of a second fault 
while the system is responding to a first fault, failures in unflexed 
equipment, i.e., components,
 that are not utilized until an error occurs, 
the frequency of diagnosis, and the scope of a transient failure that can 
disable the system. Previous work on dynamic system modeling has always 
relied on a static model of the situation. Based on our study of the 
several architectures, it is our feeling that the results produced by 
this modeling tend to be pessimistic. For some architectures, this means 
that a given reliability figure of merit may be attainable with less 
redundancy than indicated by the model. 
Transparency to User -- The application programmer should not have to 
be concerned with the fault tolerance procedures In the composition of his 
programs. This is similar to general ignorance of an application program-
mer of the executive, functions of any large computer installation. Again 
we would expect that sound executive system design would attain this goal. 
Expandability -- It is desirable that the candidate architectures be 
expandable to handle a larger computational load. What this means is that 
for a given system configuration s
 extra main-frame equipment programs and 
I/O devices are easily added to produce a larger system. It is not entirely 
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clear what range of system power will be ultimately desired, but for 
commercial aircraft over the next 15 years a computational range of 0.2 
MIPS - 2 MIPS and a memory range of 10K - lOOK seem reasonable. Systems 
of less capability than the smallest configuration are too small to worry 
about, and it does not seem possible that there would be enough computa-
tions in any conceivable commercial aircraft to occupy a system larger 
than the largest configuration. It is clear that a system is readily 
expandable if prdcessors and memory blocks are easily connected without 
requiring a major modification of the bus system, or without requiring 
modifications to the executive other than the setting up of tables for 
the new equipment and programs. The reader is warned that there are 
Insidious factors involved in designing an expandable system. For 
example, the executive overhead might grow excessively as procesors are 
added, or In aniinimal system the executive, In an attempt to make It 
general, might overwhelm the system -- the problem with running OS/360 
on the low line 360 machines. 
Prototype Development -- Although the cost and performance ofthe 
ultimate production system are of primary .iinportance,it is of some Interest 
to estimate the cost of developing a prototype unit since most of the 
systems presently exist only on paper. The major factors of interest here 
are:
• the feasibility of using off-the-shelf processors and memories 
• the amount of special-purpose logic that must be designed and 
implemented 
• the possibility of using microprogcamming techniques Instead of 
costly hardware for fault tolerance functions 
• the scope of a system that must beprototyped in order to 
demonstrate the concept. 
In the next sec t4 	 we attempt to discuss the various architectures 
relative to the Items In thls'checklist. Chapters VI and VII discuss the 
SIFT and BUCS architectures also relative to the checklist. 
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C.	 STAR 
System Organization 
Essentially, the STAR is a single processor decomposed into separate 
functional units each of which is replicated two or more times. With the 
exception of the memory modules needed for critical functions, the TARP and 
the logic processor, only one functional unit of each type is normally 
operating. Faulty functional units are replaced by power switching. Com-
munication between units is via two 8-bit byte-serial busses to which units 
are passively connected (no switches on bus lines). Two forms of error 
detecting code are employed in information transfer between units. Every 
transmitted word is examined for error syndrome by hardware contained 
within a critical "hard-core" test and repair processor called the TARP. 
Design Goals 
Extremely long meantime to failure, low weight', low power consump-
tion, low computation rate, relatively rapid recovery from transient faults, 
Technology 
Discrete transistors and small IC packages. Magnetic-core R/W

memories, a "rope-core" fixed memory, magnetic amplifier type power switches, 
Faults 
Intended to recover from all single permanent or transient 'failures 
confined to an IC Package, Massive transients and program failures can, 
at present, not be tolerated. 
Reliability. Assessment 
Survival for 100,000 hours with .95 probability, Recovery from 
transient faults in less than 50 ms, See. 'reference 7, 
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Expandability 
STAR is not particularly well suited to expandability because of 
the limited band-width, of the communication busses, which must transmit 
each word as eight serial bytes of four bits each. Current memory address 
space is also limited to 216 words. A two-processor version of STAR might 
be based-on a duplication of the TARP (test and repair processor) and bus 
system with the sharing of normally unpowered spare functional units between 
the two systems. This plan would lead to less than a doubling of the 
original hardware but would require additional "hard-core" control Btruc-
ture to handle multi-programming and memory sharing. The STAR is not 
easily contractible unless the error detecting code. features are abandoned, 
in which case' the principal means of fault detection would be lost. 
Reliability Mechanism 
The principal mechanisms employed in STAR to produce over-all 
systemreliability 'are: 
1. The use of redundant coding to detect errors in transmission 
of data or instructions from one functional unit to another. 
2. Hardware for internal consistency checking within functional 
units that detects some types of malfunction, For example, ,a 
word placed on a bus by a unit not agreeing with what actually 
appears on the bus, causes the unit to report such an occur-
rence via a status-bus to the TARP. 
3. A TARP with at least 3 identical versions powered up at all 
times (with voting) plus spare 'unitsto be switched on line 
to replace disagreeing members. This is the "hard core" of 
the system,  
4. A highly reliable magnetic switch mechanism for disconnecting 
malfunctioning units from active status and powering up 
replacement units,
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Recovery from Failures 
The TARP contains a mechanism for re-executing instructions when 
some indication of failure has occurred. If a fault occurs because of 
a short transient, normal operation may be resumed by attempting the last 
previous instruction. On a repeated failure the TARP may then attempt to 
resume computation at a designated "roll-back" point, which It is the 
responsibility of the prOgrammer to provide. Otherwise (on repeated 
failure) the unit indicating a defective status or transmitting an 
improper code is . switched off and replaced. 
The claim is made that fault detection and unit replacement can be 
handled In 50 ms. However, this does not Imply that at most a 50 ms 
delay in program execution would result, since some error circumstances 
might require roll-back to a previously established program check point. 
With regard to programming errors, STAR has no explicit means for 
coping with this variety of fault, although machine Instructions are rep-
resented In an error detecting code, since an assembly-language program 
could easily be faulty (i.e., In a tight loop) without causing any error 
report. Recovery from such blunders would have to be a strictly software 
implemented function, and at present STAR does not have a program-interrupt 
feature in the TARP. 
Measure of Redundancy 
In the STAR origanizat ion redundancy depends upon the number of 
spare units provided. Where memory space is not a vital consideration 
(so that memory units can be lost without replacement) a reliable con-
figuration containing at least one extra replacement for each functional 
unit would appear to require somewhere between 1.5 and 2.5 times the 
hardware for a minimum organization with no spare units. As a rough 
estimate, a minimum configuration STAR would probably contain at least 3 
times the hardware of a computer of the same computational capacity, but 
without special reliability features. 
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Transparency to User 
In the current implementation the user must insert roll-back points 
in his program and save the status himself. We would expect that in  
later version a compiler and executive routine could handle this chore. 
Current Status 
The STAR has been implemented and tested in "bread-board" form at 
JPL and continues to be an experimental prototype of on-board computers 
for unmanned deep-space exploration. 
General Conclusions 
While the STAR computer organization has many novel features 
uniquely suited to its mission it does not match well with our given 
mission objectives. In particular, the weight, size and power require-
ments are irrelevant, the STAR's rate of computation is far too low to 
handle the several more critical tasks of . stability augmentation, inertial 
navigation, etc., STAR is not well suited to expansion, and lastly, the 
STAR is infficient in the sense that a large amount of hardware remains 
completely idle unless a real malfunction actually occurs. 
EXAM 
System Organization 
The EXAM system  is a very homogeneous multiprocessor, multi-memory 
configuration In which any processor can-have access -to any memory through 
what amounts to a huge cross-bar switch. Each processor can-find Itself - 
in one of three states: 
1. A problem state in which it.is working on some applications 
program.  
2. The executive state in which it Is doing the usual system- - 
monitor functions.	 .	 .
3. An idle state in which it attempts to seize executive control. 
Hardware interlock features are provided to prevent more than one processor 
from securing executive status. An associative memory, accessible to any 
processor, is provided to handle some of the executive control processes. 
Memory access by more than one processor to the same memory unit is handled 
by a "round-robin" priority scheme. 
Design Goals 
Principal motivations for the EXAM architecture were: high per-
formance (as measured by executed instructions per second), the possibility 
of a highly repetitive LSI construction, and very flexible expandability 
to many-processor organizations 
Technology 
Theiiltimate use of LSI is assumed as the only reasonable technology 
for the cross-point array. This array connects processors to memories in 
a fully parallel set of 36-bit communication paths. Otherwise, processor 
and memory technologies are optional although the associateive memory 
required for executivefunctions would imply sémi-conductor implementation. 
Faults 
The documentation is not clear on this point, although processor 
failures and memory bank failures should be handled by a simple switchover 
processor.. The system seems very vulnerable to massive transients and 
permanent failures. 
Reliability Assessment 
No estimates are avialab].e. The possibilities for producing a 
reliable machine would seem to depend on software augmented identification 
of faulty processors, and/or memory modules, followed by mcdificatiion of 
the executive program to deny communication to or from these units. A 
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particularly dangerous feature of the EXAM organization from the reli-
abi"l.i.ty standpoint is that each processor can write in every memory 
(excent perhaps the executive associative table). Thus there is no 
mechanism to prevent a faulty processor from destroying data In any 
memory-unit. 
Also very critical to the reliability of the EXAM organization 
Is the Integrity of the [SI crosspoint switches. A switch failure might, 
for example, prevent access by a processor to several memory units, or 
fender some memory unit unavailable to any processor. 
Reliability Mechanisms 
The EXAM organization contains no explicit plan for ensuring 
reliable operation; Assuming that the cross-bar switch connecting 
proàessors . with-xnemorles could be made "hard-core" reliable by TMR 
téchñiques, then survival of some of the initially available -processors 
and ñemories may be assumed. In this case a continuing but degraded 
performance of the system would be feasible, but only if sophisticated 
software-diagnostic methos were employed to reschedule tasks. Themost 
vulnerable area is the possibility of a runaway processor destroying 
Iifórmation in an unprotected memory. 
Récovery.from Failures 
Here again no particular recovery means have been supplied by the 
èytern architects. One nay visualize schemes-in which several processors 
take part In one task, comparing results. On discovery of a disagreement 
the offending processor might be denied menory accesses by dropping it - 
from the round-robin memory queue. Here, recovery times could be as short 
as one 
-
instruction cycle or as long as the execution time between programmer-
assigned-check -points. - The whole strategy is vague and it Is not at all 
clear what might be expected to occur on a transient that affected some 
processors but not others.  
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Measure of Redundancy 
The EXAM architecture has no redundancy in one sense because some 
programs could employ all processors and memories In useful computation. 
To construct a "reliable" version of EXAM would require at least a TMR 
realization of the cross-bar switch plus considerable internal redundancy 
in the processors, memories and in memory access circuitry, and coding in 
memories. This might amount to a factor of 3 over a non-redundant version. 
Expandability 
The EXAM concept is certainly very flexible with regard to computa-
tional power since almost any number of processors and memories can be 
accommodated by the same general organization. However, computational 
power is not proportional to the. number of processors employed since 
conflicts on memory access can lock out several processors desiring to 
look at the same memory module. Efficient use of the EXAM configuration 
requires careful partitioning of tasks Into independent program modules --
an elaborate scheduling algorithm that must be confronted for any multi-
processor organization. 
Prototype Development 
Prototype development should not be overly involved because the 
processors, memory banks and associative memory are quite standard. The 
cross-bar switch will require special design but this should not be 
difficult to realize since its structure is uniform, and since some design 
work on it is complete, 
General Conclusions 
The EXAM computer has the merits of structural simplicity through 
the use of many similar or identical modular units. It also offers a high 
degree of utilization of available computational power. From the reliability 
standpoint, however, there seem to be no intrinsic features to recommend it 
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over other multiprocessor organizations that have a less elaborate . inter-
connection structure. In particular, the vulnerability of memory to any 
faulty processor and the necessity of faultless operation of the elaborate 
cross-bar switch seem tq be two good reasons to reject this design concept. 
E. Hopkins Scheme (HS) 
General Organization 
The HS, Ref. 9, is a multiprocessor reasonably well suited for-the 
aircraft environment. Each processor is in reality a processor-pair, PP, 
with a small triplicated scratchpad . memory, TSM. A large main memory, MM, 
is also present. The TSM holds the. status of thePP -- presumably an alias 
exists in TSM for all registers . , flip-flops in PP. An-error-in a PP, as 
revealed.by a comparator, or in the TSM causes the TSM'to gain control of 
a bus toMM, in which case the contents of TSMare dumped to  preset area 
in MM. An executive then retries the computation on the same PP-TSM 
combination or on another PP-TSM combination. As presently conceived, 
the processors in the PP . must operate in locked step, The bus is in reality 
a triplicated bus wherein the outputs of a TSM. are voted upon prio.r to 
their insertion on the bus. The main memory organization is at present 
not clear butipresuinably it is amenable to the same-coding techniques 
utilized in BUCS. All of the executiv• processing is accomplishedt in a 
particular PP-TSM until it fails whence another acts as the executLve. A 
major drawback of the present version to access the bus at each instruc-
tion. The use of the. TSM as a cache would improve the situation, but at 
the expense of increasing the-cost of the TSM.-- a discardable unit. 
Computational Environment,. 
HS seems well suited to our environment as discussed above. The system 
is intended for use. on a manned spacecraft that exerts a computational. 
load similar to that of the aircraft. 	 . 
Technology-
Probably LSI throughout.
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Faults 
HS should handle single permanent or transient faults confined to 
primitive processor unit within a PP, a single scratchpad memory within 
TSM, or a single bus. Since the memory organization is not specified the 
issue is not clear here. Multiple PP-TSM failures can be handled provided 
they do not occur within a recovery interval. There is no policy specified 
for massive transients, and at present it seems that a processor can write 
anywhere in main memory, thus leading to a vulnerability to programming 
failures,	 .	 . 
Reliability Assessment 
No goal has'been specified but with a few spare PP-TSM's and, say 
coding In MM, our reliability goal Is attainable, HS tentatively specifies 
a procedure for handling the diagnosis of the pp comparators, otherwise 
these would be unflexed hardware. 
Availability 
In responding to a fault the system effects a recovery by dumping the 
TSM contents and reloading these contents in another TSM. As presently 
envisioned the TSM is probably no more than a few hundred words, thus 
enabling a restart in 1. msec. 
Redundancy 
If MM is replicated, say by  factor of three, the redundancy ratio 
Is at least 3. For the use of a coding scheme in MM Similar to that used 
for BUCS the ratio is probably about 2. As we will note in Chapter VII. 
this ratio is very sensitive to the size of the TSM. 
Reliability Model 
No reliability model has been conceIved, but a rough estimate of relia-
billty . and availability is attainable as the product of the following 
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factors: the probability of PP-TSM failures in a mission, the probability 
of a bus failure in a mission, and the probability of a second failure 
wt 'hin a recovery interval. The unflexed situation Is not Included. 
:(r: Transparency to User 
- The application programmer Is not involved in the error control pro-
cedures; the executive handles all aspects of recovery. The application 
programmer might wish to partition his program so that It runs efficiently 
in the cache environment. 
Expandability 
The degree of expandability Is limited by the traffic that the bus 
can carry. Without a cache and with a single TMR protected bus, and with 
a single port memory, the maximum processor load is probably no more than 
0.5MIPS. With the use of a cache with each processor, or the use of a 
more complex bus and a multi-port memory, the processor load can be pushed 
to 2 MIPS. The bus would have to be designed Initially to handle the 
insertion or deletion, of processors. 
F. ARIvIMS 
General Organization 
The Automatically Reconfigurable Modular Multiprocessing System (ARMMS) 
was conceived at NASA-MARSHALL and is currently being pursued at Hughes 
Ground Syslems Group, We emphasize that much of the design work remains 
to be done, 'as of July 1972, so that there are gaps in the concept. The 
ARMMS sytemis intended for a spaceborne environment, wherein the 
reliability goal is long 'life and wherein a varying computational load Is 
anticipated throughout a mission. The system consists of eight processors, 
capable of being configured In a variety of modes. (At present, It Is not 
clear at what rate the configuration can be modified.) Up to three tasks 
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can be processed simultaneously on three processors. These three processors 
presumably operate in a near locked step TMR mode.. Thus up to five pro-
cessors can be simultaneously active; the remainder of operative processors 
are spares. Each processor contains a local memory of, say, 128 words with 
the main memory serving as a back-up to this local memory. We would guess 
that special logic within the processor controls the transfer of blocks of 
words between the local memory and main memory. The main memory is organ-
ized as 32 banks although no complete error detection or error correction 
procedures have been specified for it. There are hardware voters on the 
processor to memory links so that when the processors are operating in a 
TMR mode any processor errors are corrected before the errors propagate to 
memory. Most of the system control is contained within a specialized 
executive unit called BOSS. BOSS performs all of the executive functions 
associated with scheduling, allocation of resources to tasks, error 
reconfigurition, 1/0 control. Internal redundancy is used to make BOSS 
reliable, i.e., only one distinguishable BOSS unitexists, 
Mission 
A general spaceborne computer is sought that is responsive to a variety 
of missions. In this regard the system embodies variable redundancy -- a 
multiprocessed simplex operation for low criticality tasks, a duplex mode 
for moderately critical tasks, and a TMR mode for high criticality tasks. 
In the multiprocessed simplex mode the computation capacity Is to be 
2 MIPS, spread over three processors. The reliability goal is the sur-
vival of at least one processor, and a suitable portion of memory, with 
probability 0.99 after 5 years. 
Technology 
It is not immediately clear if special purpose LSI chips are planned. 
A processor called Space Ultrareliable Modular Computer (SUMC) has been 
designed as the basic processor. Some effort is being devoted to par-
titioning SUMC into modules. There appear to be no special constraints on 
the processor operation, so that an off-the-shelf high performance LSI 
processor should suffice.
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Faults 
Certainly in the TMR mode any fault that disables a single processor 
can be tolerated. A duplex mode is also possible in which single processor 
faults are detected. There seems to be no fault tolerance in the simplex 
mode. Masking of memory faults with error correcting codes is planned for 
the future. BOSS will probably be protected with TMR applied at the module 
level. The design has not proceeded to the point where the response to 
massive transients or permanent faults can be assessed. 
Reliability 
For our aircraft environment only the TMR mode of ARMMS can satisfy 
the 108 reliability requirement. 
Availability 
AR?VU1S can be equipped with sufficient resources to meet our avai'la-
bility requirement. 
Redundancy 
It is difficult to measure the redundancy in ARMMS since the design 
is still in its conceptual stage, in particular with regard to memory and 
BOSS. It is our guess that the redundancy ratio for a TMR mode will exceed 
three. 
Transparency to User 
The user is not involved in fault tolerance procedures except possibly 
to specify the criticality of his task, which in turn determines the mode 
	
in which ARIvUVIS will process the task, 	 . 
Expandability 
Memory is to be expandable to 512 K words. The BOSS design does not 
seem to allow for the addition of more than 8 processors, although it 
should be noted that each processor is quite powerful -- 0.5-1 MIPS.. 
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Prototype Development 
The prototype development is likely to be quite costly, mostly because 
of BOSS. It seems that BOSS is to be realized as a special purpose processor. 
A portion of BOSS can be a simple but high-speed, general-purpose computer 
since many of BOSS' functions require little more than table look-up or 
simple processing. However, much of the high-speed communication links 
between BOSS and the other system blocks will require special attention. 
,icl rtn 
Perhaps the most novel feature of ARMMS is the concept of variable 
fault tolerance. This is potentially attractive for our environment because 
of the varying reliability among criticality classes. However, as presently 
conceived the simplex mode of ARMMS does not provide any fault tolerance --
a situation that cannot be endured even for the least critical functions. 
If this mode could be modified to provide a probability of error detection 
of 0.99 per hour then the ARMMS concept would deserve a more critical study. 
Another disadvantage of ARMMS is the specialized BOSS unit. It is our 
feeling that the redundancy of the system would be significantly reduced 
by incorporating most, if not all, of the executive function within a 
processor, as in HS, SIFT, and BUCS. 
G.	 AADC 
The Advanced Avionics Digital Computer 
10 (AADC), now called the All 
Applications Digital Computer, is currently being developed by the Naval 
Air Systems Command with technical support from the Naval Research 
Laboratory and several industrial organizations. The AADC is intended to 
satisfy the majority of the Navy's computing requirements in the 1975-1985 
time period. Our discussion here is brief since the error control features 
of the AADC remain to be specified. The tack currently being pursued is 
to design and build the hardware components, and to later incorporate 
fault tolerance -procedures in specialized hardware and software executives. 
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The system consists of a set of processor elements (PE's), an-associative 
processor (AP), a large random access main memory (RAMM), a bulk storage, and 
a bus :tructure interconnecting the above units. For our purposeshere the 
PE is of inostinterest. A PE consists of a processor and a task memory, 
wherein a program requiring service is loaded into a task memory for execution. 
Significant design effort Is being devoted to the PE design inan attempt to 
realize the entire PE as a small number of wafers. If this is achieved, then 
the basic PE is certainly a candidate as the processor in SIFT, HS or BUCS. 
(HS and BUCS might require special interface logic to effect.comparisons 
between a pair of processors.) Presumably a PE will be a discardable element. 
in any fault-tolerance scheme. 
It Is impossible to assess the reliability aspects of AADC since they 
are yet to be conceived. It seems clear that .the system will be highly 
redundant	 but perhaps this is not of much concern if the PE's cost is 
nominal. However, it is our feeling.that fault-tolerance must be incorpor-
ated into the system at initial design phases in order to produce a.truly 
reliable, efficient system. Invariably special interface logic or.special 
processor instructions arerequired, for example, to prevent error-propaga-
tion, to permit, the use of error correcting codes in main memory, to permit 
the recovery'frommassive transients, or to-protect main memory.access from 
a faulty processor. 
H.	 MARCS 
General Organization 
The Modular Architecture for Reliable 
currently being pursued at IBM Yorktown. 
report MARCS is not a clearly defined syst 
very sound fault-tolerant principles. IL 
testbed for the study of coding techniques
Computer Systems 12 (MARCS) is

At the time of writing .this 
m but a concept embodying ,
 some. 
essence the concept has been a 
and circuit diagnosis algorithms. 
The concept involves an Interconnection of primitive subunits to form 
a uniprocessor. The subunits are: arithmetic logic unit, scratchpad memory
and program control unit, bus control unit, I/O processors, recovery control 
unit, and main storage. The main storage incorporates frame coding, as 
discussed in Chapter II, with the inclusion of spare frames. When the system 
is operating in a uniprocessor configuration sparQ subunits are provided 
(except for main storage), where the computer is operational if at least one 
subunit of each type is operative. An interesting logic coding scheme is 
utilized such that a single gate fault in any subunit eventually produces an 
error signal at the subunit's output. In principle, this circumvents the 
unflexed hardware problem, at least for units that perform comparison or 
decoding of an error correcting code. A multiprocessor mode is also possible. 
It is imposs:.ble to evaluate MARCS as a potential candidate since much 
of the computer is unspecified. We have been strongly influenced by the 
coding techniques both for logic and memory, and by the diagnosis techniques, 
particularly those of Roth's, that in essence have set the stage for most of 
the current work on diagnosis.
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VI . SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTED FAULT TOLERANCE (SIFT) 
This section describes a proposed design of a computer system in which 
fault tolerance is achieved using software techniques, to remove the need 
for special fault-tolerance hardware units. The computer resembles a 
multiprocessor with a restriction that each processor may not write into 
the memory associated with other processors. The executive system and the 
application programs are protected by identical fault tolerance procedures. 
The computer design gives the system programmer the ability to vary the 
degree of fault tolerance by changing the extent to which a program is 
replicated among the processors. 
The fault tolerance procedures to be described may be implemented 
by combinations of program, micro-program and hardware elements. The 
present discussion emphasizes programming. The fault tolerance features 
can be made completely transparent to the application programmer, but it 
is also possible to allow the application programmer to prescribe fault 
tolerance procedures that are specially appropriate to a given computation. 
Also included in this section are analyses of the reliability and 
fault tolerance to be expected from the design. The size and speed of 
the individual units (processors, memories, buses, etc.) are based upon 
the computational power requirements as outlined in Chapter III, and as 
described in detail 1n the Volume II report of the project. Included in 
this section are estimates of the storage and computing requirements for 
the executive of the system. Some alternative design options are discussed. 
A.	 System Design Overview 
The system (Figure VI-l) consists of a number of modules, each com-
posed cf a memory and processing unit. 
The individual processing units within the modules are connected to 
the corresponding memory units with wide-bandwidth busses. The inter-module 
bus organization (B1 , B2 , B3 ) is designed to allow a processor to read 
from any memory but not to write into .other memory units. This is a novel 
and central feature of the system, and serves to prevent fault propagation. 
*
The bus logic envisioned does not use voting. The number three is chosen. 
for convenience of discussion.
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The inter-module bus is expected to have a much lower bandwidth than an 
intra-module bus. 
The input/output (I/O) system, discussed in a later section, is 
assumed to be connected to the busses B1 , B2 , B3 . The input/output (I/O) 
system shown in Figure yr-i is all the non-computing units, e.g., trans-
ducers, actuators, sensors. That part of the total input/output which is 
carried out by program, e.g., formatting or code conversion, is handled 
in the same manner as any other task, i.e., is replicated in several	 * 
processors. 
The system is viewed as being regular in that no module is given 
special facilities or is, a priori, assigned a special role. All computa-
tions that require high reliability are carried out in several modules. 
We assume for -the purpose of this description that critical tasks.are 
processed in three units. 
The computations which must be carried out are broken into a number 
of tasks in such a way that no task requires more computing power than 
can be supplied by one processor. The tasks are given the designations, 
A, B, C...; the processors are numbered 1, 2, 3... . Each processor is 
capable of being multiprogrammed over a number of tasks, as illustrated 
in Figure VI-2. 
- The control of the computing system is carried out by an executive 
system that can be segmented by function into two parts: 
(1) LOCAL EXECUTIVE: 	 Functions that apply to each processor 
(e.g., dispatching, reporting errors, loading new task 
programs). 
(2) SYSTEM EXECUTIVE: 	 Functions that are global to the system 
(e.g., allocation and scheduling of work load, reconfiguring). 
A complete set of the software functions of Class (1) is present in 
each processor (possibly in microprogram); those in Class (2) are carried 
out in a sufficient number of processors to provide the degree of fault 
tolerance required. The functions are realized by programs that have 
the same task structure as all other programs. 
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The normal operating mode for a processor carrying out a task is 
to follow the flow of control shown in Figure VI-3. Data required for 
the task are assumed to have been computed by several processors (including 
possibly the same one carrying out the task). A check is made to see if 
the data are available in all processors. If not, the fact is noted in 
the memory of the module and the dispatcher program within the module is 
entered to determine which task is next to be processed. The next 
processing is the reading of input data from the several processors where 
copies of that exist. A validation is now carried out, typically (but not 
necessarily) by a two-out-of-three vote. If any of the copies of the input 
data are found not to agree, then this fact is noted for later processing 
by the executive. If all the copies are different, the fact is noted and 
control moves to the dispatcher program. The computation of the task is 
now carried out, the results left in the memory of the module, and note is 
made (in the module) of the fact that the task is computed. 
Certain important principles are obeyed in the above scheme: 
0 No processor writes into the memory of another module. 
0 Input data in a module are not destroyed during the compu-
tation • If the computation is repetitive, the results of 
one cycle that may be used as input for the next cyle are 
placed in a different location in memory. Similarly, because 
the input data within one module may be needed later by another 
processor carrying out the same task, the input data must not 
be destroyed until all cooperating processors have read, val-
idated, and used the data. This may require that the data 
have to be preserved over several iterations if they are 
used by another task which is delayed behind the first. 
o All conditions (e.g., errors, task complete) are left as 
notes to be read later by the system executive. 
The dispatcher program, which exists in each module, main-
tains a queue of tasks to be computed. The data for this 
queue are read from memories of the modules that are running 
*Dispatching is thc executive function that initiates a new task at the 
completion of the previous one.
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the executive. The flow, of control of the dispatcher is 
itself similar to that shown in Figure VI-3, except at the 
end, when the control is transferred to the task that is at 
the head of the queue. 
• The dispatcher in each processor checks from time to time to 
see if the system executive has changed the queue of task for 
that processor. A single bit (per processor) is set in the 
system executive tables to indicate a change of the queue. 
If this bit is not set, the dispatcher waits some time (e.g., 
1 msec.) before querying it again, thereby preventing continuous 
interrogation and consequent heavy inter-module bus traffic. 
The above scheme achieves a high degree of fault tolerance without special 
hardware requirements. In particular, an erroneous calculation carried 
out by a module does not destroy the validity of the total system, because 
results are rejected by the next calculation. 
	
B.	 Major Characteristics of SIFT 
The system described above has many properties which, .in total, dis-
tinguish it from other fault-tolerant systems. 
• Replicated units do not operate in lock-step mode, but are 
	
-	
only loosely synchronized. The communication between CPUS 
is asynchronous, thereby removing the need for an ultra-
reliable system clock. 
• Agreement between replicated units is verified only at the 
completion of program segments (tasks). 
0 Faulty units are not necessarily removed but can either be 
ignored or assigned to tasks having no overall effect. 
• Transient faults do not necessarily cause permanent removal 
of the faulty units. Furthermore, the looseness of synchro-
nization among sets of tasks makes it possible to enhance 
immunity from transients by providing that redundant versions 
of a computation may be done at different moments in time. 
The degree of fault tolerance can be different for different 
tasks being performed, and/or can be different at different 
times for the same task.
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0 No special hardware is used to carry out fault detection or 
correction. 
0 Communication between CPUs is minimized so that low-bandwidth 
busses can be used, thereby facilitating physical separation 
of modules in environments where physical damage is a hazard. 
0 'The design concept is independent of the way in which the 
units are built, i.e., no specialization of CPU or memory 
design is required for fault tolerance, thereby allowing the 
choice to be based on other properties, e.g., speed, or 
availability. 
• The total computing power of the system can be varied by 
using units of different speed Or by changing the number of 
units. 
C.	 Input/OutDut 
•	 The input/output subsystem must be designed and operated with the 
same fault tolerance as the central processing complex. Different modes 
of operation are possible, depending on the various devices that are con-
nected, to and controlled by the system. The favored principle is to use 
replication wherever possible. Varying capabilities of fault tolerance 
in the central computing system can be achieved by using varying replica-
tion and by voting at all times when valid data are required (e.g., at 
the start of a task). The results of a calculation will exist in-several 
(usually three) copies and eventually a vote must be taken. The vote that 
is required to allow another task calculation is carried out in multiple 
modules; however, if the vote is for output, then the output system or 
output unit must conduct the final vote. 
There are circumstances where the nature of the input/output unit 
assists fault tolerance through replication, as in the following cases: 
G Certain input systems (sensors) can be replicated; each 
sensor is then individually read (and voted on) by all 
modules requiring the input. 
O Certain'output devices can be built in a way that employs 
a "natural" kind of voting process in the final output medium. 
For example, a CRT display could be refreshed with each frame 
• derived from a different module. Data on which all modules 
agreed would be displayed brightly; other,data would be more 
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faint. Assuming that faults persist only for short periods, 
this would result in a temporary flicker for a few frames 
before the executive removed the malfunctioning module from 
the calculation. In the application to which the design is 
aimed, there are other output devices, e.g., flap controls 
possessing similar "natural" voting capabilities. 
In the event that the device is not in one of the above classes, another 
"final voter" must be designed that inherently possesses the required 
reliability. This consideration is independent of the architecture chosen 
for the central computing system. 
We note that the architecture described here can operate in a mode 
whereby the replicated versions of output data (or the replicated data 
from input sensors) can be processed by any of the processing modules; 
hence, no modules need be specially designed for this function. 
D.	 Bus Design 
The bus system (B1 , B2 , B3 , Figure VI-l) used for communication be-
tween modules must be designed to be fault tolerant. We remind readers 
that the bus system is used only to allow the processor of one module to 
read from the memory of a different module. The design need not be such 
that all bus traffic is checked (as in most other fault-tolerant archi-
tectures); however, it should allow a processor the choice of different 
busses in the event that a bus has failed. 
A structure based on a four-port memory module is shown in Figure 
VI-l. In this structure, each module would have connection between its 
units (processor and memory). The bus structure, B 1 , B2 , B3, would 
enable a processor to choose different paths in reading data from the 
memory units of different modules. It would be appropriate to connect 
the I/O system to this bus structure. In the event that a four-port 
memory unit such as shown in Figure VI-1 is not available (or not suitable 
from other standpoints), then the structure can be achieved by attaching 
a single-port memory to all busses using conventional techniques. 
A processor that needs to read from the memory of a different module 
must seize control of a bus. Logic associated with a bus must ensure 
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that only one processor has control of a bus at any time. In addition, 
the bus must be allocated to a processor for only a finite time, thereby 
preventing a faulty processor from seizing a bus permanently. An internal 
clock associated with each bus can control the period for which the 
processor in question dominates a bus. A failure in this control logic 
causes the loss of that bus. It remains to be shown that no situations 
can occur where. the failure of one unit can cause incorrect action of 
several other units, i.e.-we require a design so that faults remain 
localized. 
In summary, the following sequence of action is carried out in reading. 
data word (w) from memory (m) to processor (p) via bus (b). 
1. Processor p places b, in, and w in registers and signals all 
busses with a DATA REQUEST. 
2. All non-busy busses scan all processor DATA REQUEST lines 
(continuously). 
3. If a data request line is on, and b equals the bus number, 
the bus goes into BUSY state-and stops scanning the processors. 
The requested bus has now been selected by the processor. 
4. The.selected bus transmits m, w, and DATA REQUEST from the 
processor registers to all memory modules. 
5	 Each-non-busy memory module continuously scans. all busses for 
a DATA REQUEST line, that is on, and then compares the m on that 
bus with its own number. 
6. If a match is found, the memory goes into BUSY state and ceases 
scanning the busses. The . w on the bus is placed in the memory 
address register and a read request issued to the memory. The 
memory is now selected 
7. When--the word is read by the memory, it is placed on the data 
lines of the bus and a DATA READY line is-turned-on. 
8. The DATA READY and data are transmitted to the requesting. 
processor. When the data has been received by the 
processor, the DATA REQUEST line from that processor is turned 
off.
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9.	 Action 8 will cause the BUSY states (actions 3 and 6) to be 
dropped and the bus and memory resume scanning for other 
requests. 
In the above sequence each unit that requests action of another unit 
makes a request (e.g. DATA REQUEST). The granting of the request is made 
by the requestee. This arrangement will, for example, prevent a processor 
from requesting all the busses simultaneously, since the busses will respond 
only if the bus request (b) agrees with their bus number. It would, therefore, 
require failure of all of the busses to completely disable the bus structure. 
In addition to the above, it is assumed that each unit has logic 
associated with it that prevents it being seized indefinitely. This logic, 
in effect, says "f I have been BUSY for greater than a time interval DELTA, 
then the particular connection will be broken and scanning resumed for other 
units requiring action." It is possible to incorporate in this logic the 
capability to ignore requests from the offending requestor, in the future 
thereby removing that unit from affecting further system operation. The 
time interval DELTA mentioned above will be chosen to be just greater than 
the greatest time of any correct action request. 
The scanner in either the bus or the memory that is examining either 
the processors or the busses can be implemented so as to scan in any se-
quence-that is convenient (to the detail logic designer), i.e. it is not 
necessary to scan in numeric order. In the event that the scanner has 
more states than the number of units scanned (e.g. a 4 stage counter 
scanning 9 units), the spare positions can be stepped over by suitable 
design, or alternatively can be left OPEN. 
The word address (w) that is transmitted to the memory module can be 
subject to any transformation that is convenient in the design of the 
processor or memory, i.e., we can use indirect addressing, indexing, base 
registers, paging or any convenient combination of these. In addition, 
it is possible to incorporate a cache (in the 360/85 sense) in the 
processor design. 
The scheme outlined above obviates the need to provide a BURST MODE 
type of ttansmission as each word that is transferred can follow the 
sequence given. In the event that several words are required, the pro-
cessor successively requests each word and the bus is seized and the 
word is delivered. If other processors require the use of the bus during 
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the period of the multiple word transfer, a form of cycle stealing will 
take place as the bus scans the other units and honors the request before 
resuming scanning. 
A suitable structure for the processor/bus/memory connection is shown 
in Figure VI-4. 
E.	 Program Structure 
Within the computing system as described above there exists a program 
structure, that contains program segments and their interconnections. We 
distinguish those program segments that must be present in all processor 
memories from those that exist only in the memory of the processors that 
are carrying out the function of system executive. We can divide the program 
functions as follows. 
All Processors Executive Processors 
Application Tasks Allocation 
Loader Scheduling 
Dispatcher Fault location 
Fault detection Fault correction 
Fault avoidance Reconfiguration 
Fault location 
Fault reporting
The dependence of one program segment upon another is illustrated in 
Figure VI-5a, in which four examples of applications processing, and three 
of executive processing are shown. (It must be remembered that separate 
processors are not necessary for each task or for the executive. Each 
processor is multiprogrammed and may at different times be computing an 
application program or the executive.) .
 Figure VI-5a shows the inter-
connection among program segments for one executive and one application 
processing example. Multiple connectivity is assumed and is illustrated 
in Figure VI-5b. The several functions shown in Figure VI-5a are des-
cribed below. We assume for the purposes of the description that three-
fold and fourfold replication is used respectively both for the executive 
and each application task. Greater or lesser replication is possible if 
the requirements for fault tolerance are more or less stringent. 
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1.	 System Executive 
Allocation and Scheduling 
The executive carries out allocation of processors to tasks and sched-
uling (deciding when task programs should be run). These two functions 
will be described together, in Appendix A, in terns of the data structures 
and the way in which they are manipulated. 
The task matrix is a Boolean matrix indicating the results of the 
allocation process. A mark in any element signifies that a processor has 
been assigned to carry out a particular task. The task matrix will re-
main unchanged for long periods and will be changed only under two circum-
stances:
0 Change of flight phase (takeoff, cruise, etc.). 
0 Reconfiguration after a fault condition. 
There are three options available in carrying out the allocation 
function:
(a) Compute new allocations, when needed, in real time. 
(b) Pre-compute (i.e., before mission) a set of allocations 
for each flight phase and for all possible configuration 
changes. 
(c) Pre-compute a set of' allocations for different flight 
phases, and carry out perturbations of these, in real 
time, upon reconfiguration in the' event of a fault. 
condition. 
It is expected that alternative (c) above will be used in an aircraft 
- environment. 
Reconfiguration 
Reconfiguration in the SIFT concept consists of changing the allocation 
of tasks to processors. This will occur under two circumstances 
Fault conditions that occur, and require the removal 
of some units from active processing. 
• Change of flight phase, e.g., from take-off to climb, 
to cruise.
11
No special hardware is required to carry out the reconfigura.tion, 
and the software routines are identical to those described above for 
allocation. 
Task Timing 
Certain application tasks require action at regular intervals, for 
example the flutter alleviation 'calculations must be processed every 4 
msecs. For this task, it is necessary to ensure'that all the cooperating 
processors are synchronized with respect to a 4 msec period. The basic 
rule of synchronization is that no processor should compute iteration 
(n + 1), nor destroy the data from iteration (n - 1) until all processors 
have carried out iteration n. 
The idea of using a single system-wide clock is rejected as 'this 
unit would need to be built with exceptional reliability and would repre-
sent a "hardcore" in which no faults could be tolerated. 
The preferred hardware would be to use a number of replicated clocks 
which could be treated as input units, whose data could be read in the 
same way as any other units. 
Using replicated' clocks as-input units, it then becomes ' necessary to 
ensure that all processors read the clocks at 'sufficiently frequent inter-
vals (e.g., 1 msec.). , This can be achieved by an interrupt system in each 
module, that is driven by another clock (of higher frequency) local to the 
module. These interrupt systems would be independent from each other, and 
.failu-re.of,one of them would be no different from any other failure in a 
processor. 
Fault Location 
Fault location in the SIFT concept consists of determining 
(i) Which unit is at fault. 
(ii) Whether the fault condition is permanent or transient. 
Each processing module, when reading data from other modules, carries 
out a vote as, described in Section VI-E'-2. In the event that the vote 
does not yield unanimity, a single "error flag" is set and details of the 
erroneous transaction are placed in the module's memory. The executive 
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reads the error flags from time to time, and if all are off, correct operation 
is assumed. If all error flags are not off we must consider two cases. 
Case 1 Single Error Flag On 
This indicates that a fault exists that is related to that processor, 
or to the particular connections that were used in the particular data 
read, i.e. from processor to a particular bus, or from that bus to the par-
ticular memory. The analysis of this condition cannot be carried out on 
the basis of the single instance of the fault. The data must be remembered 
and further instances of errors correlated with them to determine the faulty 
unit that must be removed from use by reconfiguration. If no further instances 
of errors occur in a short period, the assumption may be made that a transient 
fault condition occurred. 
Note that an executive could read an error flag and determine that 
it is on due to a fault in the processor that is running that executive, 
or due to a fault in the data path used to read that error flag. The execu-
tive would attempt, erroneously, to diagnose an error that did not exist. 
This will not produce faulty operation of the total system because the 
other versions of the executive will effectively override the faulty 
executive. 
Case 2 Multiple Error Flags On 
Multiple error flags on indicate that several processors have detected 
an error. The details of the error will be read from the several processors 
and by correlating the data, the executive may determine which unit is 
faulty. 
2.	 Local Executive 
Input Communication and Fault Detection, Location, Avoidance and Recording 
The first step in the computation of any task is to read the data re-
quired to carry out the task. This data will exist in the memory-of three 
computing modules. We will use the phrase "Input Data Set" (IDS) to denote 
the set of words required to carry out the calculation of a task. We en-
visage that all tasks that require data will obtain it by calling a single 
program or microprogram subroutine. This subroutine is the only code 
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(outside the executive) that is concerned with detecting errors, correcting 
them in some cases, and in all cases reporting errors to the executive. By 
the use of a single subroutine for error detection, avoidance and reporting, 
the application programmer is relieved of the concern for this aspect of 
the system. This routine GETDATA is shown in flow chart form in Figure 
VI-6. Its functional specification is: 
Input Parameters 
IDS Number	 (The identification of which input 
data set is to be input.) 
IDS Size	 (The number of words to be input.) 
Buffer	 (The address of the buffer in which 
the words are to be placed.) 
Proc List	 (The address of a list of processor 
numbers from which to input.) 
Output Parameters 
Failure Flag
	 (A Boolean output variable, set = 1 
if the input could not be accomplished.) 
Error Flag
	 (A Boolean output variable, set = 1 
if input was successful but an error 
was detected.) 
Error Vector	 (The specification of the IDS, word 
position, bus and memory involved in 
an erroneous input.) 
Action 
Read an input data set (IDS Number) consisting of IDS size words from 
the processor memories specified by "Proc List." If all versions of each 
word obtained from the different processor memories agree, the data is placed 
in the memory at address "Buffer," the error and failure flag will be set 
to 0 and a return is made to the calling program. 
If all versions of a word do not agree but a majority agreement exists, 
the data is placed in the buffer, the error flag is set to 1 and the details 
of the (presumed) erroneous input are placed in memory to be read later by 
the executive. 
If no agreement can be found, the error and failure flags are set to 
1, the data is not placed in the buffer and a return is made,, 
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If no action can be accomplished (e.g. because of a faulty bus system), 
the units that are faulty are noted, and a return is made. 
The subroutine will attempt to use different busses for each word 
transferred. If no response is obtained from an input request, the sub-
routine steps to the next higher bus. 
Analysis of the time required for carrying out the GETDATA routine 
shows that when no errors occur, 75 percent of the time is used in functions 
B, .C, D, and E, and 15 'percent in functions F, G, and H. This assumes that 
the CPU has no special operations to facilitate these operations. The use 
of microprogrammable CPUs with special operation codes will significantly 
reduce the total time to execute this routine. Such special operation 
codes are discussed in Section VI-H-2. 
Dispatcher 
The dispatcher carries out the function of initiating the computing 
of tasks. The dispatcher will always be entered at the end of each task 
plus being entered regularly on an interrupt basis, probably every I msec. 
Upon entry, the dispatcher will first query the executive tables to 
see if the'queue of tasks, for it has been changed. If so, it reads the 
queue into its local store. If the item at the head of the queue is the 
same as a task which has just been interrupted, a return is made to that 
task program'to continue the task calculation. If the task at the head 
of the queue is different than the task just interrupted, the dispatcher 
.knows that a change of task is required. This may be of two types: 
(a) A change of allocatiOn wherein the previous task is 
no longer , required. 
(b) A requirement to interrupt the previous task temporarily 
(for a more urgent task) and resume it when , required. 
These two cases are distinguished by the dispatcher by the contents 
of the queue. There exists a task present in all CPUs (the terminator) 
whose function is to terminate tasks. If case (a) above exists, the 
queue will contain an entry calling for the TERMINATOR to be run, thereby 
removing the interrupted task.
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The above discussion centered around the actions of the dispatcher 
in the event that it interrupted a task. When the dispatcher is entered 
at task completion it does not need to resume an interrupted task, but 
simply transfers control to that task at the head of the queue. 
When the dispatcher is entered at the completion of a task it is 
possible for it to be interrupted. The interrupt should be ignored except 
to update the internal software clock within the CPU. 
All communication between 'the dispatcher and the system executive is 
through the GETDATA routine 
Loader 
All processors need to be able to load new programs whenever a 
reallocation of tasks is made. Two versions of the loader can be con-
sidered, a simple version that loads programs from the memories of other 
modules, and a version that can also load programs from a backup store 
(e.g. drum) in the event that such a unit is available. 
We assume that programs are in absolute binary form, i.e., no 
assembling, linking or editing is required. We also assume that the 
CPU/memory hardware enables programs to be relocatable. With these 
assumptions the loader only has to read a program from the replicated 
copies and place it in memory. In effect this will be a single call on 
the GETDATA routine for the version that reads from other memories. For 
a version that reads from a backup store, a modified version of the GETDATA 
routine would be required. 
3.	 Application Programs 
The application programs carry out such tasks as integrating 
differential control and navigation equations, formatting graphic displays, 
and so forth. Each of the programs handle certain functions in a uniform 
way. These functions include: data communication, error or failure reporting, 
and connection to the dispatcher and executive. Each application program 
will be embedded into the SIFT software structure in a uniform way. The 
typical structure for this embedding is shown in Figure VI-7. 
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The function carried out by each application program, and the 
computing and memory resources required are detailed in the report on 
Task II of this project. 
F.	 Computing Load Within SIFT 
Within SIFT, the computing and memory load are summarized in 
Tables VI.3a and VI.3b for application and executive tasks, respectively. 
(Table VI.3a is a repetition of Table 111.1, included here for the con-
venience of the reader.) 
The total computer load is as shown below, for the most critical flight 
phase (instrument landing).
CPU (MIPs)	 MEMORY (1(W) 
Application Tasks
	 0.5	 24 
Local Executive	 0.04	 1 
System Executive	 0.1	 2 
The above table does not include either CPU. or memory requirements 
required for fault tolerance procedures. 
G.	 Reliability and Fault Tolerance 
This section discusses procedures for achieving fault tolerance with 
a sufficient reliability. In addition, a specific case is analyzed to deter-
mine the expected performance of the SIFT concept under a set of assumptions 
concerning such matters as: number of LSI chips in system, reliability per 
chip, length of flight, and so forth. 
The reliability analyses are carried out for different numbers of 
processing modules. 
The system architecture can, by suitable design of the executive, 
support different fault tolerance procedures appropriate to different re-
quirements. The assumed fault detection method is by comparison of 
multiple copies of data. This comparison is carried out by software em-
bedded in a system routine, a copy of which is present in all processors. 
Fault detection by software voting is compatible with hardware 
techniques such as parity schemes. Such hardware :
 if it exists in memories, 
busses, or processors eaki be used to assist detection and diagnosis of 
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Table VI .la Computing Requirements, Applications 
Task	
- Iteration Rate/Sec . Equivalent MIPS Store Required 
• APPLICATIONS Inst. Data 
Al Attitude Control 5,20 .023 1845 230 
A2 Flutter Control 250 .069 70 22 
A3 Load Control * 240 .014 45 15 
A4 Autoland,' Horizontal * 20	 1 
A5 Autoland., Vertical * 160	 , .055 750 275 
A6 Autoland, Throttle * 33	 J 
A7 Autopilot 5	 ' 150 100 
•A8 Attitude Indicator * 30	 •, .077 790 520 
BI Supervisor	 • 75 15 
B2 Inertial * 1-25 .034 2100 150 
B3 VOR/DME 5 .004 250 50 
B4 DME, OMEGA ' 5	 • 400 105 
85 Air Data ' • 110 25 
B6 Kalman Filter 1/5	 •	 ' .001 250 65 
B7 Flight Data	 ' 5	 ' •	 .028 450 100 
B8 Airspeed, Altitude
	
, * 8,16 .009 360 70 
B9 Graphic Display * •	 1,8	 ' .032 890 5360 
B101Text io	 - --- -- 
Cl
Display-------------------- 
Collision Avoidance * 1/3,670 .021 550 600 
C2 Data Comm, A/C * Various(8)	 • .006 210 400 
C3 Data Comm, Ground *	 • 4
------- --------- ---- 
.001 450 112 
Dl AIDS	 '	 ' * 1/4 to '	 .002 650 650 
D2 Instrument Monitor * 5	 • .014 800 100 
D3 ' System Monitor * 1/2 .001 900 50 
D4 Life Support '	 ' * S 1/2	 • .001, 900 50 
D5 Engine Control * 33	 . .119 1300 200
Table VI.lb Computing Requirements, snr 1xecutivc 
When Activated	 Number of Operations 
Task	 - 	 perActivation	 StoreRequired 
STEM EXECUTIVE Inst. Data 
300
(2) (P + 20)x(T + 10) Allocation Reconfiguration 50,000 
Scheduling
*	 500 100 40 (3) 
Timing 
Fault Location On Error 5,000 30 70
[!AL EXECUTIVE
10 
50 
40 
40 
10 
10 
Input Comm. 
Error Detection 
Dispatcher 
Interrupt 
Newtask 
Loader
• Task Start (9) 
• On Error 
• Task End (9) 
*	 500 (5) 
Change of Task 
Reconfiguration
20 + 6W (4) 
25 
45 
23 
56 
20 + 6? (6)
20 
50 
40 
30 
Uses F3 space 
20+ space of loaded 
program 
BROUTINES 
GETD.TA
	
* By Call	 12 + 6W (4)
	
50	 20 
Math Routines	 * By Call
	 (7)	 200	 200
(Sin, Cos etc.)
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Notes for tables VI.la and VI.lb
 
*	 Tasks required to be run during most critical flight phase (auto land in 
(I) Task names are abbreviated. Tables 2 and 3 of the report on task 2 
gives full names. 
(2) p = number of processors, T = number of tasks. 
(3) Data space for scheduling and timing is included in allocation task. 
(4) W = number of words transferred. 
(5) Figures for interrupt handling, are for the increase in the dispatcher 
to handle interrupts. 
(6) P = number of instructions in program to be loaded. 
(7) Operation counts for math routines are included in figures for those 
tasks which call them. 
(8) Data communicat•jcL, A/C represents the input/output loadof the computer 
system. Assuming that simultaneous I/o is possible. No increase in 
MIPS is required. 
(9) To compute load, due to task start and stop, the total number of tasks 
run per second is computed for the most critical phase yieldinga 
figurc of 1259 tasks per second. The average data input (W) is 
assumed to be 10 per task. The MIPS for task.start and stop is 
therefore 1259 (65+60)
	 .15 MIPS. 
?	 Task exerts. insignificant load. 
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faults. The primary advantage of incorporation of hardware checking is to 
allow faster checking in the event that an application requires faster 
correction of fault conditions than can be achieved by software. 
An important benefit in using software techniques for fault detection 
and tolerance is that freedom is retained to change the degree of fault 
tolerance, either because experience gives data on which better methods 
can be based, or because the different applications require different 
degrees of fault tolerance, i.e. some are more critical than others. 
If threefold replication is used throughout the system a single 
faulty unit will result in one of the replicated processes computing a 
wrong result. The use of the wrong result in subsequent' calculations will 
be avoided by the fact that other (correct) copies of the data will exist 
in other modules and when used will, by voting, enable a processor to dis-
tinguish the correct data from that which is erroneous. 
A further interesting possibility would be to use non-identical but 
computationally equivalent algorithms for the several replicated processes. 
The computation of a variable can also be carried out using different 
scaling factors, for example, compute lOx, x, and x/lO. This will reduce 
the possibility of error due to bit pattern-sensitive faults. 
Consider now the case of double faults existing simultaneously. We 
must distinguish two cases, uncorrelated and correlated faults. By cor-
related faults we mean two faults that cause the computation of two equal 
but incorrect results. Clearly two correlated faults cannot be tolerated 
if the fault tolerance procedure consists merely of voting among three 
versions of all results. The probability of such correlated faults will 
be very low and for most applications is acceptable. We can, however, in 
the system as described, achieve greater reliability in the event that the 
application is so critical that this low-probability is still unacceptable. 
Two such strategies are: 
• Use threefold replication for all critical applications, 
and in the event of any disagreement, do not use the 
results until yet further processors have carried out a 
repetition of the calculation, for example use two more 
processors (making a total of five) and only act if 
three or inure agree.
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• Use fivefold (or greater) replication of tasks for all 
critical applications. 
Both of the above strategies will prevent double correlated-errors 
from causing the use of a wrong result in subsequent programs oroutput. 
The cost penalty involved in the above strategies implies that they will 
only be used for extremely critical applications, where the cost of extra 
computing equipment is small compared with the penalty for failure, e.g. 
in aircraft and space missions. 
In the case of double uncorrelated faults we need only consider the 
case of simultaneous faults. Double faults that occur separated by a time 
sufficient for the executive to have carried out corrective action after 
the first fault do not need to be regarded as different than two instances 
of single faults, which can be tolerated. 
Two simultaneous but uncorrelated faults will have: the possible effect 
of producing two different incorrect results from a calculation. These 
two results will be compared with the one correct result produced by the 
nonfaulty unit in a threefold replication scheme. Before the result is 
used in any subsequent calculation (or-output), the presence of three 
differing results will be-detected and the executive will initiate greater 
replication in other processors until sufficient agreement can be found to 
distinguish' the correct from the incorrect result, 
The executive of the system must itself be fault tolerant. This is 
achieved by the same techniques as for application programs. Each of the 
replicated copies of the executive will use data from itself and the.other 
copies. In the event of errors in one of the executives, the other copies 
will not use the data computed by it, thereby keeping their results valid. 
The correctly functioning copies will initiate a new copy of the executive 
in another processor (which may in 	 copying the program to that pro-
cessor) and will signal the malfunctioning processor to discontinue pro-
cessing the executive. In addition, all processors will, upon inspection 
*This requires availability of a sufficient number of the various units 
(processors, memories, busses).
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of the data in the correct copies of the executive, cease referencing the 
data in the incorrect copy, thereby preventing a system breakdown in the 
event that the malfunctioning processor continues processing the executive 
even though requested to discontinue. 
The fault tolerant procedures outlined above can be summarized as 
follows: 
• Given at least triple replication, all single faults can be 
tolerated, and all uncorrelated double faults detected. 
• Given greater resources (memories, busses and processors), 
multiple uncorrelated or correlated faults .can be tolerated. 
It is expected that, in the event of a permanent fault detected, a 
unit will be relieved of any active part in subsequent calculation. The 
capacity of the system will therefore be reduced, but until a large fraction 
of the system is faulty, the fault tolerance procedures can be continued 
without jeopardy. The removal of faulty units will be accomplished by al-
locating them to null tasks in the case of processors, and not referencing 
them in the case of memories. The overall effect of these strategies is to 
achieve a graceful degradation either of computer capacity or fault toler-
ance whichever is desired in the particular application. 
The foregoing has been concerned with the possible fault tolerant 
strategies that can be employed within the general SIFT concept. We now 
examine the specific case where threefold replication is used, and where 
the computing system is to handle the application tasks and the executive 
tasks summarized in Section VI-F. 
1.	 Reliability Estimates 
A full reliability analysis of a SIFT system will be possible only 
when the design has been. carried to sufficient detail to enable basic re-
liability parameters to be estimated. These parameters would include a 
count of number of chips in each module type. In addition, knowledge of 
the possible failure mode for each unit type is required. The following 
analysis makes certain simplifying assumptions (yielding what we believe to 
be a conservative reliability estimate), in order to show that the SIFT 
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architecture can achieve the required reliability. We do not, for example, 
incorporate the beneficial effects of using error correcting codes in mem-
ories, or the possible substantial reduction in memory capacity required 
through the use of secondary stored or the use of ingenious encoding schemes 
for memory data. 
In deriving an estimate of reliability we make certain assumptions 
concerning such factors as the probability of chip failure, number of chips 
required, etc. These assumptions are listed below, together with defini-
tions of the terms andsymbols used. 
R = degree of replication employed (usually 3) 
N = number of.processor/memory modules 
H = length of computer service required (assume 10 •hours) 
PR	 probability of system function failure after H time 
PF = probability of no fault tolerance after H time. 
The last two terms above distinguish between two ways of expressing 
the probability of the computer continuing to perform in.a satisfactory 
manner. PR, the probability of system function failure, expresses the 
chance that an incorrectly performed computer function is carried out 
during a flight. PF expresses the probability that the system will de-
grade during the length of a flight to the point where it can no longer 
tolerate any fault in the remaining operational computingequipment. 
We assume a load on the computer system as-below 
CPU (MIPS)	 MEMORY (KW) 
Application Tasks	 0.5 R	 24' R 
A....	 Local executive	 0.04 N	 ]! N 
System executive	 0.1 R	 2,'R 
In order to estimate the probability of fault in any. module (CPU, 
memory', bus) we start with the following assumptions. 
-6 
B. -Probability .Probability of chip failure = 10 per hour 
C. . . In the CPU it requires 30 chips to achieve 1 MIP (compare. the 
DEC, 'PDP-ll which would take 10 chips and yields 0.3;MIPS and 
the INTEL microcomputer with 2 chips for 0.05 MIPS) 
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C.. .Each LSI storage chip provides 0.1 KW of memory. 
From the following assumptions we can state 
Total memory (KW) 
Total CPU 
Total chips 
Memory per module 
MIPS per module 
Chips per module
26 R + N 
0.6 R + 0.04-N MIPS 
10(26 R + N) + 30(0.6 R + 0.04 N) 
278 R + 11.2 N 
1 + 26 R/N 
0.04 + 0.6 R/N 
11.2 + 278 R/N. 
The operating philosophy of SIFT assumes that each processor and each 
memory be capable of handling any task. The heaviest CPU load of any task 
is .08 MIPS and the largest memory requirement is 6.3 KW. With the necessity 
to be able to compute the local executive we have capacities of 0.12 MIPS 
and 7.3 KW as the minimum capacity of a CPU memory module in a uniform 
arrangement. This yields a lower bound on the size of each module, and 
for an economic design (i.e., one that does not have excessive initial spare 
capacity) it implies a bound on the number of modules. 
We now consider the steciuic case of R = 3 which is expected to be the 
most common mode of operation. From the assumptions above 
memory/module = 1 + 78/N KW 
MIPS/module = 0.04 + 1.8/N 
chips/module = 11.2 + 834/N. 
We neglect the chips required for the busses as it is estimated that they 
represent a negligible (176) of the total circuits. 
Using.R = 3, all single faults are tolerated, plus all double faults 
that are separated by a time greater than the reconfiguration time. Assume 
the latter to be 1 sec. The probability of two faults occurring in any 1 
second interval during a 10 hour flight 
= [(11.2N + 834) 10 5 1{(11. 2N +834) 106/3600). 
= (11.2N + 834) 2 10 11/3600	 . 
= (0. 19N + 13.9)2 io'.
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The above double fault only causes errors in the event that the two faults 
occur in a pair of modules that are calculating the same task. If calcu-
lating different task sets the fault can be tolerated. For this reason, the 
iigures below represent a conservative estimate of non-tolerated fault 
condition. Table VI.2 shows the probability of non-tolerated double faults 
for different values of N. 
N Probability 
3 2.1 X 
6 2.3X109 
10 2.5 X 10 
20 3.1 X lO 
Table VI-2 Probability of Non-Tolerated Double Fault 
Consider now the question of having, sufficient capacity during a 
10 hour flight. 
Probability of a single error = (11.2N + 834)	 lO	 = P. Multiple 
errors may disable several modules or may effect only one module. The prob-
ability of losing different numbers of modules is given by Table VI.3. 
Number 
disabled
Probability 
0	 ' 1-P. 
1 P 
2 P2(N - 1)/N 
3 P3(N - l)(N - 2)/N2 
4 P4(N - l)(N - 2)(N - 3)/N3
Table VI-3 Probability of Failure of Different Number of Modules 
* Second order terms are ignored. The error involved is < 1 percent. 
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Table VI.4 gives the probability of different numbers of computing 
modules having failed as a function of the number initially in the system. 
Number of Failed Modules 
Number of 
Modules	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4 
Initially
3 9.91E-01 8.68E-03 5.02E-05 1.45E-07 0.00E-00 
4 9.91E-01 8.79-03 5.79E-05 2.55E-07 5.59E-10 
5 9.91E-01 8.90E-03 6.34E-05 3.38E-07 1.20E-09 
6 9.91E-01 9.01E-03 6.77E-05 4.07E-07 1.83E-09 
10 9.91E-01 9.46E-03 8.05E-05 6.10E-07 4.04E-09 
15 9.90E-01 1.00-02 9.37E-05 8.14E-07 6.52E-09 
20 9.89E-01 1.06E-02 1.06E-04 1.01E-06 9.11E-09
Table VIA Probability of Losing N Modules 
Figure VI-8 shows graphically the probability of different per-
centages of computing power still remaining after 10 hours as a function of 
the initial number of modules. 
Making the assumption that 50 percent computing power must exist 
at the end of the flight, the shaded region indicated the acceptable opera- 
ting range, i.e., it indicates that N ^! 8 for probabilities :910 -8 of system 
failure.
The foregoing analysis is conservative in several ways, which are 
discussed below. 
An implied assumption is that a chip failure will result in er-
roneous calculation within that module and a consequent requirement to remove 
that module from service. There are several chip failures that will not 
cause the above effects. A failure of a chip in the memory will, in general, 
only invalidate the data that are stored in that part of the memory. The 
number of chips in the memory exceeds that of the processor by at least 10 
to 1 and therefore represents the most probable place of chip failure. 
Even in the processor some failures will not cause removal of the module 
from service, for example the loss of floating point capabilities will not 
prevent the module from being used for the executive and other functions 
which do not require floating point capability. The design of the executive 
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to take advantage of partial failure of a processor may unnecessarily com-
plicate it, but it remains an option that is available after experience 
shows the most common failure modes. This type of flexibility distinguishes 
the SIFT architecture from others where the reconfiguration capability is 
designed into the hardware. 
Greater reliability can be achieved by different memory structures, 
for example by the use of back-up memory and by the use of coding techniques. 
The availability-of a back-up memory such as disc, drum, or cassette with 
its low cost per bit would enable extensive replication of programs in back-
up memory and allow the main processing memories to be reduced in size there-
by requiring fewer chips which will result in a lower probability of faults 
occurring. Coding techniques can also be used in the memory both for error 
detection and for correction, thereby improving the reliability of the mem-
ories which account for greater than 90 percent of the equipment. 
If one assumes that faults in the computer are random, then there 
will be a significant proportion where the loss of computing power will 
have occurred before the aircraft flight phase that requires highest com-
puter power. This is during a blind landing and particularly in the last 
minute before touchdown. Failures that occur before this time, and which 
are sufficiently massive as to significantly reduce computing power, will 
* 
only require change of flight plan rather than endangering the aircraft. 
The reasons given above lead to the conclusion that with reason-
able chip failure rates, more than adequate reliability can be achieved for 
the intended application. 
H. Processor and Memory 
This section discusses some characteristics of the processor and memory 
units. Full specification (i.e., detailed design) of these units is out-
side the scope of the present study. Certain desirable features can, how-
ever, be distinguished at this time. Questions of speed and capacity have 
* For example, to change airports to one in which a blind landing is 
not required.
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been considered in Section VI-F. This section is concerned with struc-
tural aspects. 
	
.1.	 Word Length and Addressing 
Some application (e.g., Inertial Navigation) tasks require high 
accuracy of numeric data over a large range. The use of floating point 
arithmetic is therefore assumed with a minimum of 32 bits (8 bit exponent, 
24 bit mantissa) giving a range: 
	
•	 maximum positive number = 2(:1) 	 1.6 X 103: 
minimum positive number = 2 	 3.1 X 10 
Some reduction of word length could be allowed. It Is, however, 
more economic to keep the word length as a multiple of 8 bits, and a re-
duction to 24 bits for a floating point number yields insufficient range 
and accuracy. 
In addition to floating point numbers, many data words can be of 
16 bits, and character strings can be implemented with 8-bit bytes. We 
therefore envisage a structure in which data can be either 8, 16 or 32 
bits.
With the different data modes, as discussed above, we must con-
sider the possibility of distinguishing between those modes either by 
labeling the words by extra descriptor bits or alternatively by information 
carried within the instruction. The latter method implies, for example, 
that there will be more than one add instruction in the machine to handle 
the cases of floating point, fixed point, and possibly even single byte 
addition. Both approaches are possible and acceptable for the application. 
However, the form in which the distinction is made within the instruction 
is more common in the computer field and will, therefore, be more available 
if a choice is made to use already existing designs of processor and memory. 
Owing to the requirement to be able to address character strings 
for such application, tasks as display formatting, it is necessary for the 
instructions to be capable of addressing at the byte level as in the IBM 
360 series. This in turn implies a larger number of address bits than if 
the addressing were only possible at the word level. If one presupposes 
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that a practical word size for the instructions is 16 bits, which would 
organize well with the various sizes of data words, then we must find a 
mechanism for incorporating the address bits within an instruction word. 
Several alternatives are possible and are discussed below. 
Alternative A--Conventional machine 
In the conventional approach, a number of bits of an instruction 
word would be allocated to the operation code. A likely number would be 
6-bits with the remaining 10 bits for addressing. In most machines that 
use this structure, the 10 bits can be interpreted to address special parts 
of memory. For example, the lowest 1024 words, or words in the range 
± 512 words from the current instruction. In addition, the use of indirect 
addressing enables one to address data through a base sector of memory that 
can contain words which are interpreted as 16 bit addresses, thereby enabling 
addressing up to 64K bytes or words. An additional alternative is to use a 
structure as in the IBM 360 with base registers whose contents are added to 
the address field of the instruction before execution. This adds a small 
penalty in time, but gives freedom to address a larger space. 
In other machines using the conventional approach, the option 
exists of using double length instructions whereby the second word contains 
a 16-bit address, thereby enabling the addressing of a larger memory. 
In SIFT, the preferred arrangement among the foregoing choices 
would be to use base registers for addressing data. The primary reason for 
this is that a protection mechanism can easily be implemented so that the 
base register itself can only be set by privileged instructions within the 
local executive, thereby preventing any application task from inadvertently 
addressing data to which it was not authorized. 
Alternative B--Stack-oriented machine 
In a stack-oriented machine, addresses for data can be planed on 
the stack before an operation such as fetch, or store, or jump is executed. 
Thus only one instruction is required that can contain an address. (This 
unique instruction can be labeled by a single bit.) Successive words can 
fetch, store, or whatever, and since these words do not need an address, 
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most of the operation codes can be implemented within 8 bits. The option 
therefore exists of allowing two operations per word whenever it is not 
rcessary to place another address on the stack. For example, see 
Table VI .5 where the evaluation of an assignment statement is shown coded 
in 16-bit words. 
/22 
Mathematical form r =Vx	 ^ y 
High level language R = SQRT (X * X + Y * Y) 
Assembly language Load Address R 
Load Address X 
Load Address X 
Multiply 
Load Address Y 
Load Address Y 
• Multiply 
Add 
Load Address SQRT Routine 
Enter Subroutine 
• Store 
Machine Code Form bit 
12 16 
1 R 
1 X 
. 1 x 
0 * 
•	 ]_. Y 
1 Y 
0	 • * 
0 + 
1 SQRT •
0 JUMP 
• 	
•
0 STORE
Table VI .5 Stack Organized Computer Organization 
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In a stack machine, indirect addressing and indexing can be carried 
out and in the latter case, the value of the index is itself placed on the 
stack. In effect, the indexing operation becomes identical to the normal 
add operation for data. Namely, the index is placed on the stack, followed 
by the address. An addition then takes place followed by, for example, a 
fetch from store. The effect of the addition is to add the value of the 
index to the address which accomplishes the desired result. Indirect ad-
dressing is achieved by simply using the instruction sequence that will 
cause an address to be placed on the stack followed by an arbitrary number 
of fetch instructions, each of which puts a word at the top of the stack. 
If that word is to be interpreted not as data, but as an address, an addi-
tional fetch instruction will yield the contents that are pointed at by 
that word.
The stack organization has great advantages in that addressing of 
32K words in a.16-bit machine can be achieved simply. It has certain dis-
advantages, however, primarily due to the fact that it is a less accepted 
form of machine organization and is not easily available in existing com-
puters.
The choice between the two alternatives above does not change 
the basic concepts of the system organization which can be implemented using 
either structure of machine. Other considerations, such as the availability 
of microprogramming facilities and with it the ability to create special 
operational codes, far outweigh the differences between the two alternatives 
in terms of the choice that must be made. 
The above discussion shows that acceptable designs can be produced 
in which small computers (i.e., 16-bit word computers) can be designed that 
have, a capability to address a sufficiently large memory. 
2.	 Special Operation Codes 
Given the availability of a microprogramming capability in the 
computer, we can implement special operation codes that facilitate either 
the application tasks or the executive. We are particularly concerned 
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with the efficient implementation of those operation codes that transfer 
data between modules and carry out checking of that data. For example, in 
a general-register machine we would require an operation that could take 
three versions of some data that should be the same and carry out in one 
operation a check to see if this is indeed so, with certain control flip-
flops set to indicate whether complete agreement exists or partial (i.e., 
two out of three) agreement exists. In addition, operation codes could be 
implemented to enable flexible control of the input/output function when 
several versions of data have to be gathered from different memories using 
different busses. In effect, we are looking for a more sophisticated 
channel for this control of I/O. However, for small machines, such chan-
nels frequently are controlled directly from the instruction stream within 
the processor. 
Within the application tasks, the only . operation code requirements 
that are different from normal could be for the programs that manipulate the 
graphic and textual displays. These two application tasks both require 
large programs and also large amounts of data. Questions of special opera-
tion codes to make this more efficient should be considered. 
The use of special arithmetic operation codes (e.g., for square-
root, sin, cos) has been studied, but for the application being considered 
none of these functions require sufficient CPU or memory capacity to justify 
their inclusion unless this can be achieved with trivial cost. 
I	 Alternative Design Options 
In . Section VI.8 we discussed some of the requirements on the structure 
of the processor and its connection to memory. In this section we consider 
some of the ways in which the structure of SIFT could be changed while not 
invalidating the basic concepts. We first reiterate one of the fundamental 
features of: the SIFT organization, namely that in order to prevent fault 
propagation, a processor can only write into its own memory. We have 
suggested implementing this by a bus structure that contains only one-way 
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paths from memories to other processors. There are other possible imple-
mentations. For example, a single monolithic memory could be used and the 
protection needed could be carried out by constraining the address space 
of each processor so that only a small segment of memory can be addressed 
for writing. 
Another way of looking at this type of memory structure is to view it 
as one in which each processor has a larger address space for reading than 
writing and the writing spaces of processors are non-overlapping. This can 
be implemented by an instruction set that has a smaller number of bits in 
the address field for instructions that write than for those that read from 
memory. The advantage of such a memory structure is that in the event that 
a processor becomes faulty and has to be removed by the executive from the 
system, the memory associated with that processor could be reused at least 
in the reading form by other processors, thereby preventing the need for 
transfer of programs from one module to another in the event of a processor 
failure. 
As discussed in'Section VI.6, the minimum size of store in any pro-
cessing module is largely determined by the size of the largest task to be 
carried out, plus the size of the local executive. The largest jobs in the 
application task set that we consider are for graphics and textual display. 
Most of the storage space used for these applications is concerned with the 
retention of information that is infrequently used, i.e., we must remember 
the configuration, not onlyof the airfield to which the plane is flying, 
but also to back-up airfields. We must similarly remember the configura-
tion of the various runways of that field, even though eventually a choice 
is made for a landing on a particular runway and these are the only data 
that are eventually used. Choices of different airfields or different run-
ways are human choices and the time response to be able to change the dis-
play for a different airfield or runway is very long in computer terms. 
Certainly, there appears no strong necessity to keep these data in storage 
with access time of the order of microseconds. The availability of back-up 
stores that could possibly be of a rotating magnetic medium type, such as 
drum or disk, would enable much smaller processors to be used in the system.
II 
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This would mean that a larger number of smaller processors would be used 
that would provide a• more reliable and fault-tolerant system. Further in-
vestigation should be carried out to determine the practicality of using 
some back-up store for information of this .type. 
An additional problem is the size of the program required to carry out 
the formatting of dynamic displays and the computational time required for 
these programs, A design option would be to significantly enhance the dis-
play hardware itself so that it was capable of carrying out more automatic 
generation of display. An example of this more automatic operation might 
be an ability to interpolate between two displays so that the computer need 
only transmit updated views from time to time, (e.g., every second) and the 
hardware would. carry out an interpolation so that the transition from one 
to the other was carried out smoothly, simulating more clearly the actual 
operation of the plane. 
We note that considerations of this type regarding the display hard-
ware are independent of the architecture of the computer and whichever 
central computing system is chosen will benefit from the ability to have 
either a back-up store for data or a more sophisticated display system. 
In the context of architectural alternatives, we note again that there 
are significant alternatives among fault-tolerance procedures. While the 
most common-mode will probably be three-fold replication, a higher degree 
of replication may be appropriate for some tasks. In addition, we can carry 
different error correction procedures. For example, in the event of an 
error being detected, instead of taking the majority vote remaining, we can 
repeat the calculation by the same or a different group of processes. It 
is felt that this is a useful procedure during the critical phase of a 
flight. 
A large component of computing capacity is needed for automatic land-
ing. Only a. ! very small proportion of flights will occur where both auto-
matic landing. is needed and. faults have reduced the computing equipment to 
the minimum necessary to carry out that operation. For those cases where 
the faults have not occurred, it would seem natural to use the spare ca-
pacity to provide extra fault tolerance. In the event that the spare ca-
pacity is not available, we can opt to change the mission, i.e., to land 
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at an alternative destination. Such options as these within the SIFT archi-
tecture make it different from architectures whereby the fault-tolerant pro-
cedures are designed into the hardware and are not changeable dynamically 
at run time. 
J.	 Conclusions 
The SIFT system architecture as presented achieves great flexibility 
in fault-tolerance procedures. The salient points of the design objectives 
that are achieved are: 
•	 Fault tolerance can be varied so that for some tasks it can be 
arbitrarily high, using suitable replication and reconfiguration 
strategies, and for other tasks the fault tolerance can be less. 
• No special design requirements are placed upon the processing 
units or memories, thereby enabling different designs to achieve 
different computer power. 
• Fault-tolerance procedures can be implemented by software, micro-
programs or hardware. 
• Fault detection,, avoidance, and correction functions are achieved 
by procedures that can be transparent to the application pro-
grammer.	 • 
• The reliability 'required can be achieved by assuming reasonably 
reliable LSI circuits and three-fold replication. 
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VII	 BUS CHECKER SYSTEM 
A.	 Introduction 
This chapter describes a third candidate architecture, the Bus Checker 
System (BUCS). We start by summarizing the implications of the aircraft 
environment on the required fault tolerance and performance: 
1. The application computations are largely independent of each 
other with respect to 
• the order in which they are to be executed 
• the sharing of data and common subroutines 
• peripheral devices (generally each task is associated 
with private sensors and effectors.) 
2. For the critical computations it is essential, that the computer 
not deliver wrong results; it is preferable that no result be 
delivered rather than a wrong result. 
3. For certain high iteration rate computations (flutter control, 
automatic landing, collision avoidance) it is essential that the 
system not be down for more than 10 msec' (a few iterations). 
Generally, for these computations the pertinent program and data 
base ( 4K words), a down-time of 100 msec or more can be tolerated. 
4. Some graceful degradation is possible. During landing about 50 
percent of the computations (measured in terms of processor load 
and memory requirements) need not be considered. Hence the plane 
can land according to mission plans with only half of the computer 
resources available. However, the only positive ramification of 
this is that if a back-up memory is available to hold the landing 
programs during the non-landing portions of the flight, then thc9e 
landing programs can overlay other programs at the time of landing. 
PR10EDJNG PAGE BLANK NOT FJ.1f'iliI 
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5.. The relative independence of the computations leads naturally to 
a multiprocessor system -- a good approach to follow, in any event, 
to achieve fault tolerance. As such, each processor can be of low 
power (say, 0.1 MIPS), which in turn implies that each processor 
can be realized with few (say 3) LSI chips. Implementation in a 
few LSI chips implies that redundancy and error checking should 
be applied over a processor rather than within it. Assuming that 
failures are Independent among chips, the frame coding approach for 
memory seems natural. As will become clear, the independence 
criterion is not as important for processors wherein many failures 
that disable several chips can still be tolerated. 
The BUCS system embodies the following qualities: 
1. The main memory Is centralized to allow the full benefits of frame 
coding. In addition, program and data sharing and relocation are 
easily attained within the concept. 
2. The processor load Is divided among a set (five to ten) of small 
local processors (12), which are duplexed or tripiexed for error 
detection/correction purposes. 
Each LP contains a small (2 - 4K word) local memory. This memory 
is large enough to hold all of the program and data associated with 
any task (except display) so that the common bus traffic is low. 
The memory is loaded from main memory with the appropriate program 
just prior to each task execution. 
4. A small (about 3 chips) unit, called the bus checker (BC) coor-
dinates the flow of control between the major blocks. It also 
does initial processing of error signals. The BC is triplicated, 
and its outputs are fault masked by voters distributed at 
appropriate locations.
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5. A disaster restart mechanism is provided within the BC sub-
system. This mechanism permits a relatively simple recovery from 
a massive transient that may corrupt the executive tables. 
6. Diagnoses of main memory and of certain unflexed processor 
functions (e.g., comparators) are carried out periodically. 
Spare blocks, or possibly memory frames, can be utilized if the 
diagnostic routines reveal faults. 
7. A two-level executive is postulated. The first (higher rate) 
level controls task sequencing and error checking. The second 
(slower rate) level controls modifications in task sequencing 
and periodic diagnosis. 
8. It is envisioned that the executive will permanently reside in 
one of the LP's until the LP. fails, after which another LP will 
take on the executive role. 
The reader will observe that the BUCS system as summarized above 
Incorporates some features of the surveyed systems. The concept of local 
duplexed processors and centralized memory are parts of the Hopkins' 
multiprocessor scheme. Coding asthe primary protection for memory is part 
of the JPL-STAR and IBM-MARCS. A special bus checking block Is part of the 
NASA-Marshall-Hughes ARMMS. system. The loading of task programs into local 
processors from.a central store is a property of the Navy AADC system. 
In the sections below we present the over-all view of the architecture, 
a scenario for each major system function, tentative design features of the 
major system blocks, a preliminary reliability analysis, a brief review of 
possible extensions to the BUCS system. Chapter VIII presents a detailed 
comparison-of BUCS with the other two candidates. 
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B.	 High-Level Description of Architecture 
1. Hardware Components 
As shown in Figure VII-1, the BUCS system consists of the following 
major system blocks: a set of local processors (LP's) (five to ten, 0.1 
MIPS each, for this application), a centralized main memory (MM), a set of 
I/O units, a bus checker (BC), and possibly a back-up memory (BAM). 
The BC is assumed to consist of three identical independent units 
operating in near locked-step.* As shown in Figure VII.l, each independent 
unit delivering information to the BC has a separate set of input ports to 
the BC, and each of the three independent BC's can deliver signals simul-
taneously to all units, on a single triplicated bus. The separate units 
will generally contain their own address decoders to recognize BC signals 
and their own voters to correct any single BC errors. 
The MM is realized as a two-dimensional array of frames and blocks 
(see Chapter II) wherein frame coding is used. A spare block under the 
addressing control of the executive is also included to provide additional 
required reliability. A set of LP's are included to enable the simul-
taneousprócessing of several programs, and also to provide spares. 
Within an LP are two independent locked-step processors (P) with 
a deplexed comparator. The comparators, which, physically can be part of 
the processors, broadcast any processor disagreement to the BC. The local 
memory (LM) within each LP is relatively small, since 4K words are completely 
adequate to handle the executive and any of the individual computations 
except display (which can be easily decomposed into subtasks). Most of the 
tasks can be handled with 2K words, so it is likely that a 2K LM will suffice 
with the larger tasks using the MM as 
.
a backup memory to the I.M. Single 
*As we show later the BC can be realized with 3 LSI chips. Since this block 
is so small a reliability analysis will show, that triplication with voting 
yields sufficient reliability.'	 . 
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frame-error correcting, double frame-error detecting codes are utilized to 
increase the reliability of the LM. One notes that the UA comprises about 
80 percent of the LSI chips of the 12. 
An 12 will fail when (1) a second frame within the UvI fails, or (2) 
one of the two P's fails, as determined by a comparator disagreement, or 
(3) a comparator fails, as determined by a disagreement between the com-
parators or by a diagnosis. The failure of an 12 will induce its replacement 
with a spare 12. At first glance it might appear extravagant to discard an 
entire LP even though most of its memory and at least one P are still oper-
ative. However, as the reliability analysis will show, only one spare 12 
is necessary, and moreover a single 12 can be as little as 10 percent of 
the entire system. 
The issue with respect to I/O is not as clear-cut. It is certain that 
multiple I/O controllers will be present so that a given sensor or effector 
has access to the bus checker through more than one controller. With three 
controllers, which seems reasonable, there can be a distinct controller 
communicating with each BC. (The I/O controllers can be viewed as merely 
extensions of the BC's.) If there is triplication of the sensors then 
independent sampling of the sensors can easily be accomplished.* Similarly, 
if there can be three independent effectors for a given aircraft function, 
each such effector can receive an independent signal -- the "voting" in 
this case is accomplished by the aircraft frame. If only one effector is 
possible, then the voting of the three I/O controller outputs is accom-
plished at the effector -- clearly the last possible point for the vote. 
We have not given much attention to the characteristics of the back-up 
memory (BAM). Our present view is that there is not a clear role for a BAM 
* There is a problem with carrying out a vote of independent sensor readings. 
It is unlikely that the three sensors will supply-exactly the same value, 
and hence the vote, if done in a bit by bit manner, will fail. The solution 
Is to supply the three readings to the pertinent 12's and have the vote 
taken in software, thus allowing for a disagreement precision warranted by 
the sensor in question.
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in our system. The storage requirements do not imply a need for mass 
storage, except possibly (1) for the logging of flight information, (2) for 
the storing of runway parameters for all possible landing sites, or (3) for 
the storing of programs and status information in anticipation of a massive 
transient. The technology survey has not shown a clear reliability advantage 
or substantial cost advantage for, say, discs, as compared with MOS memory. 
If it is needed, a reasonable approach for the storage of critical informa-
tion is to use two independent BAM's, each with error detection, and each 
communicating with the set of BC's. 
We have not yet decided on the width of the communication paths between 
units. As might be expected, the bus checker (BC) is pin limited. A narrow 
bus is thus preferable as it leads to a smaller BC unit (fewer chips). The 
total data rate to and from (mostly from) the MM to the BC, for the aircraft 
computations, isestimated as 2M bits/sec. This is •a factor of 10 less than 
required by a version of the Hopkins scheme that does not incorporate a 
cache. The reduction is due to the fact that the bus in BUCS is mainly used 
for loading the LM'S with programs and constants, while in Hopkins, the bus 
is used for program execution. Assuming16 bit words and, say, a transfer 
width of 8 bits, the bit rate on the bus is 250K bits/sec. (Note that the 
I/O bit rate through the BC is negligible.) With any reasonable interconnec-
tion technology an order of magnitude scaling upward in computation load can 
be tolerated without taxing the bus. 
2. Global Description of System Operation 
The following is a brief overview of the system operation. A 
detailed description of each of the executive functions appears in Section D 
below.
As in the SIFT system, computation tasks are assigned to LP's. 
However, In BUCS the program, constants and data are retained in MM until 
the task is initialized. The pertinent information is then transferred to 
the IM, by means of a mapping provided by the executive.. That is, the 
executive in initiating a task supplies an absolute MM address and a word 
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count for the program and data of the task in question, which are then 
loaded into the LM under control of the BC. Tasks should be allocated to 
12's so as to preclude the need for multiprogramming within an 12. This 
may be accomplished by assigning to a given LP either all short, high 
iteration rate tasks or all long, low iteration rate tasks. As in the 
Hopkins scheme (but different from SIFT) a task is assigned only to a 
single 12. 
If an LP fails permanently, all of its application tasks are 
assigned to a spare LP. As the flight progresses and the task sequencing 
changes, the executive will reassign tasks to 12. It is likely that all 
of the assignments needed for a.flignt can be programmed in advance so 
that the executive function for a reallocation of tasks is merely a table 
look-up.
The executive is initially resident in one of the 12's, and it 
will probably not share the 12 with application tasks. A replica of the 
executive program and tables is retained in MM so as to permit the re-
assignment of the executive to another 12 upon failure. The BC retains 
knowledge of the identity of the executive .LP in addition to the absolute 
MM location of the executive prpgram. A failure of this 12 is counter-
acted by the BC assigning another LP to take on the executive role. The 
occurrence of a massive transient could prevent the "normal" error response 
as indicated above. For example, the register that holds the identity of 
the executive 12 could be corrupted in two BC's. If this undesired state 
change as well as others were to occur, then it is likely that several 12 
comparators would issue disagreements, but the executive would not be called 
to respond to these possible errors. The BC, if a succession of errors are 
reported to it, responds with a hard-wired-routine that selects a new exec-
utive and attempts a dead-start recovery. 
A summary of this global view of the BUCS operation is depicted 
in the flow chart of Figure VII-2. The details of each of these operations 
and of the executive appears below in Section D. 
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C.	 Description of Major Blocks 
In this section we present some design details of the major system 
blocks. The designs have been carried out only to the point where we are 
convinced of the viability of the entire approach. 
1. Local Processor 
The tentative details of the LP are displayed in Figure VII.3. 
As indicated, it consists of two replicas each of a processor (P), encoder/ 
decoder, and comparators and a single replica of a LM. It is anticipated 
that each encoder/decoder would be realized as a single chip. Each pro-
cessor, together with its comparators would probably consist of two to three 
chips. The LM, which will probably require no more than 4K words--of 16 bits 
plus six check bits--should consist of no more than 22 chips. The optimum 
coding for the U'1 is frame coding, with frame-width f 	 2, and with a Hamming 
single frame error correcting, double frame error detecting code. We recall 
that the words in Main Memory (MM) are also encoded as a Hamming frame-error 
correcting code., Hence the encoder/decoder within an LP can suffice for the 
code conversion between the LP and MM. That is, words being transferred 
between the 12 and Livi always pass through the LP encoder/decoder. Thus an 
error in either the LP or LZ,I is immediately identified, corrected, and pin-
pointed. Another possibility, albeit not as attractive, is to use the U'1 
as the interface between the LP and MM. In this case, the words passing between 
the two units will be encoded properly by definition. 
We recall that single frame errors within the LM are masked, re-
quiring no additional reconfiguration action. The occurrence of a double 
frame error causes each encoder/decoder to send an error indication to the 
BC, signifying the failure of the U'. Similarly, a disagreement between two 
processors also is an indication of LP failure. 
In Figure VII-3 we have shown exclusive-OR gates to indicate the need 
for a test for disagreement between the P1, and P2 units. However, this some-
what begs the issue. We believe the best solution is to effect a comparison 
whenever a signal leaves either P1 or P2. We clearly do not need to compare 
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at each cycle of P since roll-back is not achieved as a single instruction 
restart but as a task initiation restart. Hence, the comparisons could be 
done on the completion lines or on the address lines going from P1 and P2 
to the BC's. Similarly, a comparison could be effected on the words from 
P1 and P2 to be written into 11V1. 
As mentioned previously the control signals from the BC are trip-
licated--one for each BC--and hence within the P's there is an error-correcting 
voting mechanism. Except for coded data words, signals emerging from the LP 
destined for the BC are duplicated--one version for each P--and hence there is 
a comparison mechanism within the BC that will signal a possible failure if 
there is a disagreement. 
The two P units are synchronized but only loosely. We envision a 
clock control line between the units that is activated only when a comparison 
is called for, say when a completion signal is to be sent to BC. Thus, a 
reliable clock is not needed. If, say P1 (or P2) fails to receive a control 
signal from P2 (or P1) within a certain tolerance then it signals an error 
condition to BC. The inter-unit control signal could also resynchronize the 
clocks within each P so that the clocks do not drift appreciably apart. 
Similarly the communication between an 12 and BC is done asynchronously. Thus 
a reliable system clock is not needed. 
2. Main Memory Organization 
An appropriate main memory (MM) organization is depicted in Figure VII.4. 
We have also shown the form of the interconnection between the MM and other system 
units. Briefly, the address lines and clockcontrol lines are derived from the 
bus checker (BC). We assume, as shown, that a separate voter is provided to supply 
address data for each frame of memory within MM, and the voter is driven by the 
three BC's. The voted address lines are passed to all chips in the MM since each 
such chip contains an internal address decoder .  Note that a single failure such 
as one chip "shorting-out" (at its input) a voted address line will disable only 
one frame of the MM. Consequently the coding of the MM words will handle this 
fault. However, there are, double faults that can disable the MM. For example, 
the failure of two frame address voters will potentially corrupt two frames of 
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MMs and as such is not correctable. We believe that such double failures 
represent a small percentage of the possible double failure patterns, but 
they will be included in the. reliability analysis.. 
In one approach for the transfer of data from an U' to a MM the MM 
data input lines are derived from the LM's. Thus the same error correcting 
code is conveniently used in both the U4's and MM. It seems possible to 
wire together the corresponding bit outputs of the 1)11's destined for the MM. 
Because of the error-correcting coding a chip failure anywhere that shorts 
out an entire frame for all UI's is not fatal. Simultaneous with trans-
ferring words from an UI to an MM the decoders associated with 12's could 
cneck the validity of thetransferred words to pinpoint a possible Ui! failure. 
The MM output words are destined for decoding in one of the decoders 
associated with an 12. Hence it seems reasonable again to wire together all 
of the corresponding decoder inputs and MM frame outputs. Once again, a 
single chip failure can onlydisable a frame in all decoders or in all blocks 
of MM and, hence, the failure is correctable by the code. 
It is assumed that the MM is organized as a two-dimensional array of 
B blocks and f frames. At each-block-frame intersection, there is an LSI 
chip containing 4096 bits of memory. As in the case of IM's, the apparently 
optimum organization of the chip is 2 bits wide by 2048 words. Thus for a 
MM of 32K words--reasonable for this application--16 blocks will be required. 
As mentioned above it seems prudent to incorporate the same code 
within the MM as in the IM's, namely a single-frame-error correcting, double 
frame error detecting code. In the case of the MM, our reliability analysis 
will show that single error correction is not quite adequate to achieve the 
stringent reliability requirements, for the reason that the MM has too many 
failure-prone chips within it. However, the portection against all double 
failures appears adequate. There are several approaches toward achieving 
double fault tolerance, among which are: 
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(a) the use of a'double error correcting code for all words 
(b) the use of a spare frame within each block 
(c) the use of a single spare block. 
We -have ruled-out (a) as being too costly, both in terms of the extra 
redundant bits and the decoding costs. Approach (b) adds very little to 
the cost of the MM--approximately 5 percent--but it introduces the need 
for extra switching to provide a route around the faulty frame. 
It appears that the spare block approach (c) is the most attractive. 
The extra cost is certainly moderate--6 percent for an original 16 block 
memory. The routing arotnd •a bad block is relatively simple, involving merely 
an address translation. In addition, a separate power supply could be pro-
vided for each block, thus providing a tolerance to single power supply failures. 
There are two approaches toward identifying a faulty block of MM. 
As the MM words are decoded by the decoders in the LP's, single errors in MM 
will be revealed, but also corrected. Secondly, our intention is to peri-
odically diagnose MM, mostly to ensure that the rarely used programs retain 
their integrity throughout the flight. As we show later a low , rate of diagnosis--
once every 10 seconds--is quite adequate. 
We emphasize that the MM provides for single-frame fault masking with 
block switchover to yield a system that is essentially double fault tolerant. 
There are, however, certain double failure's that can disable the entire MM. 
Since the MM data inputs and outputs corresponding to a frame are wired together, 
two failures that each short out frames would not be. correctable. Although we 
do nothave sufficient information to assess this possibility, we suspect it is 
unlikely. 
3. Bus Checker Organization 
'The organization of each of the three bus checkers '(BC) is displayed 
in Figure VII.5. ' For convenience of description we have shown the BC as com-
posed of seven distinct sections. This particular decomposition may not hold 
in practice. A brief discussion of these sections follows. 
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(a) Address Translation. 
As indicated previously, addresses emanating from the LP's 
are used relative to a base addressthat is computed by the éxecütive. The 
address translation process, which is-merely forming the sum of . the base 
address and-relative address to compute the true.?vllI .
 address, is carried out 
by the. BC.
(b) Signaling of Units 
The BC is assigned therole of signaling the LP, I/O, and 
Back-up Memory (BAM) units. -Such signaling . generally.signifies that-a word 
of data is being-sent to the unit in question. 
(c) Inter BC Synchronization 
It is recalledthat three BC's areprovided so-as to afford a 
tolerance to single BC failures. The voting of the BC outputs is. not accom-
plished within the.BC's but by voters at the inputs to the units--LP's,-MM, 
I/O's, and BAM's. However, there is a need to synchronize the operation;of 
each of the BC's. As with the duplexed LP's-the three BC's neednot -operate 
in locked-step, but must be coordinated.upon delivering a signal .to. another.
 
unit. This coordination is attained by having-eachiBC deliver a ;synchro-
nization signal -to the otherBC's when it--is - ready'
 to.deliver asignal to a 
12, MM, etc. The appearance-of two synchronization signals, inc]ud.ing a 
self-generated one, is sufficient to enable the transmission. .Snchronizat.ion 
signals appearing at times other than transmission times are ..ignored,-thus. 
preventing afaulty.BC from.corrupting the other two BC's by:emittingrandom 
synchronization -signals. 
(d)' Error Processing 
All disagreement .signals :from a duplexed processor-pair or 
error signals from-an LP decoder are-directed-towards theBC. For "normal" 
error processing, i.e. the response-to single unit-permanent failures or non-
massive transient failures, the BC merely records the identity ofthe unit 
reporting the failure .and signals the executive.. It is likely that'the various 
.140
LP's will be sampled on a round robin basis to prevent a permanently 
disagreeing LP from seizing permanent control of the BC. It would also 
be desirable for the BC to ignore a permanently disagreeing LP so as not 
to continuously bother the executive. 
(e) Completion Processing 
When an LP completes a task it alerts the BC. Once again, 
the BC merely records the fact and signals the executive. Around robin 
sampling of the 12 outputs is again In order here. 
(f) Executive Signaling and Restart 
This section of the BC is responsible. for signaling the exec-
utive upon the completion of an application task or an error condition. 
Accordingly, the BC knows the address of the executive 12. The signal is 
sent to all 12's but only the executive should respond. There is a possi-
bility that a nonexecutive 12 could fail (in both P's) such that it thought 
it was the executive, but this requires two correlated failures. 
This section of the BC is also responsible for processing 
failures in the executive 12, and as such is the final arbiter. If the 
error signal emanates from the executive 12, the BC initiates the recovery 
by first trying to restart the executive 12, and then, if that attempt is 
unsucessful, finally switching in a spare LP to function as the executive. 
As such the BC must retain the following information: (1) identity of the 
executive, (2) absolute location in MM of a program that will restart the 
executive and load in last input data, and (3) identity of all spare LP's. 
(g) Disaster Restart 
We mentioned previously that It is desirable for the BUCS 
system to be able to respond to a massive transient that causes severe state 
changes. Under such a transient, for example, the registers in the BC that 
store the address of the executive LP could be corrupted. The Disaster 
section is intended to combat such a transient by restarting the system. 
In carrying out this role the BC performs global consistency checks on the 
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rest of the, system by executing a small program stored in an internal ROM. 
For, example, if continuous errors are reported by many of the LP's or if 
the executive fails to respond to signals, then the BC restarts the system. 
We presume that it has access to a BAM that holds the program and possibly 
a last'status dump. It is presumed that the identity of failed IP's and 
failed MM blocks is also lost during the transient, so that the BC must 
proceed slowly in a bootstrap approach toward activating the system. It 
selects an executive LP and, a fte r determining that it is operative, lets 
the executive continue with the reconfiguration. 
We believe that the design of the BC according to the above 
specifications is relatively straightforward. One possible difficulty con-
cerns the number of BC terminals. The control, signal lines are not a problem 
here because only a few are associated with each unit. However, the address 
input lines from the 12's could pose some difficulty since about 12 such 
lines.will emanate from each P unit, corresponding to 24 from each 12. 
Clearly, they cannot be wired together since there is no error correcting 
coding of these lines. One approach is to have these address inputs trans-
ferred byte serially. Address requests to the. BC should occur infrequently 
enough to warrant this serialization. 
The BC as described above is a special purpose controller. 
The BC could be realized as a small microprogrammed processor with about 
100 words of memory. It would also require a multiplexer to coordinate the 
communication with the LP's, MM's, etc.. 
D.	 Executive Operation 
This section briefly summarizes the functioning of the executive in the 
BUCS system. First we will distinguish the main roles of the executive. 
1. .Applic'ation.Task Scheduling 
We recall that tasks are loaded into a LP when they are to be serviced. 
The executive supplies a MM address, and a word count to the BC in order to 
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initiate the loading process. Since the computation load can be predicted 
for all flight contingencies during preflight planning, the task load and 
task sequencing for each LP can be prestored in the executive tables. In 
* 
this case the executive merely cycles through a task schedule associated 
with each LP. The scheduler could be driven by a clock whose frequency is 
about the same as the highest iteration rate associated with a task--250 
Hertz in our environment. At each clock occurrence, the executive determines 
if any task that should have completed its execution has failed to do so. It 
could also schedule any tasks that require service at that time, Including 
performing of an I/O operationfor a task. 
2. Background Executive Processing 
There are several executive functions that require periodic but 
infrequent service. Among these functions are the diagnosing of "unflexed" 
hardware and the changing of the application task schedules due to a possible 
mission change. A relatively slow clock, say 0.1 Hertz could drive this portion 
of the executive. It is envisioned that these functions would be carried out 
in the executive 12. 
With regard to diagnosis there is a need to periodically check 
portions of the system that are "unflexed," i.e. very rarely stlmulated. Such 
portions include programs that are needed only for landing, executive programs 
that control reconfiguration, unused portions of MM, and the comparators assoc-
iated with 12's. The particular problem of concern here is that two failures 
could possibly occur in a hardware section that is not exercised during normal 
computer usage. Hence when the particular hardware section is needed, say a 
memory block holding a reconfiguration program, it would not be operative. The 
solution is to diagnose such sections. With regard to rarely used programs the 
solution is simple--merely read through the storage holding the programs and 
* This simple cyclic scheduling process also requires that no preemption of 
tasks is requizd prior to their completion. If It turns out that inter-
ruption is required to effect the multiprogramming, then some swapping of 
LJVI memory space will be called for, without introducing any fundamental 
difficulties.
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check for the appearance of any errors that are handled by the decoder. 
The effect of an error Is handled by the executive transferring the infor-
mation in the offending MM block to another MM block. 
For multiple failures in the comparators and other error indicators, 
the solution Is also quite simple. Within the LP's let there be a few routines 
that Introduce errors. Corresponding
. to
 such routines provide a few words 
in LZ4 that purposely contain one or two errors. The reading. out of these 
words should. induce a properly functioning decoder to emit an error signal. 
The comparators associated with P units are checked by comparing the-values-
store 
. d in two; registers that are purposely set to be different. These types 
of diagnoses by the executive should Improve the situation, but clearly do. 
not solve the problem completely. 
For example, with regard to a program intended, to carry out a recon-
figuration, is It sufficient to merely check the integrity of the stored 
version of the program? The possibility, albeit unlikely, exists that a par-
ticular portion of a register, used only for this program, could fall in each 
of the P units. Under this event the. reconfiguration program would not function 
properly, ,
 although no comparator would emit an error signal. With the basic 
architecture-of BUCS (or a three voting SIFT or Hopkins' scheme), it is un-
likely that the system 'canbe'mads-totally tolerant to all double faults. The 
design problem we have addressed Is the reduction of the fraction of al-1--double 
faults--say to one percent--that can. result in system failure. 
3. Single Error Processing. 
If .
 an error is detected as a.disagreement among. P units, as a 'single 
error indicatton in an MM block, or as a. double error Indication in an LM, 
the executive is signaled. Since the failure might only, be transient the exec-
utive should reinitiate the computation, with the initial data and allow the 
computation to be retried. IfI a failure' occurs several times in successIon, 
another LP or another MM block should be-initiated with the same initial data. 
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A question arises concerning the response to a second error that 
occurs in the executive LP during the retry reconfiguration process. The 
probability of the'. second error arising from a second permanent failure is 
indeed remote, since we do not expect more than two faults in a mission. 
However, a second transient fault is possible and should be handled by the 
system. The process is as follows: the pertinent error data--identy of 
possibly failed 12, and the number of retries effected so far--is stored in 
the executive tables as part of the initial executive program data. (The 
second failure occurring during this brief time it takes to store the initial 
data would possibly be untolerated.) Hence, if the executive fails, the bus 
checker can activate another executive to effect a retry and possible recon-
figuration of the first executive. A failure in the second executive would 
result in a similarprocedure, involving the activation of a third executive, 
etc. The process operates as a pushdown stack of executive status, although 
the system's resources are likely to be depletedbefore the stack gets very 
deep.
4. Executive Load 
The executive routines as described above should require no more 
than 4K words of storage, including data, and hence the entire executive should 
fit into a LM. The task scheduling routines, including the process of loading 
programs into LM's, should consume no more than 0.1 MIPS, and as such repre-
sents about a 20 percent overhead, compared with the application tasks. The 
background executive processing should consume about 100 msec every sec, or 
equivalently 0.01 MIPS--a negligible overhead. Note that the MM diagnosis 
portion of the executive will by necessity be multiprogrammed with other ex-
ecutiv.e functions. The decomposition, involving the diagnosis of a block of 
MM in a given computational interval, is easily achieved. 
Our analysis has shown that an executive that is centralized and is 
normally operative in a particular 12 (except when that U' fails) is adequate 
for controlling the presently conceived system. If it becomes desirable in 
the future to incorporate the BUCS concept within a much larger system--say 
containing 25 LP's--some modifications arecalled for. In this case, the 
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task scheduling and background task part of the executive could be dis-
t.ributed among the processors, as in SIFT, If the scheduling routine can 
be made small enough, a copy could be permanently resident in each of the 
LZvI's. In addition, if it becomes feasible (on the basis of application pro-
gram size) to use a 2K UVI instead of 4K then the scheduling 'portion of the 
executive will be permanently resident in an LP. The remainder of the ex-
ecutive will be treated as an application task to be loaded into an LP, when 
needed, under control of the scheduler. 
E.	 Reliabilit y and Performance 
This section presents a simple analysis of the reliability of the 
BUCS system as described in the previous sections. Although the analysis 
is simple, we believe that it is conservative, i.e. the actual reliability 
is expected to be better than described here. Our intention, is to show that
-8 
with rather low redundancy--less than 40 percent--the reliability goal of 10 
for a 5 'hour mission is attained. 
Our assumptions on the failure mechanisms are as follows: 
(1) Failures from chip-to-chip are assumed to be independent, and 
failures do not -propagate from chip to chip. 
(2) The failure rate is 10- 6 failures/hour/chip. 
(3) The failure rate is independent of time--a good assumption for 
short missions. 
(4) The probability of failure of the total system is derived as 
the sum of the failure probabilities of the individual subsystems--
a good assumption for the low probabilities that we are dealing 
with.,' 
(5) Only permanent failures are included in the model.' 
The BUCS architecture exhibits 'the following failure states for each of 
the major subsystems.
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(1) Bus Checker (BC)--The failure of two of three BC's leads to a 
system failure. Each BC is assumed to contain 3 chips. 
(2) Processor (P) portion of LP's--we assume one spare duplex P unit, 
and 6 duplex P units required for a non-redundant system (5 for 
the application tasks and 1 for the executive),. Hence the failure 
of two P-pairs leads. to system failure. Each P pair consists of 
6 chips. 
(3) Local memory (LM) portion of LP's--we assume one spare UvI and 
6 required for a non-redundant system. Hence the failure of 
two LMs leads to system failure. Each LM is protected by a 
single frame-error correcting code, i.e. two frame failures within 
an LM lead to an IN .failure. Each LM contains no more than 22 
chips (arranged as 2 blocks of 11 frames each). 
(4) Main memory (MM)--Each block, of MM is protected by a single 
frame-error, correcting code, with a switchover to a spare block 
whenever a failure occurs. Hence, it takes three bloCk failures 
to cause a system failure. The MM contains 176 chips arranged 
as 16 blocks of 11 frames each. (This allows for sufficient memory 
to hold all application programs, executive programs, plus a single 
spare block.) We pessimistically assume that three chip failures 
anywhere lead to system failure. 
(5) Second failure within reconfiguration interval--a second failure 
occurring while the system is responding to the first failure will 
lead to system failure. We assume that the reconfiguration interval 
is 10 seconds--clearly a pessimistic guess for the response to a, 
failure, but reasonable as an interval between diagnoses of the MM. 
Given the first failure in MM, the second failure would have to 
occur in the same block of MM as the first failure to bring the 
system down. On the other hand, given the first failure in a LP, 
the second failure would have to occur in the spare LP taking over 
the tasks of the first LP to bring the system down. The net effect 
is to reduce the fraction of equipment that is vulnerable to about 
1/10 of the total equipment. The total system' contains about 400 
chips.
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(6) Fatal double failures--because of the "unflexed" components 
(Section D-2) certain double failure patterns lead.tosystem 
failure regardless of when they occur during the flight. A 
rough analysis of the double fault patterns indicates . that less 
than 1 percent of thedouble fault patterns will lead to system 
failure. 
We are now in a position to evaluate-the-contribution of each of the 
above failureniëchanisnis to-the total system failure probability. 
For failure mechanism i, i = 1, . . , 6, assuming the parameters given 
in the opening of this section, the failure probability P f is: 
i 
Pf
 = () • (3 . lO:6 )2 . 5	 :1.35.1010 
Pf	 () • (6.106)2.5	 3.78.10 
2
= () [(2?) . 10 12j2	 5 
= (176)	 lo8. 5
	
negligible 
4 
Pf	 400.106	 3600 • 399lô 6 )	 .5	 (1/10) = .22	 lO 
Pf = (40)	 1012	
= 4 10 
Foxing the sum	 P, =	 8 X-l0 , which is within -the goal of.1rming for 
.1=1	 i 
the five hour mission. 
Clearly, the two most significant factors are P.. and Pf
 . The former 
2	 6 
can be reduced to a negligible quantity bymere1y providing one :additional 
spare LP;(for two spares) total, at an. additional redundancy cost of 15 percent. 
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On the other hand, P_ can be rduced only by carrying out more diagnoses 
to reduce the quantit of unflexed hardware or by good engineering design 
(e.g., locate sensitive , gates on opposite ends of a chip). 
We emphasize that these figures are tentative, although probably 
pessimistic. The redundancy is quite low, being about 30 to 50 percent in 
total extra chips required for the fault tolerance (dependent upon LZvl size) 
plus about 10 percent extra chips required to implement theexecutive. 
A few comments are in order with regard to BUCS performance measure-
ments other than failure probability. One Important parameter of the system 
is the down-time following a transient or permanent failure. Several of 
the crucial computations (flutter control, load control, collision avoidance) 
cannot be unserviced.for more than a few milliseconds. We will now demon-
strate that no such discontinuity need occur in.BUCS. 
Typically, when a failure Indication is broadcast to the BC, the BC 
will initiate a retry. The main delay in effecting this retry is the time 
in reloading the program into the LM from the MM. However, the critical 
programs never require more than 1K words of storage, so it seems reasonable 
to accomplish this reloading in a few milliseconds. If the executive LP 
fails, the entire 4K word executive must be reloaded, an operation that could 
take 10 msec. There might be some tasks that cannot wait for this transfer 
to be completed. The solution is to reload first that portion of the exec-
utive concerned with scheduling--a portion that should not require more than 
a few hundred words. Then the reloading of the rest of the executive can be 
multiprocesSed with the critical tasks, encumbering no further delay. However, 
If a second failure occurs' In an application task LP, the system might come to 
a temporary halt. However, as we demonstrated above, the probability of a 
second failure Is remote.
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F.	 Embellishments and Discussions 
The BUCS system is an attractive architecture for fault tolerance 
because of its relatively low redundancy. In our application the redun-
dancr is low because the system is memory dominated permitting the use 
of coding protection for much of the hardware, and because the applica-
tion program mix permits a fine decomposition of processing power into 
relatively small processors. 
The three main deficiencies of the BUCS approach as described 
above are thei following: 
High speed operation will preclude the byte transfer of 
information between LP's and the BC. Thus an extremely 
large number of pins will be required for the BC. 
• The expandability of BUCS is limited by the capacity of 
the BC. This speed limitation is common to all single 
bus multiprocessors. 
The redindancy, although low as compared with most fault 
tolerant architectures is still needlessly dominated by 
the LM's associated with each LP. These LM's were in-
serted to. reduce the bus traffic, and represent 80 percent 
of the LP hardware. 
One way to circumvent these difficulties is to incorporate a multi-
bus structu.re--a concept suggested by Jim Miller of Intermetrics. The 
main memory system as described would be replaced by a system composed 
of numerous modules. With such an embellishment the LM's can be dis-
carded in favor of simultaneous communication among several LP-MM 
modules. A single bus checker unit (triplicated), almost identical to 
the one described in this chapter, would establish the communication 
links, respond to error signals and coordinate all calls on the executive. 
It is envisioned that a communication link between an LP and a MM 
module would remain established for the duration of a computational task. 
If the processing required temporary access to another MM module, say, 
for a particular data set, the BC would be signaled. The signaling process 
would correspond closely to a page fault in a contemporary paged machine. 
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The type of multiprocessing as conceived here is grealy enhanced by pre-
dictable computational demands. Thus the programs do not require any 
dynamic linking except subsequent to a permanent fault. However, even 
in this case the relinking involves.only a simple address translation. 
151
VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.	 Summary 
In this study we have attempted to identify the architectural features of 
a digital computer that are well-matched to the reliability and computational 
requirements of an advanced commercial aircraft. The intention is to have a 
central computer complex carry out the computations presently distributed 
among small digital systems, analog computers and mechanical computers. As 
part of the study we investigated three candidate architectures that could 
meet the specific requirements. One of the candidates is a multiprocessor due 
to Hopkins; the other two candidates were conceived during this present study--
SIFT and BUCS. Before embarking on a detailed design effort on these systems 
we surveyed the numerous fault-tolerant architectural concepts that have been 
developed over the past decade. One of these concepts (JPL-STAR) has been pur-
sued to the breadboard stage, but the rest have remained "paper" designs. 
We do not feel that any of the surveyed systems is suitable for NASA-
Langley, mostly because the designs have not been carried to the necessary 
detail such that the fault-tolerant procedures could be evaluated. The one 
notable exception is the STAR, in which all fault-tolerant procedures have 
been specified, and in some cases implemented. It is clear that the STAR 
can tolerate any single fault that disables one of the independent units that 
comprise the system. This fault tolerance is achieved with a relatively low 
cost and less than 100 percent redundancy, assuming sufficient spares for 
single fault tolerance. Transient faults that have the same effect can also 
be tolerated. However, the following deficiencies of STAR have induced us to 
pursue the three aforementioned candidates. 
• STAR is not readily expandable/contractible to accommodate 
large variations (say, an order of magnitude) in computational 
load. 
© STAR was not designed with an LSI environment in mind. It 
contains more module types than need be, and the arithmetic 
codes may not be useful for the massive failures expected 
of an LSI implemented arithmetic unit. 
•R'JC
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The design does not take advantage of the independence of the 
computations. That is, the aircraft environment almost implies 
that the fault tolerance' and graceful degradation should be 
carried out by a multiprocessor. 
The three candidate designs, in addition to STAR, can be contrasted 
in their mechanisms for carrying out the various fault tolerant procedures. 
Table VIIJ.l indicates the comparisons for these four systems. In the 
table we have included the following functions: 
Fault detection The detection of error conditions in memories, 
buses and processing units. 
Fault masking Theremoval of errors, within a particular unit, for 
example by error-correcting codes within a memory so 
that they are not aparent to other units. 
Fault correction The procedures that are used to initiate a recovery 
procedure after an error has occurred. 
Roll-back	 The ability to re-run part-of a program either for 
error detection or correction purposes (sometimes 
called "check .point/réstart'). 
Fault location	 The ability to determinethe'unit that is faulty, 
when an error occurs. 
Reconfiguration The ability to change the units that are used for 
a calculation. 
Periodic' diagnosis The flexing at various system blocks or function, 
in background, to determine if any permanent failures 
are present.  
The' following abbre.'iations are used 
H .'.. hardware
 
M ... microcode  
S ... system' routine 
E ... executive  
A ... application program. 
Multiple entries in Table viii. 1 indicate that design options still exist. 
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JPL STAR HOPKINS BUS-CHECKER SIFT 
Fault detection H H H,	 S, H,M,S 
Fault.masking H1 H4 H' (2) 
Fault correction 11(1) H S M'S 
Roll-back H H S S,E 
Fault location H H S E 
Reconfiguration H E .	 E E 
Periodic Diagnosis E E5 E6 S,E7
Table VIII.l	 Comparison of Fault-Tolerant Procedures 
(l) Within the TARP (Test and Repair Processor). 
(2) Within SIFT the memory could use hardware fault masking.; 
otherwise no fault masking is required. 
(3) Assuming that the bus checker units are implementing system 
functions. 
(4) By voting on the buses and possibly by coding within, the memory. 
(5) Of the hardware voters. 
(6) Of the memory system. 
(7) Of the software voters and reconfiguration programs. 
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Table VIII. 2 compares the three candidates according to the check-
list categories of Chapter V. Table VIII.3 compares the candidates in 
terms of perfOrmance.
SIFT HS BUCS 
COMPUTATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
MULTIPROGRAMMING Yes No "Yes" 
TECHNOLOGY 
•	 NUMBER OF CHIP TYPES Low Medium Medium 
o	 SPECIAL FAULT. •ISOLJTION 
HARDWARE NEEDED Low Moderate
-	 High 
REDUNDANCY	 . High High Low 
RELIABILITY MODELING 
o	 CREDIBILITY OF MODEL Very High High Moderate 
EXPANDABILITY Very High Low Moderate 
PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT EFFORT Low High	 . Moderate 
Table .
 VIII.	 2	 Candidate Comparisons by Checklist Categories 
SIFT . HS
.BUCS 
TIME TO DETECT MOST
	 100 Psec - 10 msec 2sec 2 .Lsec - lOmsec 
FAILURES	 - 
ERROR CORRECTION TIME
	
. 0	 . < 1 msec 5 msec 
REcOVERYTIME
	
-	 >.lOmsec . 2 rnsec	 . 10-msec 
BUS DATA. RATE
	
200 kb 20 mb 2 mb 
REDUNDANCY.	 > 3	 . .. > 3 > 1.5 
rTableVIII.3
	 Performance Comparison of Candidates
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We conclude that a fault tolerant computer can be built for commercial 
aircraft at this time. A number of factors have led to this conclusion; 
Component costs continue to drop to the point where the 
hardware costs of a triplicated (quadruplicated, etc.) 
computer system are an insignificant fraction of the total 
aircraft cost (less than 1 percent). 
0 The aircraft computations do not exert a large computational 
load, relative to the capacity of contemporary computers. 
o An understanding has been acquired of the fault tolerant 
procedures to the point where almost any desired reliability 
can be convincingly demonstrated. Included herein is a 
tolerance to permanent faults that disable a chip, and to 
transient faults, that do not completely destroy critical 
memory functions. 
Of the three candidate-architectures investigated we recommend that 
SIFT be pursued for future development. This recommendation is made 
recognizing that all of the architectures exhibit sufficient reliability 
and fault tolerance, and SIFT incurs the largest cost in terms of compo-
nent ccunt. The primary reasons for selecting SIFT over the others are: 
0 it should incur the lowest development costs and perhaps 
- development costs are more crucial than ultimate component 
costs. 
° It accommodates varying reliability requirements among 
computations.	 -	 - 
The redundancy can be reduced by utilizing a central memory 
that is protected by coding techniques. 
C. It is easy to modify since the fault tolerance is implemented 
in software or microcode.. 
The concept can be adequately demonstrated with off-the-
shelf processors and memories; only the bus must be 
specially designed. 
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Although the concept requires software , for error detection, 
etc., it does not require special software for enforcing 
protection disciplines. Such protection is inherent in the 
design.. . . .	 . 
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Appenuix P.
ALLOCATION AND SCHEDULING SYSTEM ROUTINE 
These two functions are desôribed in terms of the data structures 
used, and the way in which they are manipulated; 
The major. data structures are shown in Figure A-i. The six vectors 
T, DT, MT, CT, CI, MR contain, for each task., the data required to calculate 
the task matrix. The information contained is: 
	
T	 The 'iteration period for the task 
	
DT:	 The permissible, variation of T, i.e., a task will normally be 
carried out between T : - DT andT + DT after the previous 
iteration 
	
MT:	 The 'Miss Time' which is the maximum time that can be tol-
eratedwithout the task being carried out. 
	
CT:	 The computer time required to carry out one iteration of 
the task. 
	
CI:	 The current iteration being computed for the task 
	
MR:	 The memory requirement for the task. 
The flight phase 'matrix contains the priority number for each task 
for different flight phases. In our application, approximately ten flight 
phases are assumed. These will include normal phases such as takeoff, 
climb, cruise, etc., and also potential abnormal phases (e.g., when an 
engine is inoperative). A priority of 0 indicates that a particular task 
is not carried out during this phase. It is assumed that' transitions from 
one phase to another is initiated by aircrew action.' 
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PROCESSORS
TASKS QUEUES 
r
-'\ CHANGE TA	 T	 T B	 C T' M FLAG 
T TA 0 0 
TC 0 • 
P3 x x TA 0 1 
P4 T0 0 0 
TASK MATRIX I	 • 1 QUEUE MATRIX
 
PNLE
.11 I	 • I	 .1 JH
T 
DT 
MT 
	
CT	 TASK PARAMETER MATRIX 
	
CI	 • 
MR
TT TM 
	
F1	 1	 4	 2	 2 
	
FLIGI1tF2
	 1	 • 0	 2	 2	 •	 • • 
PHASES	 • 
FLIGHT PHASE MATRIX 
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FIGURE A-i ALLOCATION AND SCHEDULING DATA STRUCTURES 
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The vectors TT and TM hold, respectively, the total computer time 
required' and the total memory required for each phase of the , flight. 
The queue matrix represents the output of the scheduling task within 
the executive. For each processor a queue is maintained as to which tasks 	 V 
are to be computed next. It is assumed that each processor will examine 
the queue and store a local copy from time to time, thereby reducing the 
number of accesses required to be made into the queue matrix. If the 
scheduler has to change a queue, a bit is set in the change flag vector 
indicating that the processors' local copy of the queue must be discarded 
and a change made. This will normally occur when the flight phase changes., 
and also in the event of reconfiguration following a fault condition. It 
is expected that the vectors within the queue matrix will be maintained 
as circular buffers, thereby preventing any requirement to change the numbers 
except to place new items on the queue (change a 0 to the task number) or to 
remove tasks that have been completed (change a task number to a 0). 
In addition to the data structures described above, the allocation task' 
will store a note as to which flight phase is current, and also it will keep 
a note of the resources currently. available, normally those processors, busses 
and memory modules that are operative. 
The allocation function consists of deciding which tasks are computed 
in each processor. Two possible algorithms are described -- the first 
algorithm attempts to find a solution, the second algorithm adjusts the 
result of the first to remove cases where necessary constraints have been 
disobeyed. 
The allocation, problem can be stated as follows: 
Let P be the number of processing modules having the same computing 
power' and associated memory capacity. Let N be the number of'tàsks. 
for the j th task (j
 
c = fraction of-computing power required 
= fraction of memory capacity required 
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(3). 
(4) 
7A m 
J . i i 3 - 
c
•jJjjl
(Memory constraint) 
(Computing constraint)
r = replication required for the task 
3 
Determine an allocatioz matrix A 1 : i = 1,...,P; j = 
where
A	 = 
ii	
0 or 1	 (No fractional allocation) 	 (1) 
(Correct replication)	 (2) 
Note that we are only concerned with finding an allocation matrix 
and not with any defined optimum. It may be desirable to define an optimum 
solution as one which leaves all spare capacity (both computing and memory) 
uniformly distributed among processors; however, a contrary case can be made 
to leave spare capacity concentrated in one processor in order to aid the 
reconfiguration and re-allocation in the event of a processor failure. The 
algorithms below were not. intended to find such an optimum, however defined. 
Replication of tasks can be. both active and passive. By active, we 
mean that the tasks will run in those processors. By passive, we mean that 
sufficient capacity is available to allow them to run in the event of failure 
of one of the active allocated processors. Passive allocation would only be 
used for those tasks where the task must be carried out in a time interval 
that is too small to allow loading it to a new processor upon reconfiguration. 
Algorithm 1 
The general scheme of the algorithm is to allocate tasks one by one 
starting with that task which has the greatest demand upon a resource (i.e. 
maximum c or m) and progressing down to the last task which has the 
easiest constraint. The allocation is made to those processors-that have 
the maximum available of the most demanded resource. Ties are decided 
arbitrarily, in our example, by allocating to the lowest numbered processor. 
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In the event that m = C., the tie is broken by deciding on the basis of the 
resource which is most critical (memory in our example). The algorithm is 
shown in flow-chart form in Figure A-2. 
Algorithm 2 
Algorithm 2 is applied after algorithm 1 and is applied repetitively 
(including possibly zero times) until constraints 3 and 4 are satisfied. The 
algorithm consists of finding that constraint 3 or 4 which is disobeyed to 
the greatest extent, and moving a task to that processor which has the maximum 
available of that resource. The movement is subject to the constraint that a 
single task may not exist twice in the same processor (i.e.; A
	
or 1). 
The task that is moved Is that which most tends to equalize the constraints. 
A more sophisticated version of the algorithm Is to re-allocate (using algo-
rithm 1) all the tasks previously allocated to the two processors. 
Example 
Table A-1 shows the values of r,,	 and c for a real example. 
Table A-2 shows the application of algorithms 1 for this example. As 
can be seen, algorithm 2 does need to be applied as all constraints are 
satisfied. To illustrate the use of algorithm 2 consider the artificial, 
example set of 3 tasks, with P = 2. 
Task m c r,, 
1 .1 1 
2 .1 .8 1 
3 .7 .7 1
The result of algorithm 1 will yield an allocation matrix 
Tasks 
	
[1	 0	 1 
Processors I
	
[0	 1	 0 
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INITIALIZE 
FIND MAXIMUM
c1m1=c,m 
FIND MAXIMUM 
C, m 
FIND MINIMUM
C 1 , M1 
ALLOCATE TASK J

TO MODULE i 
•	 REMOVE TASK 
I	 I	 FROM LIST 
No • DONE 
c.	 Computing Requirement Yes for Task j 
m = Memory Requirement 
for Task j ALL M	 Yes 
C. = Computing Load Already Cl	 1	 Exit 
Allocated to Module i 
= Memory -Load Already, 
•	 Allocated to Module i No 
• Algorithm 2
•	 SA-1406-22 
FIGURE A-2
	 ALLOCATION ALGORITHM 1
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Table A-i 
Example Data For. Allocation Function 
Task No. m c r 
1 .02, .04 3 
'2 .02 .33 4 
3 .10 .12 4 
. 4 . .03 .02 3 
5 .23 .14 .4 
6 .03 .01 .	 3 
7 .43 .25 3 
8 ' .12 .09 3 
9 .20 .06 3 
10 .10 .01 3.. 
11	 ' .10 .01 '	 3 
12	 ' .12 .12 4 
13 .15 .01 3 
14 .10 .20 '4
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Table A-2 
Application of Algorithm 1 for Data in Table 1 and P = 6 
PROCESSORS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Task just allocated Em Ec Em Ec Em Ec I Em Ec Em Ec I Em Ec 
7 43 25 43 25 43 25 
2 45 58 2 33 2 33 2 33 
5 66 39 25 47 25 47 25 47 
9 45 53 45 53 45 53 
14 76 59 53 45 55 73 55 73 
13 60 59 68 46 60 54 
3 70 71 86 71 78 58 70 66 
8 82 80 67 82 67 82 
12 90 70 79 94 79 94 82 78 
10 92 81 89 95 89 95 
11 96 72 99 96 92 79 
1 98 76 92 74 94 83 
4 95 83 95 76 92 97 
6 98 84
= =
95 98 
-
97 
-
84 
Totals F98
= 
84
= 
98
= 
76 195 76 11 99 96 95 98 97 84
*Capacity is expressed as a percentage, unchanged values not entered. 
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with
:A 1 m. = 1.5 ,
	 A2 m . = .1 
A 1 c .
 =	 .8	 A2c. = .8 
Algorithm 2 calls for movement of a task from processor 1 to processor 2, 
based upon balancing the systems' as far as possible. 
The changed matrix would become 
[i 
This allocation matrix satisfies the constraints 
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Appendix B 
COMPARISON OF THE SIFT SYSTEM AND A MULTI-CHANNEL SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
In this appendix we compare the SIFT architecture with the multi-
channel concept. The multi-channel concept uses n independent computers, 
each capable of performing all tasks, and 'a highly reliable voter at the 
output to compare all data before it is transmitted to an effector. 
Variation on both the SIFT and the multi-channel concept are discussed. 
In all cases we assume a chip failure probability of 106 per hour. 
We use the notation that P[event] = probability of the event occurring per 
hour. 
REQUIREMENTS
* 
We distinguish between tasks of most criticality (MC) where error 
probabilities should be.be .low 10-8 per hour and those less critical (LC) 
tasks where errors should be beloe 10	 per hour (approximately). We also 
distinguish those tasks required for automatic 'blind' landing and other 
tasks. The landing phase is the most demanding in terms of computing load. 
Based on the entries of Tables 2 and 3 of Volume II, we summarize in 
Table B-1 a representative set of requirements, where M = memory require-
ments in K words and P = processor requirements in MIPs. 
Table B-1 
Computation and Memory Requirements 
Landing	 Other 
M.C. P=	 .29 P=	 .09 
M= 8.7 M= 2.2 
p =	 .9 P=	 .05 
L.C. M = 6.8 M = .5.5
*	 . 
In this analysis, we do not distinguish between erroneous outputs to 
actuatórs.and null outputs. A more comprehensive analysis would need 
to make this distinction.
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Note that no allowance has yet been made for an executive to. carry out 
such functions as multiprogramming, voting, etc. 
We assume that words contain, on the average, 24 information bits. We 
further assume that a memory chip contains 4K bits, and that it requires 30 
chips/MIP to realize the CPU. 
Case 1 Multi-channel 
We assume 10 percent extra memory and processor requirement to handle 
the multiprogramming and other executive requirements (interrupt handling, 
etc.). The multi-channel concept requires enough memory in each channel to 
hold all tasks (= 23.2K + 10 percent	 26K), and the CPU must handle the 
heaviest task load (= .38 + 10 percent	 .42 MIPs). Therefore for each 
channel we have
26K words = 156 chips	
}
	
170 chips 
0.42 MIPs	 13 chips 
Assume that the chips in the voter (sufficiently replicated for reli-
ability) are negligible and considerthe probability of error for 3, 4.and 
5 channel configurations.. The results are displayed in Table B.2. 
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Table B-2 
Reliability Estimates for Multi-channel System 
3 Channel 
Total chips	 = 540 
P{l fault]	 = .51 X 10 ,... voting masks error, discard faulty 
channel 
P[2 faults]	 = .17 X 1016, ... system failure 
4 Channel 
Total chips 
P[l fault.] 
P[2 faults] 
P[3 faults] 
5 Channel 
Total chips 
P[l fault] 
P[2 faults] 
P[3 faults] 
P[4 faults]
=680 
= .68 X 10, ... voter removes faulty channel 
= .34 X 10 
6,	
voter masks second fault, discard faulty 
channel 
= 1.2 X - 10-10 ,... system failure 
=850 
= .85 X 10, ... voter removes faulty channel 
= .58 x	 ... voter removes faulty channel 
= .3 X 10, ... voter masks fault, discard faulty channel 
-13	 . 
= 1 X 10	 ,... system failure 
Case 2 SIFT With Fault Tolerance Achieved by Uniform Replication 
For this case, the strategy is to triplicate all tasks, and when faults 
occur to reduce the LC tasks to duplicate, then single processors, finally 
removing them entirely in the event that resources are drastically reduced. 
We assume 20 percent overhead for executive plus voting routines. 
The memory and processor requirements are as in TableB-3. The re-
liability results are displayed in Tables B-4, B-5 and B-6, for a SIFT sys-
tem decomposed into 4, 6 and 10 modules, respectively. 
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Table B-3 
SIFT Processor and Memory Requirements 
Landing	 Other 
. P=	 .35 P=	 .11 
M. C.
M = 10.4 M = 2.6 
P=	 .11 P=	 .06. 
L. C.
M=	 8.2 M= 6.6.
Total memory requirement = 27.8 j 28K 
Maximum CPU requirment = .46 MIPs 
Table B4 
Reliability Estimates for a 4-Module SIFT 
Each memory = (28 X 3)/4 = 21K = 126 chips
	
136 chips 
Each CPU
	 = (0.46 X 3)/4 = 0.35
	 10 chips J 
Total chips = 544 
We denote MC during landing as MCtL etc. 
P[l fault] =.54X 10 3 ,M = 63K, P = 1.05 
During Landing: Remove.LC, MC survive 
During Other: MC survive, all LC to SIMPLEX, future removal LC/L 
P[2 faults] .= .22 x 10 6 , M = 42K, P = 0.70 
During Landing: MCA only survive in DUPLEX 
During Other: All MC to DUPLEX in memory, all LC to SIMPLEX, future re-
moval of LC/L 
P3 faults] .= .6 X 10 10 System Failure 
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Table B-5 
Reliability Estimates for a 6-Module SIFT 
Each memory = (28 x 3)/6
.
= 14K = 84 chips	 91 chips 
Each CPU	 = (0.46 X 3)16 = 0.23 1 7 chips J 
Total chips = 546 
P[l fault] = .55 X 10, M = 70K, P = 1.15 
During Landing(1)Fault masked, LC to SIMPLEX 
During Other: Fault masked, future LC/L to SIMPLEX 
P[2 faults] = .25 X 10 6 , M = 56K, P = 0,92 
During Landing: Fault masked, MC, LC to DUPLEX 
During Other: LC failure, MC fault masked 
P[3 faults] = .91 X 10-10 M = 42K, P = 0.69 
During Landing: System failure 
During Other: LCfailure, MC fault masked 
P[4 faults] = .16 X 10 14 
All: System failure 
(1) Assumes slight increase of CPU to .24 MIPs 
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Table B-6 
Reliability Estimates for a 10-Module SIFT 
Each memory	 = (28 X 3)/10 = 8.4K = 51 chips
}	
55 chips 
Each CPU
	 = (0.46 X 3)/10
	 0.14	 chips 
Total chips
	 = 550 chips 
P[l fault] =
	 .55X l0, .M = 75.6,	 P = 1.26 
During Landing: Fault'masked, LC to DUPLEX 
During Other: Fault masked, LC/0 to DUPLEX, Future LC/L to DUPLEX 
P[2 faults] =	 .27 x 10_ 6 , M = 67.2, P = 1.12 
During Landing: MC fault masked, LC failed 
During Other: Fault masked, Future LC/L fail 
P[3 faults] =
	 .19 X 10 9 , M = 48.8,	 P = O98 
During Landing: MC fault masked, MC/L to DUPLEX 
During Other: Fault masked, Future LC/L fail 
P[4 faults] =
	 .73 X lO s , M = 40.4,	 P = .84 
During Landing: Possibility of system failure 
During Other: Possibility of LC failure, future MC/L in DUPLEX
Case 3 . SIFT .with Coding, in Memory 
The majority of chips for SIFT in Case 2 are used in the memory. 
We can add protection by using an error detecting/correcting code. The 
analysis displayed in Tables B-7 and B-8 is for a single. error correcting, 
double error detecting code with an' assumption of 25 percent increase in 
memory cost. A module failure requires failure of one chip in the CPU or 
two chips in the memory. The reconfiguration strategy is as shown in 
Figure B-1, for most-critical tasks. Low criticality tasks are run in 
SIMPLEX mode.
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Reliability Estimates for a 3-Module SIFT With Coding in Memory 
Memory per module = (13 X 2 + 15)/3 + 25 per cent 17K = 102 chips 
CPU per module	 = (.35 X 2 + Al)/3 = .27 = 8 chips	 J 110 
Total chips = 330 chips 
P[C1J fault] = ' .8 X 10 5/per module 
P [ single memory fault] = 104 
P[double memory fault] = 10 
P[LC task failure] = .8 X 10 
P[reconfiguration for MC] = .3 tX 103 
	
P[ second module failure (undiagnosable)J = 3 X 10 4 X .8 X 10	 = 2.4 X lOs, 
system failure 
RUN TASK 
IN DUPLEX 
DOUBLE	 SINGLE 
MEMORY	 MEMORY FAULT	 CPU FAULT 
FAULT	 (MASKED) 
REPEAT TASK
TO GOOD	 4	 CPU FAULTY IN NEW 
	
_j-J RECONFIGURE	 DIAGNOSE WHICH I	 	 I MODULE	 MODULE	 BY REPEATING I I IN ANOTHER 
[	 MODULE	 I 
SA-1 406-25 
FIGURE B-i SIFT WITH CODING, RECONFIGURATION STRATEGY 
FOR MOST CRITICAL TASKS 
*
CPU fault is any disagreement between the cooperating pair of modules, 
without indication of memory fault. It therefore includes the case 
of multiple non-correctable or-detectable faults in the memory of the 
module, which is far less probable than a CPU fault. 
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Table B-8 
Reliability EstinI.tes for 4- and 6-Module SIFT 
With Coding in Memory' 
4 Module 
Memory per module = (13 x 2 + 15)/4 + 257o 13K = 78 chips
	
84 chips 
CPU per module
	 = (.35 X 2 + .11)/4
	 .2 = 6 chips
	 5 
Total chips
	 = 332 
P[CPU fault] = .6 X 10 5/per module 
P[single memory fault] = .8 X 10 -4
 
P[double memory fault] = .6 x 10-8 
P [ LC task failure] = .6 X 10 
P [ reconfigurationj = .3 X 10 
P[second module fail] = •.8 X 10 
P[MC task fail] = 1.3 X 10 
16 Module 
Total chips = 348 
P[LC fail) = .4 X 10 
PMC fail] = 2 X 10 
Note that in the SIFT architecture, either with or without coding the 
occurrence of faults reduces the available CPU power preventing the MC/L 
tasks from being carried out. The CPU is only approximately 8 percent of 
the total. If the CPU were, to be designed with double the capacity (in 
MIPs) the cost would rise by 8 percent but the probability of system failure 
would, for some systems, be improved immensely. The results for the different 
configurations are displayed in Table B-9 and in 'Figure B-2.
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Table B-9 
Summary of Size and Reliability of Alternative Architectures 
System No	 of Chips P[LC fail] P[MC fail] 
REQUIREMENTS 0.(10) 108 
SIMPLEX 170 2 X 104 
MULTI-CHANNEL 
3	 MODULE 510 1.7 X 
4	 U 680 1.2 X 1010 
5	 " 850 1.0 X 1013. 
SIFT - 
4	 MODULE 544 5.4 X 10 4 6 x 
3	 H 546 2.5 X10. 6 9 x 10_li 
10 550 2.7 X 10 7 7.3 X 10 
SIFT + CODING 
3	 MODULE 330 8 X 16- 6 2.4 X 10 
4	 " 332 6 X 10- 6 1.3 X 10- 11 
6	 " 348 4 X 10 6 2 X ioll 
SIFT (DOUBLE CPU MIPi) 
4	 MODULE 584 2 X 107 (10- 14 
6	 " 588 10 (iO) -18 
10	 " 590 - 
SIFT+ CODING + 
DOUBLE CPU MiPs 
3	 MODULE 354 1.6 X 10 9 X 109 
U 356 1,2 x 10 (lO0 
6 372 8 X 106. :	 (10)
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